Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Delaware, 2007. / Principal faculty advisor: Ronet Bachman, Dept. of Sociology & Criminal Justice. Includes bibliographical references.

This present study evaluated the use of conditional discrimination training and a self-control procedure to increase task compliance, task preference and self-control in three participants. All three participants were previously diagnosed with autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Using a multiple baseline design, participants were first exposed to a preference assessment, a naturalistic baseline and a choice baseline. A relational responding task was then introduced, which attempted to alter the functions of contextual cues associated with `more than' and `less than'. A choice baseline was re-administered to support the transformation of functions and the larger, delayed reinforcer was thinned within a second choice baseline. A final preference assessment was completed that showed an increase in preference of a previously least-preferred task. Results of the procedure showed an increase of self-control, task compliance and task preference. Suggestions for future research and limitations of the study are also discussed.

The present study examined the effects of engagement in both low-preferred and high-preferred concurrent activities during self-control training, and determined the activities' differential effects on participants' tolerance to delayed reinforcement. Three children with autism were given a choice between a small immediate reinforcer and a large delayed reinforcer. During baseline, all three participants consistently selected the smaller reinforcer, and the immediate choice. Two training conditions, including a progressive delay to reinforcement with either a preferred or non-preferred concurrent activity, were first alternately and then simultaneously presented. Two of the three participants reversed response allocation from 100% for the sooner smaller reinforcer to over 90% for the larger later reinforcer, and maintained almost exclusive allocation for the preferred activity. All three participants increased delay tolerance by at least 250% of average natural baseline duration.

Graduate

In this thesis I argue that emotion is integral to practical rationality, contrary to the dominant tradition that has held that emotions are irrational and dangerous disruptive influences that we’d be better off without. In Chapter 1 I argue that practical rationality consists in doing what one has most normative reason to do, and in Chapter 2 that an agent is practically rational to the extent that she responds to her reasons; this is how she guides her actions in line with the norm of doing what she has most reason to do. This can be done in ways other than by the employment of practical reasoning. In Chapter 3 I argue for a picture of practical reasoning that stands against the division of emotion and rationality. This account makes room for the overwhelming evidence that challenges the traditional view of emotions as the enemy of practical rationality. Chapter 4 gives a brief overview of the philosophical literature of emotions, and their place in practical rationality. In Chapter 5 I argue that emotions provide us with the necessary access to our reasons for action which we need in order to be able to respond to them, and thereby to be practically rational. Further, as I argue in Chapter 6, emotions play vital roles in the process of practical reasoning itself. Thus practical rationality would not be better off without emotion. In Chapter 7 I argue that we should distinguish between two types of incontinent action (acting against ones all things considered judgement about what one has most reason to do) and that one of these – weakness of will – is necessarily irrational, but the other – akrasia – is not. In Chapter 8 I apply my thesis to the question in the practical domain of what it means to ‘lose self-control’ in the context of killing in response to a provocation, which is a defence to murder. I argue that the ‘control’ that is lost is the regulative guiding control characteristic of the reason-responder. Understanding practical agency as reason-responsiveness, and understanding the role that emotions play within it as per my thesis, enables this coherent understanding. Thus I am arguing for neither a pro-emotion nor anti-emotion view of the role of emotion in practical rationality. Emotions should not be seen as either ‘for’ rationality nor ‘against’ rationality: they are simply part of rationality.

No description available.

Research evidence is suggestive of a strength model of self-control, also known as ego depletion, in social psychological literature. Engaging in an initial task of self-control depletes a limited resource, resulting in less self-control on a subsequent, unrelated task. The strength model of self-control has been applied to many practical, everyday situations, such as eating behaviors among dieters. Newer studies suggest that blood glucose is the resource consumed during acts of self-control. Consuming glucose seems to "replete" individuals who have been depleted, improving performance and self-control. The current study aimed to examine the effects of ego-depletion on restrained eaters. The hypothesis was that restrained eaters who were depleted by a task of self-control would exhibit more disinhibition on a taste-test task than would restrained eaters who were not depleted. However, if the participants were given glucose following the depletion task, then their self-control would be "repleted" and they would exhibit similar control to that of the non-depleted participants. Contrary to expectations there were no differences between the groups in terms of total amount of cookies consumed. These results are inconsistent with a glucose model of self-control. Suggestions for future research and implications of the findings are discussed.

The psychological construct of temptation is understood largely to be the undesirable conflict between short-term urges and long-term ideals. Likewise, the resolution of temptation is thought primarily to be a function of self-control. The common cultural understanding of temptation necessarily involves the notion of evil, including its connotations on a transcendent level. However, the psychological study of temptation largely has excluded religious and spiritual factors, whether examined by social psychology, addiction psychology, or the psychology of religion and spirituality. A more comprehensive conceptualization of temptation is needed to better understand its influence on the human condition. Indeed, temptation necessarily includes not only undesirable, but illicit and transcendent levels of experience. Including the transcendent in the psychological conceptualization and study of temptation would lead to more effective measurement, which would allow a broadened approach to the basic science of temptation and thereby a more inclusive application of temptation in clinical settings. As such, issues related to context and measurement are discussed and a more adequate definition of temptation is proposed. Consequent clinical implications include understanding the valenced expression of temptation and the valenced effect of temptation (on health and prospection). Implications of patients' experiencing transcendent-level temptations are discussed and a case example addressing the dysfunctional effect of transcendent- level temptation in couples therapy is provided.

The most common paradigm for investigating self-control is the choice paradigm . The choice paradigm, also known as delay of gratification, involves having an organism choose between a smaller immediate reinforcer (impulsive choice) or a larger delayed reinforcer (self-controlled choice) (Logue, 1988). The value of the work to improve self-control by increasing the organism's ability to wait for the larger reward has been questioned because of its lack of similarity to real life situations (Cole, Coll & Schoenfeld, 1982) . An alternative self-control paradigm which is based on the organism's refrainment from consumption during the presentation of a reinforcer has been used with rats and pigeons (Cole, et al. 1982; Coll, 1983; Stern, 1986). Lack of refrainment results in no reward instead of a smaller one. The present study used this refrainment procedure with preschool children to teach them to wait for 300 s using a changing criterion design. All Eight participants were able to reach criterion using this procedure. Scores on a generalization task show that this procedure helps to remediate the lowest scores on a measure of impulsivity. It was also demonstrated that the contingencies were responsible for the waiting behavior. Suggestions are made for the way this paradigm can be used to train children in real life situations.