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Consumers often face conflict between what "makes sense" and what "feels right" - between logical analysis and intuition. This dissertation focuses on the means by which such conflict is resolved. Extending dual-process models of judgment, we suggest that consumers often select a processing output based on their assessment regarding the appropriateness of experiential (system-1) and analytical (system-2) responses. Specifically, we propose distinct mechanisms that affect the weighting of experiential versus analytical outputs by influencing the perceived suitability of each processing mode, and we test these mechanisms in a series of experimental studies. In order to demonstrate the broad applicability of our framework, these studies investigate numerous domains in which the 'head' and 'gut' produce opposing responses, employ diverse manipulations of perceived suitability, and utilize multiple judgment and evaluation measures.The dissertation is organized in three chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of dual-systems theories and introduces the notion of simultaneous conflicting preferences. In addition, the chapter describes our conceptualization of perceived suitability as a metacognitive construct and lays out a model by which this construct influences the resolution of conflicting preferences. Chapter Two presents six empirical studies spanning a number of paradigms relevant to consumer behavior and social cognition. As an initial demonstration, Studies 1-2 utilized a semantic priming task to manipulate representations of experiential and analytical processing, and then tested the effects of this manipulation in a game of chance pitting a logically superior option against one that was perceptually appealing. Studies 3-6 expanded our model to situations involving conflict between implicit and explicit brand attitudes. Three of these studies (3, 5, and 6) tested the proposition that prior-formed, 'implicit' attitudes will affect even overt preferences to the extent that experiential processing is deemed suitable to the evaluation task. The other (Study 4) identified various decision characteristics that may affect the perceived suitability of each processing mode in real-world decisions. Chapter Three concludes the dissertation by reviewing the evidence for our conceptual model and discussing both theoretical and practical contributions of the question "How should I think about it?" in situations pitting instincts against reason. / Dissertation

The field of artificial intelligence, research on knowledge representation and reasoning has originated a large variety of formats, languages, and formalisms. Over the decades many different tools emerged to use these underlying concepts. Each one has been designed with some specific application in mind and are even used nowadays, where the internet is seen as a service to be sufficient for the age of Industry 4.0 and the Internet of Things. In that vision of a connected world, with these many different formalisms and systems, a formal way to uniformly exchange information, such as knowledge and belief is imperative. That alone is not enough, because even more systems get integrated into the online world and nowadays we are confronted with a huge amount of continuously flowing data. Therefore a solution is needed to both, allowing the integration of information and dynamic reaction to the data which is provided in such continuous data-flow environments. This work aims to present a unique and novel pair of formalisms to tackle these two important needs by proposing an abstract and general solution. We introduce and discuss reactive Multi-Context Systems (rMCS), which allow one to utilise different knowledge representation formalisms, so-called contexts which are represented as an abstract logic framework, and exchange their beliefs through bridge rules with other contexts. These multiple contexts need to mutually agree on a common set of beliefs, an equilibrium of belief sets. While different Multi-Context Systems already exist, they are only solving this agreement problem once and are neither considering external data streams, nor are they reasoning continuously over time. rMCS will do this by adding means of reacting to input streams and allowing the bridge rules to reason with this new information. In addition we propose two different kind of bridge rules, declarative ones to find a mutual agreement and operational ones for adapting the current knowledge for future computations. The second framework is more abstract and allows computations to happen in an asynchronous way. These asynchronous Multi-Context Systems are aimed at modelling and describing communication between contexts, with different levels of self-management and centralised management of communication and computation. In this thesis rMCS will be analysed with respect to usability, consistency management, and computational complexity, while we will show how asynchronous Multi-Context Systems can be used to capture the asynchronous ideas and how to model an rMCS with it. Finally we will show how rMCSs are positioned in the current world of stream reasoning and that it can capture currently used technologies and therefore allows one to seamlessly connect different systems of these kinds with each other. Further on this also shows that rMCSs are expressive enough to simulate the mechanics used by these systems to compute the corresponding results on its own as an alternative to already existing ones. For asynchronous Multi-Context Systems, we will discuss how to use them and that they are a very versatile tool to describe communication and asynchronous computation.

The present work describes the model of heuristic judgment of Kahneman & Frederick (2002) and two experiments based upon it. According to the model people answer a question with an answer to an easier question when making a heuristic judgment. This process is called the attribute substitution because a target attribute of a question is substituted by an associated and easier accessible heuristic attribute. The first experiment investigated whether two heuristic attributes can be used simultaneously during making of a judgment. A part of participants gave 1 or 4 reasons for one of the statements in Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Numbers of reasons were selected so as to produce a feeling of fluency of disfluency. Although the conjunction fallacy occurred, the writing of the reasons didn't have any influence on the assessment of the probability of the related statement. The second experiment investigated whether the priming of the relation between processing fluency and risk can influence the effect of pronounceability of a food additive name on the assessment of its harmfulness. In accord with previous study (Song & Schwarz, 2009) it was shown that food additives with less pronounceable names were considered as more harmful. The priming didn't have any effect. The present studies...