The quality of officers serving in department head afloat billets influences the combat effectiveness of a ship. SWOCP was established to retain more quality officers in the department head ranks. This thesis addresses quality as a quantitative value that is a function of an individualâ s FITREPs and a time decay factor. A statistical study of the data showed no significant effect of SWOCP on the quality of officers retained. The bonus also had no significant influence on an officerâ s downstream performance. Based on these conclusions it appears that SWOCP has served as primarily a retention tool for quantity rather than quality. / US Navy (USN) author.

Abstract The key feature of an ideal remuneration system is not only encourage, but also to invite or improve the sales representative retention in the team very likely.The object of this study, company S was founded in 1989,the business model is 3C digital chain monopolized shop. The major commodities is PC and computer peripheral equipment. in 23 years they already have 36 stores. The case company located in the province a total of six types of shop type system¡Gthe DIY chain monopolized shop, the notebook chain monopolized shop, the SONY chain monopolized shop, the APPLE chain monopolized shop, the LENOVA chain monopolized shop, the COMBO chain monopolized shop. There are Different attributes of each store, also have Different remuneration system. Although, Bonus is not the only incentive to enhance job performance , but in addition to performance bonuses, promotion, sense of accomplishment, sense of honor is limited to encourage the business. This study is expected by interviews and questionnaires¡Gto access 15 business ,Conduct one questionnaire survey to 160 retail business and each choose 5 sales from performance achievement rates located in high, medium and low range . The main function of interviews and questionnaires is for a specific problem to understand the business ideas and attitudes, as the reference of analysis and submit response strategies. After two weeks of interviews, to data analysis and presentation of evidence and theory finally. In this study, the percentage of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012 sales target reached as the analysis of the data source. Case the change of the bonus system for the company's performance to the case study approach. The results showed¡Gafter 2012 implementation of the new bonus system, increased revenue, but operating margin decline. 1. No matter what Kind of remuneration systems, all need to consider the profit structure of goods, Unit price, Species to Select the appropriate bonus system. 2. No matter what Kind of bonus system must be in accordance with the consumer segments, product category, business model, employees to choose the right system. the class attributes of the individual performance bonus system and group performance bonus system has its applicability, it is suggested that the case company can adopt a hybrid performance bonus system to store system do to set the applicable performance bonus system, in order to achieve the incentive result, in line with both employers and employees look forward to the results and benefits.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 58-59). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--Cornell University, August, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 48-56).

The thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay, the strategic effects of bonus/penalty compensation contracts are analysed. This essay consists of the first three chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 1, viewing each firm as a "principal-agent" pair, we examine firms' rivalry in bonus/penalty contracts in oligopolistic markets when the agents are risk-neutral. Under standard assumptions concerning production, demand, and cost functions, we show that bonus/penalty contracts may be used for strategic purposes. We find that whether agents' actions would (in equilibrium) be encouraged through bonuses or discouraged through penalties would critically depend on the existing strategic relationships between agents' actions or firms' products. We further show that firms' capita] stocks can affect their strategic positions in the bonus/penalty rivalry. The social welfare implication of the bonus/penalty rivalry is also examined. In Chapter 2, using a general framework of rivalrous agency with risk-averse agents, we identify two distinctive effects of bonus/penalty contracting, namely, the strategic effect and the incentive effect. We find that the two effects may or may not work in the same direction for a principal-agent pair, depending on the nature of strategic relationships between agents' actions. In Chapter 3, we compare the strategic effects of bonus/penalty contracts with that of linear contracts. We find that, if only one principal is active in designing agency compensation contracts, then he/she would be indifferent between a bonus/penalty contract and a linear contract. If both principals are active in designing agency contracts, however, the choice between bonus/penalty and linear contracts would in general matter to the principals. In particular, we show in an example that both principals would non-cooperatively choose a bonus contract over a linear contract. The second essay of the thesis, as in Chapter 4, presents an analysis of common sales agents based on their precommitment role when consumers are imperfectly informed about the products on the market. We show that an exclusive channel stucture can create a cost due to exclusive channels' inability to commit themselves to sales impartiality. We further show that independent non-cooperative firms may use common agents as a precommitment device to convince potential consumers that the risk of being misrepresented has been reduced or eliminated. We demonstrate that a market involving common sales agents can arise as an equilibrium outcome. Our analysis shows that common sales agents can be welfare improving for both firms and consumers. The third essay, as in Chapter 5, investigates the dynamic pattern of firm competitive conduct, using time-series and firm-specific data for a set of duopoly airline routes. We estimate the mean conduct parameters for each firm and each period, and infer whether the data are consistent with the Cournot, Bertrand, Friedman, or Green-Porter models. We find that airlines' competitive behavior may switch between the competitive and collusive regimes. Moreover, we find that airline profits in a collusive period appear less than the (single-period) monopoly profits, and the degree of overall market competitiveness is between the Cournot and monopoly solutions but closer to the Cournot solution. Our data suggest that major carriers might use quantity volumes, rather than prices, as their strategy variables. We also conduct some Bayesian analysis of seeing how our results would influence priors associated with different models. We illustrate a model choice criterion based on Bayesian analysis and use the criterion to choose the "best" model among competing models. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen, 1932. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [4-5]).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Higher, Adult, and Lifelong Education, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on July 8, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 112-116). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cornell University, 1993. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 274-285).