The United Nation’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft is correlated with the promotion of universal human rights. Universal human rights are held to apply consistently to everyone everywhere without conceivable exception. There is some debate as to whether universal human rights possibly exist. This debate centers around two difficulties: 1) the task of identifying a single trait or capability that all human beings necessarily share, and 2) the task of relating human rights to this trait or capability. Conventional epistemic justifications defending the existence of universal human rights attempt to address both difficulties. However, they have become the focus of numerous criticisms. By conducting systematizing and critically reviewing text analyses, I will conclude that conventional epistemic justifications are unable to refute standard criticisms satisfactorily. In their place, I will introduce an epistemic justification from the philosophy of mind. I will attempt to demonstrate that this justification is capable of 1) identifying a single trait that all human beings necessarily share, 2) relating human rights to this trait, and 3) satisfactorily refuting the standard criticisms raised against conventional epistemic theories. I have produced this paper in the hope of further legitimizing the UN’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft by providing a more philosophically optimal justification of claims affirming the existence of universal human rights.