[pt] Este trabalho é composto por dois artigos. No primeiro deles, modela-se a atuação de fundos de investimento pequenos em mercados relativamente ilíquidos com o objetivo de identificar os efeitos de suas transações sobre o volume transacionado das carteiras de ativos, bem como sobre seus preços. Insere-se um incentivo à coordenação entre os fundos de investimento, o que faz com que a distribuição das carteiras compostas pelos fundos seja concentrada ao redor da carteira média de mercado. Como se lida com um mercado ilíquido, tem-se que as carteiras próximas à média sofrerão um aumento maior de preço. Além disso, mostra-se que a quantidade total – soma das quantidades investidas em todas as carteiras por todos os fundos – cresce quando o motivo de coordenação está presente. Esse crescimento contribui para o aumento médio da variação de preços dentre todas as carteiras. O segundo artigo se dedica à inclusão no modelo básico de uma nova fonte de informação quanto à rentabilidade das carteiras dos fundos: um concurso de rentabilidade. Mostra-se que os resultados alcançados são exatamente opostos aos do aumento da coordenação. / [en] The present work is formed by two articles. In the first, I model the interaction of small investment funds in a relatively illiquid market with the aim of identifying the effects of their transactions on volume and price movements of assets. The behavior of the investment funds exhibits a coordination-motive, which ultimately diminishes the differences in the composition of the various portfolios. In an illiquid market, the rise of the price of these portfolios is higher. Besides, I show that the total volume bought by all funds rises when the coordination-motive is present. That contributes to raise the variation of prices among all portfolios. The second article is dedicated to the inclusion on the basic model of a new source of information concerning the profitability of the funds: a profitability contest. The results are opposite to the case in which the coordination-motive is present.

Prior to the passage of the 1997 Kentucky Postsecondary Education Reform Act, postsecondary education in Kentucky was governed by the Council on Higher Education. The council was responsible for overseeing the educational activities of the University of Kentucky, the University of Louisville, Morehead State University, Northern Kentucky University, Eastern Kentucky University, Western Kentucky University, Murray State University, and Kentucky State University. At that time, 2-year postsecondary education was segmented among 14 public community colleges under the control of the University of Kentucky’s Community College System and 15 state vocational–technical schools known as Kentucky Tech, under the administration of the Workforce Development Cabinet. With the passage of HB 1, the Council on Higher Education was replaced by the Council on Postsecondary Education, and the Kentucky Community and Technical College System was created, combining the 14 community colleges and 15 vocational– technical schools. This research examines the development and implementation of a funding model for the Kentucky Community and Technical College System (KCTCS), from its inception in 1998 through its 10th anniversary in 2008. This examination reviews and analyzes the funding of KCTCS from its formation in 1997, until a new funding model was implemented at the beginning of the 2003–2004 fiscal year. The study then compares the funding of the 16 colleges of KCTCS prior to and after the implementation of the new equity funding model, to determine if the model was successful in providing a more equitable method of public funds allocation. This study utilizes two methodological approaches, the first being a comparative analysis of KCTCS and its 16 colleges’ funding for a period of 10 years and the second being a qualitative analysis of historical data interviews obtained from 8 key individuals who were directly affected by the passage of the 1997 Kentucky Postsecondary Education Improvement Act. The findings of this study detail the development of a new KCTCS equity funding model and show that when new appropriations were distributed utilizing the new model, the gap in funding inequities between the highest funded and the lowest funded colleges showed significant compression.

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A research report submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Commerce, University of the Witwatersrand. / As the objective of investing is the maximization of wealth, it is imperative for investors to find instruments which will help them achieve their goal. A real estate investment trust can be a form of wealth maximization if an investor is knowledgeable about its long-term performance and the drivers of this performance. This study employed the use of panel regression models to isolate the performance of South African REITs, in order to compare the risk-adjusted returns of REIT segments over the long term and to identify the determinants of REIT risk-adjusted returns. Risk-adjusted performance ratios were used to measure return on real estate investment funds to conclude on the performance of SA REITs. The Sharpe ratio, Treynor index and Jensen’s Alpha were performance measures of 55 JSE-listed and delisted REITs over 18 years (2000 – 2017) thus incorporating 433 firm-years.The empirical evidence suggests that size, book-to-market, property asset intensity, dividend yield and real GDP growth influence the performance of South African real estate investment trusts and Hotel and Resort REITs as well as Retail REIT significantly underperformed the other REIT sectors, under the Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s Alpha. Furthermore, the REIT performance during the financial crisis outperformed their performance during the other market phases. / PH2020

Essay One Under the principal-agent framework, we study and compare different compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to the symmetric performance fee structure. However, the use of high water mark (HWM) mitigates the suboptimality, though to a very limited extent. Bothour theoretical models and simulation results show that HWM will induce more managerial efforts only when a fund is slightly under the water but it will unfavorably dampen incentives when a fund is too deep under the water and when the manager's skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, however, helps align interests and provides positive managerial incentives. Essay Two Existing literature has detected a "tournament behavior" among mutual fund managers that mid-year underperformers tend to take relatively higher risk than peers in the second half-year. We reexamine this issue and provide empirical evidence that such behavior does not exist among hedge fund managers, either at fund level or risk style level. Instead, hedge fund managers shift risk at mid-year in response to the moneyness of their incentive contracts. Also, risk shifting decisions are more driven by underperformance than by outperformance. HighWater Mark can strongly rein in excess risk-taking and therefore better aligns interests. Last, risk shifting on average does not improve either performance, moneyness of incentive contracts, or cash inflows. Essay Three We use factor models and optimal change point regression models to capture the intra-year risk dynamics of hedge fund managers. Those risk shifting managers are further divided into 'Informed', 'Uninformed' and 'Misinformed' groups, according to their post-shifting risk adjusted performance. We find evidence that supports the existence of an Adverse Selection' problem of managers compensation schemes. Namely, incentive contracts, designed to share risks and align interests, induce the strongest risk taking from the least informed or skilled hedge fund managers, whose risk-shifting decisions result in undesired or even deteriorated risk-adjusted returns for investors. We also find that the High Water Mark has only limited influence on mitigating excessive risk shifting.

As personal backgrounds and experiences vary, emotions stemming from exposure to violence shape a manager's risk perception and investment strategies. We document significant variation in the risk exposure of managers who were raised in states with higher per capita violence rates than those who were not. Although managers exposed to violence tend to hold more stocks in their portfolios, take less idiosyncratic risk, hold portfolios with betas closer to 1, and have less concentrated portfolios, these managers' risk-adjusted performance is not statistically different than that of their counterparts who were not exposed to violence.

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