The division of resources between a group of people may cause con- flicts: Individuals with varying roles and responsibilities will claim different shares of the surplus to be divided. In this dissertation, we analyze how the decision to form a group will influence the bargaining behaviour of the members of that group. People will act collectively as certain tasks may require the participation of a specific number of individuals before it can be completed. We examine whether certain mechanisms can efficiently promote group formation for the sake of surplus production, and then, what will be the effect of these mechanisms on the behaviour of the group members. For these reasons, we constructed a novel surplus production and distribution interaction which we call the Anticipation Game (AG). The AG can be played between only two players (pairwise interaction) or among more then two players (group interaction). In our study we will analyze both the pairwise AG and the group version of AG, first by obtaining our own empirical data and then by performing a stochastic evolutionary analysis. We aim to provide answers on: i) how will a reputation based partner approval mechanism influence the surplus distribution in both the pairwise and the group AG, ii) will then limitations in obtaining the reputation of a potential partner alter the results of the pairwise AG? iii) will we notice any effect on the behaviour of players when they can repeatedly cooperate with the same partners in group interactions, iv) how natural selection may have shaped the behaviour of players in group formation interactions (both pairwise and group AG evolutionary analysis). / Doctorat en Sciences / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished