Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1961. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-75).

Data taken directly from the web sites of the House and Senate and massaged into usable form. Data are organized by session. Displayed by Congress number, session, and file type. So sen1012 would be data from the senate, 101st congress, 2nd session. Code=codebook, Summ= summary file, and Notes= miscellenous notes

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophy--Edmonton, University of Alberta. / Bibliogr. p. 291-313. Index.

The Provincial Congress assumed the leadership of North Carolina at a time when, almost simultaneously, the seeds of the American Revolution were beginning to take root throughout the neighboring provinces. The task faced by that body was, therefore, not only one of reinstituting their own civil government, but also of providing for the protection of North Carolina and working, in union, for the defense of the entire continent.

This paper describes John Tyler's political career, specifically his involvement with the Whig legislation of the twenty-seventh Congress.

This study seeks to analyze quantitatively the Court-curbing tendencies of the Ninetieth Congress.

I have examined the relationship between the U.S. Congress and professional sports—specifically, Major League Baseball. The focus of this examination was on the abuse of steroids in professional sports, and how certain constitutional limitations on Congress inhibited direct mandates on drug testing for individual players due to the Fourth Amendment. I have concluded that due to major league sports being for-profit ventures, economic motivations in the form of tax incentives were the most effective way for Congress to implement a tougher drug testing policy without violating the Fourth Amendment.

This project takes an in-depth look at the role that media coverage of both individual members of Congress and Congress as a whole plays in shaping approval of legislators and the legislative branch. I argue that by examining what the media choose to cover and how the media cover it, we can learn more about the standards by which judgments of political performance take place. As such, I also contend that differences between the tone and substance in which the media cover individual legislators compared to how they cover the legislative branch go a long way to explaining why Americans cast favor upon those they send to Congress and cast doubt on Congress itself. The essential dichotomy examined in the project, based on Thomas Patterson's (1993) assessment of the changing nature of how the mass media cover campaigning, splits reporting on Congress into governing coverage and game coverage. Governing coverage deals more with substantive issues, policy problems, and signals that business is taking place. Game coverage, on the other hand, is more concerned with the parliamentary struggles between actors and parties to pass legislation and accrue power; it treats politicians as strategic actors always competing for advantages. Game coverage also focuses heavily on winning and losing. I argue that the over time focus on either game or governing aspects of legislating and representing will drive assessments of members of Congress and Congress itself. More specifically, I analyze how game frame coverage is likely to spur negative job approval, while governing frame coverage drives positive assessments of job performance.

Policymakers need a wide array of information for multiple purposes. Acquiring information often is costly, so it is assumed that incentives must be provided to overcome these costs and stimulate information gathering. It is further assumed that increasing the number of actors engaged in acquiring information creates free-rider problems. In 2007 the U.S. House of Representatives created a select committee to address energy and environment issues, but did not give that committee legislative authority. The new committee could not compete with others for the ability to write or amend legislation, so its presence should not have changed the standing committee’s information gathering patterns. In fact, committees did alter their hearing patterns in response to the select committee’s work. Information has jurisdictional and reputational value to policymakers in addition to the incentives it can help them obtain, and policymakers will act to acquire information even without explicit incentives to do so. / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1988. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 426-443).