University of Macau / Faculty of Science and Technology. / Department of Computer and Information Science

This research sought to shed light on information systems security (ISS) by conceptualizing an organization's use of countermeasures using general deterrence theory, positing a non-recursive relationship between threats and countermeasures, and by extending the ISS construct developed in prior research. Industry affiliation and organizational size are considered in terms of differences in threats that firms face, the different countermeasures in use by various firms, and ultimately, how a firm's ISS effectiveness is affected. Six information systems professionals were interviewed in order to develop the appropriate instruments necessary to assess the research model put forth; the final instrument was further refined by pilot testing with the intent of further clarifying the wording and layout of the instrument. Finally, the Association of Information Technology Professionals was surveyed using an online survey. The model was assessed using SmartPLS and a two-stage least squares analysis. Results indicate that a non-recursive relationship does indeed exist between threats and countermeasures and that countermeasures can be used to effectively frame an organization's use of countermeasures. Implications for practitioners include the ability to target the use of certain countermeasures to have desired effects on both ISS effectiveness and future threats. Additionally, the model put forth in this research can be used by practitioners to both assess their current ISS effectiveness as well as to prescriptively target desired levels of ISS effectiveness.

Thesis. 1977. M.C.P.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Urban Studies and Planning. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Bibliography : leaves 108-109. / M.C.P.

Web-based applications and services are increasingly being used in security-sensitive tasks. Current security protocols rely on two crucial assumptions to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information: First, they assume that end-point software used to handle security-sensitive information is free from vulnerabilities. Secondly, these protocols assume point-to-point communication between a client and a service provider. However, these assumptions do not hold true with large and complex vulnerable end point software such as the Internet browser or web services middleware or in web service compositions where there can be multiple value-adding service providers interposed between a client and the original service provider. To address the problem of large and complex end-point software, we present the AppCore approach which uses manual analysis of information flow, as opposed to purely automated approaches, to split existing software into two parts: a simplified trusted part that handles security-sensitive information and a legacy, untrusted part that handles non-sensitive information without access to sensitive information. Not only does this approach avoid many common and well-known vulnerabilities in the legacy software that compromised sensitive information, it also greatly reduces the size and complexity of the trusted code, thereby making exhaustive testing or formal analysis more feasible. We demonstrate the feasibility of the AppCore approach by constructing AppCores for two real-world applications: a client-side AppCore for https-based applications and an AppCore for web service platforms. Our evaluation shows that security improvements and complexity reductions (over a factor of five) can be attained with minimal modifications to existing software (a few tens of lines of code, and proxy settings of a browser) and an acceptable performance overhead (a few percent). To protect the communication of sensitive information between the clients and service providers in web service compositions, we present an end-to-end security framework called WS-FESec that provides end-to-end security properties even in the presence of misbehaving intermediate services. We show that WS-FESec is flexible enough to support the lattice model of secure information flow and it guarantees precise security properties for each component service at a modest cost of a few milliseconds per signature or encrypted field.

Conventional wisdom suggests that in order to build a secure system, security must be an integral component in the system design. However, cost considerations drive most system designers to channel their efforts on the system's performance, scalability and usability. With little or no emphasis on security, such systems are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks that can potentially compromise confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive data. It is often cumbersome to redesign and implement massive systems with security as one of the primary design goals. This thesis advocates a proactive approach that cleanly retrofits security solutions into existing system architectures. The first step in this approach is to identify security threats, vulnerabilities and potential attacks on a system or an application. The second step is to develop security tools in the form of customizable and configurable plug-ins that address these security issues and minimally modify existing system code, while preserving its performance and scalability metrics. This thesis uses overlay network applications to shepherd through and address challenges involved in supporting security in large scale distributed systems. In particular, the focus is on two popular applications: publish/subscribe networks and VoIP networks. Our work on VoIP networks has for the first time identified and formalized caller identification attacks on VoIP networks. We have identified two attacks: a triangulation based timing attack on the VoIP network's route set up protocol and a flow analysis attack on the VoIP network's voice session protocol. These attacks allow an external observer (adversary) to uniquely (nearly) identify the true caller (and receiver) with high probability. Our work on the publish/subscribe networks has resulted in the development of an unified framework for handling event confidentiality, integrity, access control and DoS attacks, while incurring small overhead on the system. We have proposed a key isomorphism paradigm to preserve the confidentiality of events on publish/subscribe networks while permitting scalable content-based matching and routing. Our work on overlay network security has resulted in a novel information hiding technique on overlay networks. Our solution represents the first attempt to transparently hide the location of data items on an overlay network.

The aviation industry is undeniably playing a very significant role in our day-to-day life. A vast and inter-connected web of flights ensures swift passenger travel and cargo traffic. However, in the name of security, otherwise intrinsic technicalities tend now not only to hinder on further development of aviation facilitation but also take over and lead towards the exact opposite result. What are the current measures taken by the international community to streamline passenger travel? What are the new initiatives which ought to be implemented? How is the future of aviation facilitation going to look like? How is it going to affect air travel and what legal implications is it rising? Throughout this thesis we will present the legal framework applicable to aviation facilitation and discuss the main initiatives that are being considered by ICAO and IATA in this respect. While Facilitation and Security should be considered as "two faces of the same coin", in reality they appear to "compete" against each other. Hence, we will provide our arguments in support of this theory.

To perform their business activities effectively, organizations rely heavily on the use of information (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1996, p 1). Owens (1998) reiterates this by claiming that all organizations depend on information for their everyday operation and without it business will fail to operate (Owens, 1998, p 1-2). For an organization it means that if the right information is not available at the right time, it can make the difference between profit and loss or success and failure (Royds, 2000, p 2). Information is an asset and just like other important business assets within the organization, it has extreme value to an organization (BS 7799-1, 1999, p 1; Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 8). For this reason it has become very important that business information is sufficiently protected. There are many different ways in which information can exist. Information can be printed or written on paper, stored electronically, transmitted electronically or by post, even spoken in conversation or any other way in which knowledge and ideas can be conveyed (URN 99/703, 1999, p. 2; Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 8; URN 96/702, 1996, p 3).It is, therefore, critical to protect information, and to ensure that the security of IT (Information Technology) systems within organizations is properly managed. This requirement to protect information is even more important today, since many organizations are internally and externally connected by networks of IT systems (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1996, p 1). Information security is therefore required to assist in the process of controlling and securing of information from accidental or malicious changes, deletions or unauthorized disclosure (Royds, 2000, p 2; URN 96/702, 1996, p 3). By preventing and minimizing the impact of security incidents, information security can ensure business continuity and reduce business damage (Owens, 1998, p 7). Information security in an organization can be regarded as a management opportunity and should become an integral part of the whole management activity of the organization. Obtaining commitment from management is therefore extremely important for effective information security. One way in which management can show their commitment to ensuring information security, is to adopt and enforce a security policy. A security policy ensures that people understand exactly what important role they play in securing information assets.

In recent years higher education institutions have come under increasing financial pressure. This has not only prompted universities to investigate more cost effective means of delivering course content and maintaining research output, but also to investigate the administrative functions that accompany them. As such, many South African universities have either adopted or are in the process of adopting some form of cloud computing given the recent drop in bandwidth costs. However, this adoption process has raised concerns about the security of cloud-based information and this has, in some cases, had a negative impact on the adoption process. In an effort to study these concerns many researchers have employed a positivist approach with little, if any, focus on the operational context of these universities. Moreover, there has been very little research, specifically within the South African context. This study addresses some of these concerns by investigating the threats and security incident response life cycle within a higher education cloud. This was done by initially conducting a small scale survey and a detailed thematic analysis of twelve interviews from three South African universities. The identified themes and their corresponding analyses and interpretation contribute on both a practical and theoretical level with the practical contributions relating to a set of security driven criteria for selecting cloud providers as well as recommendations for universities who have or are in the process of adopting cloud computing. Theoretically several conceptual frameworks are offered allowing the researcher to convey his understanding of how the aforementioned practical concepts relate to each other as well as the concepts that constitute the research questions of this study.

Critical Infrastructure is often overlooked from an Information Security perspective as being of high importance to protect which may result in Critical Infrastructure being at risk to Cyber related attacks with potential dire consequences. Furthermore, what is considered Critical Infrastructure is often a complex discussion, with varying opinions across audiences. Traditional Critical Infrastructure included power stations, water, sewage pump stations, gas pipe lines, power grids and a new entrant, the “internet of things”. This list is not complete and a constant challenge exists in identifying Critical Infrastructure and its interdependencies. The purpose of this research is to highlight the importance of protecting Critical Infrastructure as well as proposing a high level framework aiding in the identification and securing of Critical Infrastructure. To achieve this, key case studies involving Cyber crime and Cyber warfare, as well as the identification of attack vectors and impact on against Critical Infrastructure (as applicable to Critical Infrastructure where possible), were identified and discussed. Furthermore industry related material was researched as to identify key controls that would aid in protecting Critical Infrastructure. The identification of initiatives that countries were pursuing, that would aid in the protection of Critical Infrastructure, were identified and discussed. Research was conducted into the various standards, frameworks and methodologies available to aid in the identification, remediation and ultimately the protection of Critical Infrastructure. A key output of the research was the development of a hybrid approach to identifying Critical Infrastructure, associated vulnerabilities and an approach for remediation with specific metrics (based on the research performed). The conclusion based on the research is that there is often a need and a requirement to identify and protect Critical Infrastructure however this is usually initiated or driven by non-owners of Critical Infrastructure (Governments, governing bodies, standards bodies and security consultants). Furthermore where there are active initiative by owners very often the suggested approaches are very high level in nature with little direct guidance available for very immature environments.

This dissertation addresses the problem of a lack of a formal incident response capability in the South African National Research and Education Network (SA NREN). While investigating alternatives it was found that no clear method exists to solve this problem. Therefore, a second problem is identified: the lack of a definitive method for establishing a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) or Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) in general. Solving the second problem is important as we then have a means of knowing how to start when building a CSIRT. This will set the basis for addressing the initial problem, resulting in a prepared, improved and coordinated response to IT security incidents affecting the SANREN. To commence, the requirements for establishing a CSIRT are identified via a comprehensive literature review. These requirements are categorized into five areas, namely, the basic business requirements followed by the four Ps of the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL). That is, People, Processes, Product and Partners, adapted to suit the CSIRT context. Through the use of argumentation, the relationships between the areas are uncovered and explored. Thereafter, a Design Science Research-based process is utilised to develop a generic model for establishing a CSIRT. The model is based on the interactions uncovered between the business requirements and the adapted four Ps. These are summarised through two views -- strategic and tactical -- together forming an holistic model for establishing a CSIRT. The model highlights the decisions required for the business requirements, services, team model and staff, policies and processes, tools and technologies, and partners of a CSIRT respectively. Finally, to address the primary objective, the generic model is applied to the SANREN environment. Thus, the second artefact is an instantiation, a specific model, which can be implemented to create a CSIRT for the SA NREN. To produce the specific model, insight into the nature of the SANREN environment was required. The status quo was revealed through the use of a survey and argumentative analysis of the results. The specific decisions in each area required to establish an SA NREN CSIRT are explored throughout the development of the model. The result is a comprehensive framework for implementing a CSIRT in the SA NREN, detailing the decisions required in each of the areas. This model additionally acts as a demonstration of the utility of the generic model. The implications of this research are twofold. Firstly, the generic model is useful as a basis for anyone wanting to establish a CSIRT. It helps to ensure that all factors are considered and that no important decisions are neglected, thereby enabling an holistic view. Secondly, the specific model for the SA NREN CSIRT serves as a foundation for implementing the CSIRT going forward. It accelerates the process by addressing the important considerations and highlighting the concerns that must be addressed while establishing the CSIRT.