There have been numerous proposals to reform Australia's government structures, both prior to and since Federation in 1901, including calls for New Colonies and New States, Unification plans, Regional Government models spanning across the federal-unitary continuum, and proposals to transfer functions between Commonwealth and State governments, such as the modern day attempts by the Commonwealth government to establish a national Industrial Relations system. But while several functions have been transferred from the States to the Commonwealth since Federation, major changes sought by supporters of New States, Regional Governments and Unification have never been achieved. The financial benefits possible through various reformed government structures are first examined in terms of claims and estimates that have accompanied past reform proposals. Financial benefits are then estimated for the four years from 1998-99 to 2001-02 using population and expenditure data, per capita expenditure comparisons, and various linear and non-linear regression techniques. New States appear likely to cost in the order of $1 billion per annum per New State, and possibly more if costs associated with State-Territory borders are taken into account, but their financial viability could be vastly improved if New State formation follows or is accompanied by functional transfers to achieve national systems in areas such as health and education. It is estimated that Unification and some Regional Government models could achieve financial benefits in the order of five to ten per cent in both public and private sectors and the economy as a whole, which, in June 2002 dollar terms, would amount to some $15 billion to $30 billion per annum in the public sector, $25 billion to $50 billion in the private sector, and hence $40 billion to $80 billion per annum across both public and private sectors and the entire Australian economy. It is also estimated that for several functions, including education and health, unitary national systems under Commonwealth control could generate significant financial benefits, whereas for other functions, notably transport and communications, national systems could prove more costly. Additional research could clarify estimates, but ultimately the only way to fully check estimates is to observe and measure actual reforms in action. If all State-Territory level health care functions, for example, were transferred to the Commonwealth government to achieve a fully national health system, then the benefits and costs of such reform could be assessed with much more certainty than is possible through pre-reform empirical estimates. The establishment of a national health system could also diminish concerns that New States or Regional Governments might exacerbate problems associated with separate State laws, regulations and systems - problems likely to be tolerated least in health care given its life-and-death gravity. And for Unification advocates, a national health system would represent a significant step towards complete Unification across all functions. Estimates appear to be robust when assessed in light of Commonwealth Grants Commission methodologies, differential levels of tax expenditures and privatisation across the current States and Territories, and Australia's economic and industrial geography, and on balance suggest that intelligent government structure reforms have the potential to significantly enhance Australia's financial and economic strength, and hence provide the financial capacity to achieve significantly improved social and environmental outcomes as well.

Though sovereign debts are often viewed as risk-free assets, some extreme events may lead to the repudiation of these debts. A large literature has been devoted to the motivations of repayment and to the causes of default. The impact of wars, which may lead to the repudiation of sovereign debt, on sovereign bond prices has also been analyzed. However, the impact of other types of seldom occurring but dramatic events, which may lead to the repudiation of debts, on bond prices has been overlooked. My current research aims to analyze three of them: the repudiation of debts because of their alleged "odiousness", the introduction of common debt after a state's unification and the debt partition following the break-up of a country. Since the events under consideration don't happen frequently, the dissertation will rely on four historical examples: Cuba, Russia, Italy and Belgium. The time period considered is the 19th century. Based on a historical analysis and the set-up of an original database, this project determines the effects of these events on sovereign debt valorization, using an econometric approach.<p><p>The first part of the research estimates the risk premium required by investors to hold debts which could be denounced as odious. Bondholders could require a premium to compensate for the higher default risk due to the odious character of the debts. The paper quantifies the risk premium required by investors to hold debts which could be denounced as odious and it analyses the relation between the value of the government bond and extreme "odious debt" events. In order to identify if such a premium exists, I focus on a Cuban case study. Based on an original database of Cuban bonds, the paper reveals the existence of a risk premium of at least 200 basis points which penalises bonds issued by dictatorial regimes. The bond market "odious" shocks are provided by a Structural VAR analysis. In a second case study, my research analyses the Tsarist bonds of 1906 and the premium to hold despotic regime debt. The paper shows that the market required a premium despite the attempts made by the Russian government to present the loan as clean.<p><p>The second and third parts of my research look at the effects of state succession on the sovereign bonds market. They analyze respectively the two subsets of state succession: state unification and "country break-up". The second part of the dissertation provides an empirical study of sovereign debt integration and analyses the evolution of sovereign bond prices when several countries merge to become a "unified country" or when the probability of such an event exists. Based on an original database made of pre-unification and post-unification Italian bonds, the paper shows the impact of Italy's unification on the bonds. The analysis puts forward that prior to the unification in 1862, the bonds issued by the future parts of the kingdom reacted in an idiosyncratic way. Around the sovereign debt integration, the paper highlights a large risk increase for low-yield bonds. Using a break point analysis and a Dynamic Factor Model, the paper proves that until the late 1860's the financial market did not believe in Italy's Unification. The third part of my research analyzes the financial impact on state bonds of a country which faces a risk to break up. This paper provides an empirical analysis of the evolution of sovereign debt prices when a state breaks up, or when it faces such an event. Based on an original database of Dutch and Belgian bonds, this research shows the impact of Belgian independence in 1830 on the Belgium bonds. This article analyses two risk premiums which may affect the sovereign debt of a state: the first one is linked to the country break-up (or the probability that one may occur) and the second one is due to the instability experienced by the new country. This analysis puts forward a "country break-up" risk premium of 142 basis points. The role of the debt underwriter has also been highlighted in the case of Belgian independence. Financial markets required no "new country" risk premium for Belgian bonds which were underwritten by Rothschild, but the risk premium remained for the Belgian authorities. This was likely due to the role of Rothschild as underwriter whose reputation persuaded the market that the risk is low, but who charged a premium to the Belgian government for their services.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished