The European Union (EU) published its first Counter-Terrorism Strategy in December of 2005. After four years of reacting to the major terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005, the EU has enacted a substantial body of counterterrorism measures across multiple functional areas. The implementation of these actions, however, has not always been consistent or timely, due to a number of issues, including public threat perception, concern over social tensions, and competing national priorities. These roadblocks to a successful counterterrorism policy were often discovered upon new terrorist attacks and a renewed evaluation of EU counterterrorist activity. After the London bombings, the United Kingdom held the EU Presidency and immediately set to work on a strategy to counter terrorism, both similar and subordinate to the 2003 European Security Strategy, which specifically listed terrorism and weapons of mass destruction amoung the top five threats to the EU. The new strategy of 2005 outlines EU efforts over the long term and provides a tool for public information. Despite the EU's embrace of its new strategy, the document has many shortcomings. Evaluation of this strategy against a series of counterterrorism best practices accumulated from the work of functional and scholarly experts shows several areas in which the effectiveness of this strategy to successfully affect terrorism is severely limited. In all, the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy serves limited use as a strategy document, but does serve to guide the EU's efforts in fighting terrorism, as well as deepen EU integration in security affairs and in justice and law enforcement.

Human Systems Integration Report / The rapidly changing complexity of the Global War on Terrorism has changed the approach to equipping forward deployed military forces. Combatant Commanders conducting operations now require timely materiel solutions to enhance mission capabilities and reduce risk for individual Soldiers. To address this challenge the U.S. Army established the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to assess emerging requirements, to propose solutions to those requirements, and to implement those solutions in an expdient time frame. Unfortunately, the REF lacks a consistent analytical methodology for developing alternative materiel solutions. To address the need for a Human Systems Integration analysis method, the authors developed an Assessment Based Rapid Acquisition HSI Analysis Tool (ABRAHAM) capable of generating tailored surveys and evaluating these surveys for unacceptable risks to Soldiers. To validate ABRAHAM's concept and content, ABRAHAM was showcased in three Department of Defense settings, the Human Factors Engineering Technical Advisory Group, the REF, and the United States Marine Corps' Operational Test and Evaluation Activity. The ABRAHAM appears to fill a gap in the current library of HSI tools. Based on the feedback provided during the product showcases, there is sufficient interest and tech nological maturity to futher develop ABRAHAM to serve both the traditional and rapid acquisition processes.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States exposed the vulnerability of democracy to such actions. An adequate response requires U.S. counterterrorist policy to interact with broader U.S. foreign policy, a difficult and complex balancing act that often handicaps or limits potential gains in the "war against terrorism." In Southeast Asia separatists and extremist groups use terrorism as it is much more likely to lead to the undermining of fragile governments. Any one country, regardless of that nation's power or influence within the region, cannot counter terrorism in Southeast Asia. To be effective, counterterrorism demands understanding the terrorist's psychology, motivations and goals. The challenge presented by the region's geography requires the shared use of counterterrorist assets including intelligence, military force and international cooperation in policing and upholding international law and covenant. Identifying the nature of the terrorist threat must be the key element to U.S. policy. The diverse nature of terrorism and its various causes within the region must first be understood before being effectively countered. U.S. efforts must be guided by a balanced approach that looks not only at removing the terrorist, but removing the terrorist's raison d'etre. / Major, United States Marine Corps

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<p>Vårt syfte med undersökningen är att undersöka hur de diskursiva praktikerna ser ut för terrorrapporteringen på 1970, 1980 och 2000-talet, vi kommer särskilt att fokusera på beroendeförhållandet mellan terrorism och massmedier. Vi har valt ut tre terrordåd, München 1972, Lockerbie 1988 samt World Trade Center 2001. Vid varje terrordåd har vi tagit två artiklar vardera från tidningarna Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter och Svenska dagbladet. Det blir totalt arton artiklar som vi har använt oss av. Terrorism lever i ett beroendeförhållande till massmedia. Om massmedia skulle sluta rapportera om terrordåd skulle terroraktioner förlora sitt värde för terroristerna som deras huvudsakliga kommunikationsform. Eftersom journalister oftast befinner sig i samma sociala kontext som sina läsare skriver de om händelser ur den kontext som vi är vana vid. Detta innebär att manuset redan är färdigskrivet då olika terrorattacker sker, terroristerna behöver bara addera våldet. Terrordåd är deras sätt att tvinga allmänheten och omvärlden att lyssna på dem. Ett annat resultat som vi kommit fram till är att terrorister ofta likställs med araber och muslimer. I München var det palestinska gerillamän, i Lockerbie "den islamiska revolutionens väktare" och i World Trade Center "militanta muslimer" och al Qaida. Ett annat huvudresultat är att offren oftare beskrivs som individer än vad terroristerna gör. Undantaget är Usama bin Ladin som själv fick stå som aktör för attentatet mot World Trade Center.</p>

The purpose of the study was to gather strategies and factors from tourism security professionals from which terrorism risk management policies can be developed. This study utilized the Delphi method in order to provide structure for the group process. Twelve tourism security experts made up the panel completing three rounds of questionnaires via the email based Delphi technique. This research identified fifty-four strategies to reduce the propensity of terror attack at a tourism venue. Those strategies were divided into four levels of priority based on criticality and feasibility. The fifty-four strategies were grouped into nine subordinate categories. The subordinate categories were related to Training, Communications/ Liaison, Planning/ Assessment, Background Checks, ID Badges/ Secure Entrance, Specialty Security Units, Architectural Design, Media Cooperation, and Technology Based strategies. Alongside the strategies are a collection of comments by the experts regarding strengths, weaknesses, and any barriers to implementation pertaining to the individual strategy. Tourism risk managers, security personnel, and insurance underwriters can all use the results in reducing the opportunity for a terrorist attack at a tourism venue. Major research findings from this study included: 1. The strategy receiving the highest criticality ranking over all other strategies involves training first responders on their role in circumventing the success of terrorists. 2. The subordinate category Communication/ Liaison contains the largest number of strategies indicating the significance of this category among experts. 3. The subordinate category of Specialty Security Units contains the second highest number of strategies indicating the importance of the topic among experts. 4. All of the technology based strategies fell into the lowest priority level. Based on the findings of this study, researcher recommendations include: 1. The guidelines developed in this study should be used by operators of tourism venues to make the best use of limited resources. 2. National or international conferences should be established to further discuss these issues. 3. A greater number of communications mediums should be established to facilitate the exchange of ideas and experiences between affected professionals. 4. Insurance providers should use this information to establish validated guidelines so that, if prospective clients adhered to the recommendations, a reduction in premiums could be offered. 5. Other entities may benefit from this study, such as public school systems, the energy production industry, hospital systems, and pipeline systems.

Vårt syfte med undersökningen är att undersöka hur de diskursiva praktikerna ser ut för terrorrapporteringen på 1970, 1980 och 2000-talet, vi kommer särskilt att fokusera på beroendeförhållandet mellan terrorism och massmedier. Vi har valt ut tre terrordåd, München 1972, Lockerbie 1988 samt World Trade Center 2001. Vid varje terrordåd har vi tagit två artiklar vardera från tidningarna Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter och Svenska dagbladet. Det blir totalt arton artiklar som vi har använt oss av. Terrorism lever i ett beroendeförhållande till massmedia. Om massmedia skulle sluta rapportera om terrordåd skulle terroraktioner förlora sitt värde för terroristerna som deras huvudsakliga kommunikationsform. Eftersom journalister oftast befinner sig i samma sociala kontext som sina läsare skriver de om händelser ur den kontext som vi är vana vid. Detta innebär att manuset redan är färdigskrivet då olika terrorattacker sker, terroristerna behöver bara addera våldet. Terrordåd är deras sätt att tvinga allmänheten och omvärlden att lyssna på dem. Ett annat resultat som vi kommit fram till är att terrorister ofta likställs med araber och muslimer. I München var det palestinska gerillamän, i Lockerbie "den islamiska revolutionens väktare" och i World Trade Center "militanta muslimer" och al Qaida. Ett annat huvudresultat är att offren oftare beskrivs som individer än vad terroristerna gör. Undantaget är Usama bin Ladin som själv fick stå som aktör för attentatet mot World Trade Center.

Counter terrorism is one of the contemporary issues that concerns both the international community and Arab states. A problematic issue in this regard is the lack of a definition, which allows states to criminalize “terrorism” based on the best interest of each individual state. This thesis examines the laws that deal with terrorism in Kuwait, which rely on Kuwait’s broad national security laws. Problems with these laws include the lack of the rule of law and violation of human rights. This thesis highlights Bahrain’s experience with counter terrorism and the human right violation during the February 2011 revolution. The thesis emphasises the importance of having an appropriate definition that coincides with the rule of law and human rights, by adhering to the international guidance provided by the 1999 ‘International Convention on Suppression of Terrorism Financing’ and the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) as a first serious step in combating terrorism.

Counter terrorism is one of the contemporary issues that concerns both the international community and Arab states. A problematic issue in this regard is the lack of a definition, which allows states to criminalize “terrorism” based on the best interest of each individual state. This thesis examines the laws that deal with terrorism in Kuwait, which rely on Kuwait’s broad national security laws. Problems with these laws include the lack of the rule of law and violation of human rights. This thesis highlights Bahrain’s experience with counter terrorism and the human right violation during the February 2011 revolution. The thesis emphasises the importance of having an appropriate definition that coincides with the rule of law and human rights, by adhering to the international guidance provided by the 1999 ‘International Convention on Suppression of Terrorism Financing’ and the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) as a first serious step in combating terrorism.

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