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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2002. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 389 p.: ill. (some col.). Includes abstract and vita. Advisors: John Rule and John F. Guilmartin, Jr., Dept. of History. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 136-144). Includes bibliographical references (p. 363-389).

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Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden. / Summary in Catalan and English. Includes bibliographical references (p. 248-252) and index.

The prevailing historical narrative of the collapse of Louis XIV's naval power has emphasised the importance of political decision-making, either in the strategic shifts between the guerre d'escadre and the guerre de course, or in the decision to reduce the naval budget in the midst of war in 1694 and 1707. As France faced massive financial overextension and an increasing need to fight for territorial survival in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), it was inevitable that Louis XIV's government would fund its armies in preference to its naval capabilities. However, a shift in priorities at Versailles does not provide a full explanation for the navy's decline. Recent works emphasise the effectiveness of the state's revenue-raising capabilities and the importance of the fiscal intermediaries who financed royal expenditure. Yet, these connections between French naval power and Louis XIV's fiscal capabilities remain only partially explored and this thesis presents a fresh examination of the navy's financing arrangements. It is argued that the difficulties that Louis XIV faced in maintaining the fleet were rooted in a unique set of issues embedded in the navy's financing mechanism and the way it was managed. The problem was four-fold: the naval ministry consistently overspent its allocated funds; the navy's budget was increasingly underfunded as a result of the finance ministry's mismanagement and also of wider fiscal instability; the naval treasury was not fit-for-purpose since the navy's fiscal intermediaries, the trésoriers généraux de la Marine, lacked the capacity to sustain costly levels of borrowing; and the crown failed to meet the organisational challenges of war by not controlling spending and the activities of the trésoriers. These structural issues surfaced internally early in the war and would be progressively and disastrously exposed by the loss of liquidity and the mounting debts that affected France in the 1700s.

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The War of the Spanish Succession saw the culmination in the development of European warfare during the “Military Revolution” period, which saw European states fielding larger armies with geographically more ambitious strategies under the umbrella of the nascent eighteenth‐century phenomenon of the “Fiscal‐Military State.” By investigating the Austro‐British alliance at the diplomatic, strategic, logistical, and operational levels during the war, greater insight can be gained into the mechanics of alliance warfare and how two allies reconcile independent war strategies in order to achieve a common goal. This is done in particular by exploring British attempts to influence Austrian war strategy through the tools of diplomacy and logistics in order to bring it more in line with British war strategy, particularly in the region of southern Europe. The chronological approach adopted by this thesis will demonstrate how the course of a war can influence strategy and, in turn, facilitate or impede allied collaboration. The early years of the war saw unsuccessful attempts at Austro‐British collaboration due to the distance between the two allies and the limited contact between them. The 1703 crisis of the Austrian monarchy following financial collapse, rebellion, and a hostile Bavaria forced a dramatic revision of British strategy, culminating the Blenheim campaign of 1704. The expansion of the war into Iberia saw a broadening of Austro‐British military contacts, and the strategic situation in Italy was the source of greater collaboration. However, this expanded collaboration could prove diplomatically damaging when strategic or operational goals diverged. The later years of the war saw Austro‐British collaboration reach its peak, but Austria had to sacrifice much of the direction of its own war effort in the Mediterranean to Britain as the price for British support. The final years of the war saw British and Austrian war strategies diverge in light of the death of Joseph I.

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