Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1982. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-151).

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Illinois State University, 1967. / Title from title page screen, viewed Aug. 12, 2004. Dissertation Committee: Ben C. Hubbard (chair), Alice Ebel, Eric Baber. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-117). Also available in print.

published_or_final_version / Asian Studies / Master / Master of Arts

Banks, like other business firms, must attract outside funding within competitive capital markets, must face competition in product, and must deal with corporate governance issues deriving from agency problems and asymmetric information. Corporate governance in banks is unique compared to non-financial firms, with factors such as higher opaqueness, heavy regulations, and government interventions, which thus require distinct analysis. Although it is well recognised that corporate governance can affect bank value, in this thesis I combine external and internal corporate governances by considering board composition and ownership structure, as well as trading behaviour on stock markets. The main objective of this thesis is to study empirically the impact of various governance mechanisms on bank stability, in terms of capital strategy, risk-taking and performance. The finding is that there exists a significantly positive relationship between market discipline and bank capital structure. In addition, over-performing banks attract a high level of informed trading, which in turn leads to a higher level of capital buffer held by a bank. Also, banks with strong corporate governance are associated with higher risk-taking. More specifically, banks that have an intermediate board size, a separation between the CEO and the chairman of board, and are audited by the Big Four audit firm, are likely to take higher risks. Banks with more state shareholders also tend to have poorer performances, and banks with higher domestic and private shareholders generally operate more profitably. Ownership type diversity is associated with better bank performance, while banks with concentrated ownership are worse performing. Finally, banks with political connections distribute more credit than nonpolitically connected banks. The results have certain policy implications for understanding the role of governance in affecting bank operations that, in turn, could improve bank prudency and assist the design of an enhanced regulation framework. Regulators should reduce protection, improve banks' asset quality, and strengthen market discipline.

<p>Despite a highly centralised system of government, Tanzania, has attempted several measures aimed at achieving decentralisation of its immense powers to allow people to have a say on matters affecting their respective areas of jurisdiction. By discussing the autonomy of local government in Tanzania, this research will highlight whether or not local government in Tanzania has the autonomy to exercise its functions without undue interference from the central government. There is not much literature on the local government laws of Tanzania .Therefore, this research will contribute to the concept of decentralisation in Tanzania in particular and Africa in general.</p>

This study, therefore, inquires into whether the regional states are discharging their constitutional obligation of creating adequately empowered local government. It will attempt to do so by examining the decentralisation programme of four of the nine regional states of the Ethiopian federation.The argument in this study is developed in the following manner. First, it will be examined whether decentralisation is favourable for democratisation, development and accommodation of ethnic minorities. Second, institutional frameworks will be identified which will be used to examine whether Ethiopia’s local government is indeed empowered enough to achieve these objectives. Third, the structural organisation, powers and functions of local government of four of the nine regional states of Ethiopia will be described. The regional states are Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples’ regional states. Fourth the Ethiopian local governance system will be assessed in light of the institutional principles that are identified in chapter 2.

The expanding Colombian education system has seen the emergence of new state managerial styles. The system was designed originally for a country with one-half of the present population, one-third of the human resources and less than one-fifth of the required financial resources. / For this reason, it was necessary to extend and diversify services to include preschool, postgraduate education, nonformal education and services. Cultural activities, recreational activities of all types, and the development of scientific and technological research have also been included. At present this process is coming to an end and there is a tendency toward decentralization at the Ministry of National Education. / The general recommendation is to define the role of the state at each administrative level. The ministry should be director, planner, coordinator and evaluator of all education. The regions should be administrators and executors in their specific level in relation to the personnel and the relocation of the personnel. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

<p>Despite a highly centralised system of government, Tanzania, has attempted several measures aimed at achieving decentralisation of its immense powers to allow people to have a say on matters affecting their respective areas of jurisdiction. By discussing the autonomy of local government in Tanzania, this research will highlight whether or not local government in Tanzania has the autonomy to exercise its functions without undue interference from the central government. There is not much literature on the local government laws of Tanzania .Therefore, this research will contribute to the concept of decentralisation in Tanzania in particular and Africa in general.</p>

This study, therefore, inquires into whether the regional states are discharging their constitutional obligation of creating adequately empowered local government. It will attempt to do so by examining the decentralisation programme of four of the nine regional states of the Ethiopian federation.The argument in this study is developed in the following manner. First, it will be examined whether decentralisation is favourable for democratisation, development and accommodation of ethnic minorities. Second, institutional frameworks will be identified which will be used to examine whether Ethiopia’s local government is indeed empowered enough to achieve these objectives. Third, the structural organisation, powers and functions of local government of four of the nine regional states of Ethiopia will be described. The regional states are Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples’ regional states. Fourth the Ethiopian local governance system will be assessed in light of the institutional principles that are identified in chapter 2.

The subject matter of the thesis is the study of managerial incentive schemes for public enterprises. The problem of incentives and control is characterized in Chapter I stressing asymmetric information and preferences between principal (Minister) and agent (Manager). Chapter II reconsiders the findings of some previous works on the use of simple mechanisms under certainty and it shows that incentive problems may be solved with a pure-rent type contract. One of the parameters of the contract (profit-sharing ratio) is central to the enforcement of 'managerial' efficiency while the relative weights given to profit and (an approximation to) consumer surplus will influence optimal pricing decisions. This feature is maintained in a risky environment (Chapter III) although reinterpreted in a second-best fashion due to the trade-off between incentives and risk-sharing. The weights given to each side of the contract depend on the impact of price changes upon the degree of profit-uncertainty and the managerially self-selected level of effort. In addition it is shown that, when providing incentives, the Minister will depart from the pricing rule derived under full information. Chapter IV shows that these results are valid when capacity choice and non-price rationing issues become relevant. Chapter V attempts to integrate the issues of performance indicators and efficiency audits into the previous framework. It is shown that there must exist an upper limit to the admissible number of performance indicators and that efficiency audits can be designed as conditional investigation procedures and used according to an expected cost-benefit characterization. Some central underlying factors affecting the form of the optimal investigation strategy are identified. Finally, Chapter VI attempts to consider the previous results and their implications within a brief discussion of U.K. policy for public enterprises in the last decades.