Thesis (M.A.)--York University, 2000. Graduate Programme in Psychology. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-76). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ67724.

Viewing oneself positively has long been regarded as motivating. Past studies (e.g., Bandura, 1982; Feather, 1966; Felson, 1984; Taylor & Brown, 1988) have shown that maintaining positive self-view has positive impacts on motivation. However, the importance of positive self-evaluation has been challenged by some recent studies (e.g., Kim, Chiu, & Zou, 2010; Marx & Roman, 2002). The motivational benefits of positive self-evaluation are inconclusive. The present research addressed this issue by investigating the conditions that may facilitate or undermine the motivational effects of positive or negative self-evaluations. Specifically, two experiments were conducted to investigate the moderating role of culture and regulatory focus on the motivational effects of self-evaluations. Study One investigated the moderating role of culture on the motivational effects of self-evaluation. A 2 (self-evaluation: positive vs. negative) x 2 (cultural groups: Caucasian vs. Chinese) experimental design was adopted. One hundred and eleven participants were recruited, in which 56 were local Chinese college students and 55 were Caucasian students from universities in North America but studied in Hong Kong through exchange programs. The participants were asked to engage in two visual search tests. After the first test, the participants were randomly assigned to the positive or negative self-evaluation condition. Half of the participants were told that they did better than 70% of their fellow students. The other half were told that they did worse than 60% of their fellow students. They were then asked to write down three personal merits or limitations that accounted for their good or bad performances before the second test. Afterwards, the participants were asked to do the second test. Their persistence and performance in this test were measured. The findings showed a consistent interaction effect between culture and self-evaluation on the two outcome measures. The positive self-evaluation was motivating to the Caucasian participants whereas the negative self-evaluation was motivating to the Chinese participants. Study Two investigated if regulatory focus, a personality variable, moderates the motivational effect of self-evaluation. It adopted a 2 (self-evaluation: positive vs. negative) x 2 (regulatory focus: promotion focus vs. prevention focus) experimental design. The participants (93 Hong Kong college students) were asked to engage in three visual search tests. The experimental procedures were the same as those in Study One except that three instead of two visual search tests were included. The first and third tests were those used in Study One. The second test was primed for regulatory focus and was presented with a journal article that advocated either a promotion or prevention focus. Persistence and performance of the participants in the third test was measured. They were also asked to indicate whether they were willing to join a training workshop to improve their visual search ability. The findings showed a pattern parallel to those in Study One. The positive self-evaluation was motivating to participants with promotion focus, whereas the negative self-evaluation was motivating to participants with prevention focus. The two studies showed both within and between cultural differences in the motivational effects of positive and negative self-evaluations. The findings were discussed with reference to the literature on cultural and individual differences in motivation. / published_or_final_version / Psychology / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Depression research demonstrates that self-focused processing, such as rumination, causes and maintains depressive disorders (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Kuhl & Helle, 1986; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987), while emotional processing literature shows beneficial effects to self-focus under some circumstances (Rachman, 1980; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Pennebaker, 1989). Therefore, it seems that self-focus is not inherently detrimental; rather, the way a person self-focuses could differentiate between unhealthy rumination and healthy emotional processing. Rude, Maestas, and Neff (2006) demonstrated that when the wording of a well-known rumination measure was altered to reduce judgment, the measure no longer correlated with depression. Mindfulness approaches that emphasize a non-judgmental acceptance of one's experience have produced beneficial outcomes (Baer, 2003), thus corroborating this finding. This dissertation investigated the role of acceptance in emotional recovery from a distressing event. It was hypothesized that encouraging participants to process emotions in an accepting manner would help them recover from a dysphoric mood more quickly than participants not given acceptance instructions or those given instructions to evaluate and change their emotions. Recovery was defined as return to baseline on measures of heart rate, skin conductance, skin temperature, self-reported positive and negative affect, and rumination (cognitive priming). In addition, the study investigated whether differences in the effects of emotional processing condition would be greatest for participants with low trait acceptance of emotions or high trait rumination. As predicted, Acceptance participants reported less negative affect than Control participants at the end of the study. There were no significant differences on negative affect between Acceptance and Evaluation conditions, however. Hypothesized differences in recovery as measured by heart rate, skin conductance, skin temperature, positive affect, and rumination were not found. As predicted, trait rumination and emotional acceptance interacted with processing condition for negative mood and heart rate: Acceptance and Evaluation conditions reduced negative mood more than the Control group for participants low in trait Emotional Acceptance, and the Acceptance condition reduced heart rate for high ruminators more than the Control group. Interestingly, and contrary to prediction, Acceptance participants showed evidence of greater priming of failure-related words than the other two groups on the reaction time measure. / text

No description available.

No description available.

I contend that all theories of self-deception (SD) which operate on a belief/knowledge account are mistaken and that Fingarette is correct in basing SD on a volition/action account. Fingarette's account, however, is also mistaken in its failure to understand the sometimes crucial role of motive and the always crucial role of acceptance of responsibility. My theory of SD claims that it occurs due to lack of communication between two extremely different sets of structures in the brain. These have evolved for entirely different purposes, and are called the affective and cognitive brains, respectively. This theory demonstrates why the action/volition account is correct. When the cognitive brain judges some idea to be a threat to one of the various self-concepts, the affective brain is alerted to attempt to protect the system of the self by escape of any viable sort. The theory gains strength by its ability to shed light on other psychological phenomena, e.g., false confession and inexplicably docile behavior greatly disadvantageous to those doing it. In addition, my theory undermines all of the so-called paradoxes of SD, partially by showing that the "deception" in SD does not point toward objective truth and a purposeful even if conscious failure to see it, but rather toward the perceived consistency, or lack of it, of one's self-concept. Specifically, drawing on general examples of SD taken from literature, film, and various psychological experiments, I criticize in great detail the accounts of SD given by Fingarette, Rorty, Szabados, and Saunders. In less detail, I criticize the accounts of Freud, Sartre, and Kierkegaard.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.