Targeted sanctions have become increasingly utilized as conflict management tool to safeguard global peace and security. In recent years, there have been a global push to utilize this tool to specifically address conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Yet, there is a dearth in research on how the imposition of targeted sanctions effect the prevalence of CRSV. This thesis aims to contribute to this alarmingly understudied relationship between targeted sanctions and CRSV by investigating the following research question: what impact do targeted sanctions have on the perpetration of CRSV by rebel groups? Thus, I employ a structured, focused comparison of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda to test a theoretical theory which argues that targeted sanctions may increase the prevalence of CRSV perpetrated by the targeted rebel group. The empirical findings give partial support to both the proposed hypothesis and the theorized ‘selective incentive’ casual mechanism. However, the findings also suggest less effective sanctions may result in the hypothesized increase in wartime sexual violence perpetrated by the targeted actor, while more effective, debilitating sanctions may a decrease alongside other interventions.