This thesis first examines the determinants of earnings management in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). The model predicts that investor attention reduces earnings management. I have four key findings. First, I document that financial analysts curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals and absolute performance-matched abnormal accruals in global firms. Second, I document that institutional block-holdings curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals across the world. Third, I document that analyst following is related to more reduction in earnings management in common law countries than in code-law countries. Fourth, I find that institutional block-holders are more effective monitors in common law countries than in code law countries. This thesis also examines the relation between investor attention and stock mispricing of abnormal accruals in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Consistent with the model’s hypothesis that investor attention reduces stock mispricing, I document three key findings. First, I find a significant and negative correlation between stock mispricing and analyst following in global firms. Second, stock mispricing is negatively correlated with institutional ownership in U.S. firms. Stock mispricing is not significantly correlated with institutional block-holdings in global firms. Third, stock mispricing per dollar of abnormal accrual is decreasing in analyst following for sufficiently large abnormal accruals in U.S. and global firms.

This thesis first examines the determinants of earnings management in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). The model predicts that investor attention reduces earnings management. I have four key findings. First, I document that financial analysts curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals and absolute performance-matched abnormal accruals in global firms. Second, I document that institutional block-holdings curb adjusted absolute abnormal accruals across the world. Third, I document that analyst following is related to more reduction in earnings management in common law countries than in code-law countries. Fourth, I find that institutional block-holders are more effective monitors in common law countries than in code law countries. This thesis also examines the relation between investor attention and stock mispricing of abnormal accruals in an international setting using the Limited Investor Attention Model of Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Consistent with the model’s hypothesis that investor attention reduces stock mispricing, I document three key findings. First, I find a significant and negative correlation between stock mispricing and analyst following in global firms. Second, stock mispricing is negatively correlated with institutional ownership in U.S. firms. Stock mispricing is not significantly correlated with institutional block-holdings in global firms. Third, stock mispricing per dollar of abnormal accrual is decreasing in analyst following for sufficiently large abnormal accruals in U.S. and global firms.