Freedom of speech in the Czech Republic This thesis deals with the freedom of speech in the Czech Republic especially with its limits and jurisprudence related to this key political right. It is composed of five chapters. The first chapter is The Introduction. It highlights the importance and necessity of the freedom of speech for an individual and the society. It also describes the main purpose of this work. The second chapter briefly summarizes the history and evolution of the freedom of speech in Bohemia particularly in the constitutional documents. The second chapter ends with adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (No. 2/1993 Coll.) which set the current constitutional state of the freedom of speech. The third chapter is named "Specification of the Freedom of Speech". At first it explores the guaranteeing of the freedom of speech in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and then in international treaties mainly International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and European Convention on Human Rights. There are also mentioned some constitutional rights associated with the freedom of speech. The subchapter 3.4 explicates the definition of "speech" in the czech law. The last part of chapter 3 pays attention to the specification of subjects of the freedom of speech...

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In this dissertation, through three separately published articles, I interrogate the role of expert knowledge in First Amendment theory and doctrine. I argue that expert knowledge ought to play a prominent role in answering doctrinally relevant empirical questions, as in the case of incorporating a scientifically grounded understanding of visual perception into Establishment Clause inquiries concerning religious symbols. Moreover, the generation and dissemination of expert knowledge itself is worthy of First Amendment protection, for example in protecting professional speech. And expert knowledge should determine the scope of First Amendment protection for professional advice. There is, in other words, a close but often underappreciated connection between expert knowledge and the First Amendment. In Active Symbols, I challenge the assumption sometimes articulated in Establishment Clause case law involving religious symbols that visual representations of religious symbols are merely “passive” as compared to textual (spoken or written) religious references. Drawing on one relevant body of expert knowledge—cognitive neuroscience—I argue that images are at least as “active” as text. The lack of judicial expertise on the empirical question of how visual images, as opposed to spoken or written words, communicate has led to a distortion in the development of Establishment Clause doctrine. This distortion can be remedied by taking relevant expert knowledge into consideration where such knowledge can answer germane empirical questions that are doctrinally relevant but tend to be outside the realm of judicial expertise. Professional Speech argues that the First Amendment protects the communication of expert knowledge by a professional to a client-within a professional-client relationship for the purpose of giving professional advice. The First Amendment thus provides a shield against state interference that seeks to prescribe or alter the content of professional speech. The key to understanding professional speech, I suggest, lies in the concept of the learned professions as knowledge communities. First Amendment protection for professional speech can be justified on all traditional grounds: autonomy interests of the speaker and listener, marketplace interests, and democratic self-government. Unprofessional Advice provides a theory to identify the range of valid professional advice for First Amendment purposes. Building on the concept of the professions as knowledge communities, this article explores the range of professional advice that may be given consistent with the professional knowledge community’s common ways of knowing and reasoning and the respective profession’s agreed upon methodology. Because knowledge communities are not monolithic, there is a range of knowledge that is accepted as good professional advice. Advice falling within this range should receive robust First Amendment protection. Advice not within this range, however, is subject to malpractice liability, and the First Amendment provides no defense.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1983. / Vita. Bibliography: leaves [193]-205.

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, 1973. / "March, 1973." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in microfiche.

Thesis (Ph.D.). / Written for the Dept. of Political Science. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/07/23). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Texas A&M University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 152-161). Also available online.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Youngstown State University, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 100-107).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Linguistics, June 2003 / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.