Major paper (M. Ed.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexanders-Universität Erlangen. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

The problem is to determine if there are discrepancies between self-ideal concept which come about through changes in position with respect to group standing, and to what problems specifically that change is related to.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 1999. Graduate Programme in Psychology. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 304-325). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004 & res_dat=xri:pqdiss & rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation & rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NQ39268.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 100-110). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

I contend that all theories of self-deception (SD) which operate on a belief/knowledge account are mistaken and that Fingarette is correct in basing SD on a volition/action account. Fingarette's account, however, is also mistaken in its failure to understand the sometimes crucial role of motive and the always crucial role of acceptance of responsibility. My theory of SD claims that it occurs due to lack of communication between two extremely different sets of structures in the brain. These have evolved for entirely different purposes, and are called the affective and cognitive brains, respectively. This theory demonstrates why the action/volition account is correct. When the cognitive brain judges some idea to be a threat to one of the various self-concepts, the affective brain is alerted to attempt to protect the system of the self by escape of any viable sort. The theory gains strength by its ability to shed light on other psychological phenomena, e.g., false confession and inexplicably docile behavior greatly disadvantageous to those doing it. In addition, my theory undermines all of the so-called paradoxes of SD, partially by showing that the "deception" in SD does not point toward objective truth and a purposeful even if conscious failure to see it, but rather toward the perceived consistency, or lack of it, of one's self-concept. Specifically, drawing on general examples of SD taken from literature, film, and various psychological experiments, I criticize in great detail the accounts of SD given by Fingarette, Rorty, Szabados, and Saunders. In less detail, I criticize the accounts of Freud, Sartre, and Kierkegaard.

No description available.

This study introduces a self concept that can serve as practice theory for pastoral counselling. The practical theological model of Zerfass is used to develop a basis, meta and practice theory. The basis theoretical perspectives indicate that the self may be viewed as the culmination of al the dimensions of perception of man. Three dimensions of the self may be distinguished, after the analogy of man as creation of God. -lmago Dei as structure/condition before God - man as the image of God - this emphasizes man's worth as creation of God. -lmago Dei as relational concept - man as a relationship being -this is essentially about experiencing love (security) in relationship with God, fellow man and nature. -lmago Dei as functional concept - man as representative of God -this essentially deals with the position in which man is appointed as representative of God. As a result of the fall of man the image of God in man is scarred and he exists in a condition of: -Shame (as the opposite of worth); -Fear (as the opposite of love); and -Guilt (as the opposite of position). Through the process of regeneration God creates a new person and in so doing restores man's worth in Christ. Through reconciliation in Christ God restores the love (security) within relationships as He had in mind before the fall. God acquits the person in Christ Jesus and restores the saved person's position as representative of God. Although man possesses love (security) and position in Christ, a bipolar tension exist between: -Worth and shame; -Love (security) and fear; and -Position and guilt. According to the meta theoretical perspectives man is a social creature and his/her self comes to fulfilment (with)in relationships. Man finds himself in a certain environment and circumstances and as such is subject to external influences. Man's need for security must be heeded in order for the self to realize its full potential. A safe place for genuineness, respect, and empathy must be created to actualise the self. Seeing that children learn through imitation, it is the responsibility of adults to be admirable role models for children. These perspectives raise an appeal to the human intellect. Man's intellectual/cognitive dimension therefore plays an important role in man's self. Finally, guidelines for the design and application of a practice theory for the application of a self-concept for pastoral counselling are suggested. / Thesis (M.A. (Practical Theology))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2006.

This Thesis deals with the problem of selfhood and otherhood, or selfhood vs otherhood from the point of view of contemporary postmodern, structuralist, psychoanalytic and developmentalist theories. In the first chapter, Jean Baudrillard and Jacques Lacan are examples of theories of exteriority. In chapter II, Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein present arguments for theories of interiority. In the third and final chapter, Daniel Stern' s analysis allows for a reconciliation of the two opposing points of view about the nature of the Subject. His work is significant in that it offers a synthetic view of the Self and its relationship to the Other.