<p>In the paper different views on the question of world government and world governance are presented. I take the position that only a <em>democratic</em> world government is a desirable political goal, as it is only possible to promote individual autonomy consequently solving global problems. While accepting that there could be different answers to this condition, I analyze three approaches to the subject by Tannajo, Nielsen and Held and argue that shared sovereignty within a world federation defined by a democratic global constitution is a necessary condtion to call a world order a democratic one.</p>

In the paper different views on the question of world government and world governance are presented. I take the position that only a democratic world government is a desirable political goal, as it is only possible to promote individual autonomy consequently solving global problems. While accepting that there could be different answers to this condition, I analyze three approaches to the subject by Tannajo, Nielsen and Held and argue that shared sovereignty within a world federation defined by a democratic global constitution is a necessary condtion to call a world order a democratic one.

Most - if not all - conflicts in international relations have - to an extent - something to do with sovereignty. On the theoretical side, we learn at University that either considered as a strong concept or one that has lost relevance, it is still discussed. On the practical side, the prerogatives a State has over its people and territory appear to be the highest. Within these ideal and real backgrounds, there are various sovereignty disputes around the world that struggle between legal and political limbo, status quo and continuous tension with various negative consequences for all the involved parties (e.g. violation of human rights, war, arms trafficking, only to name a few). It is increasingly clear that the available remedies have been less than successful, and a peaceful and definitive solution is needed. This thesis proposes a fair and just way of dealing with certain sovereignty conflicts. Part One presents the core argument to work out the structure upon which this thesis will be developed. There is a traditional idea that sovereignty must be unshared and unlimited. I argue that in actual fact both in theory and in practice sovereignty is always limited. Thereby, I consider how shared sovereignty is possible—how a State can limit itself and stay sovereign. Chapter One, the Introduction, presents the basic constitutive elements of this thesis. Chapter Two examines if sovereignty can be (in fact, may actually be) limited, and therefore can be shared. To show this I use both criticism of the best known theories of sovereignty and investigation of the historical facts. Part Two explores the minimum elements that must be acknowledged conceptually, legally and realistically in order to give flesh to shared sovereignty and the way it needs to work if we want a peaceful understanding amongst the parties concerned. Chapter Three appraises ‘shared sovereignty’ and similar expressions used in political and legal literature. In order to do that, I show which notions of shared sovereignty are not relevant. Chapter Four examines how a relevant notion can be developed, using the analogy of self-ownership. Chapter Five discusses the main remedies applied at international level in sovereignty issues and why proposed alternatives to shared sovereignty will not solve the problem. Part Three considers how distributive justice theories can be in tune with the concept of sovereignty and explores the possibility of a solution for sovereignty conflicts. I argue that shared sovereignty can be that solution based on Rawlsian principles. Chapter Six introduces and explores a new conception of shared sovereignty. Chapter Seven evaluates what sorts of institutions and arrangements could, and would best, realise shared sovereignty so defined by showing in outline how it might be applied to territory, population, government and law. Chapter Eight brings together the main points of this thesis, and shows possible further implications.

Before 1950, the United States intervened in large scale counterinsurgencies twice as often and intervened almost exactly as long as interventions after 1950. Yet, U.S. supported states developed before 1950 tended to survive an average thirty years after U.S. withdrawal. In contrast, U.S. supported states after 1950 have tended to survive only three years. The central question of this examination is why did U.S. military counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions before 1950 produce host-nation governments and host nation security forces that tended to endure ten times longer than interventions after 1950? My central argument is that when the U.S. military deeply embeds within and inhabits host-nation institutions (institution inhabiting strategies) then, state longevity improves in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. Inversely, when the U.S. military employs strategies of lower embeddedness (institution influencing strategies) then, state longevity decreases in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. I compare cases of intervention in tabula rasa or erased governance in the Philippines 1898-1913 and Iraq 2003-2010. The former employed high degrees of embeddedness in both governance and security development and the latter low degrees in both. I also compare cases of intervention in existing governance in Nicaragua 1912-1933 and Vietnam 1964-1972. The former employed a high degree of embeddedness in host-nation security force development and a low degree in host-nation government development while and the latter employed low degrees in both. My research finds a correlation between degree of embeddedness in developing security and governance and state longevity after withdrawal of U.S. forces. The implications for this study are salient today. Where state fragility has progressed to the point where intervention by conventional military force is required to arrest it, institution influencing strategies like Advise and Assist are insufficient. And while trusteeship forms of relation have been largely dismissed since decolonization, the apparent efficaciousness of neo-trusteeships and shared sovereignty relationships in places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone hold out the promise of more effectual strategies for state building in counterinsurgency interventions. / PHD