Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz. / Typescript. Bibliography: leaves 307-318.

It is orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science to hold that the human brain processes information, both about the body in which the brain is located and about the world more generally. The internal states of the brain that encode this information are known as mental representations. Two matters concerning mental representation are interwoven here: the role of representational content in cognition and the format of mental representation. Robert Cummins, among others, argues that content is intrinsic to mental representation, rather than involving matters external to a representation, such as the use to which the representation is put. He also holds that resemblance accounts of representation best make sense of this fact. Thus, according to Cummins, the content of a mental representation is determined by its form. This thesis argues that an account of representation requiring that representations possess resembling structure is unlikely to be correct given (a) the minimal requirements that something must meet in order to count as a mental representation, (b) the tasks required of representation in cognition, such as capturing abstract properties, combining with other representations, and tracking change, and (c) the possibility that content stands in a different relation to form and cognition from the one Cummins has in mind. In criticising Cummins, however, this thesis explores possible implementations of resemblance theories in connectionist representation. It also redraws his map of the psychosemantic field to suggest that classical theories of cognition, which posit concatenative schemes of symbolic representation, share some of the benefits of tying content to orm. Finally, in exploring various notions of the role of form in representation, this thesis also advocates a pluralistic approach to the mental representations implicated in human cognition. / Thesis (M.A.)--School of Humanities, 2004.

It is orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science to hold that the human brain processes information, both about the body in which the brain is located and about the world more generally. The internal states of the brain that encode this information are known as mental representations. Two matters concerning mental representation are interwoven here: the role of representational content in cognition and the format of mental representation. Robert Cummins, among others, argues that content is intrinsic to mental representation, rather than involving matters external to a representation, such as the use to which the representation is put. He also holds that resemblance accounts of representation best make sense of this fact. Thus, according to Cummins, the content of a mental representation is determined by its form. This thesis argues that an account of representation requiring that representations possess resembling structure is unlikely to be correct given (a) the minimal requirements that something must meet in order to count as a mental representation, (b) the tasks required of representation in cognition, such as capturing abstract properties, combining with other representations, and tracking change, and (c) the possibility that content stands in a different relation to form and cognition from the one Cummins has in mind. In criticising Cummins, however, this thesis explores possible implementations of resemblance theories in connectionist representation. It also redraws his map of the psychosemantic field to suggest that classical theories of cognition, which posit concatenative schemes of symbolic representation, share some of the benefits of tying content to orm. Finally, in exploring various notions of the role of form in representation, this thesis also advocates a pluralistic approach to the mental representations implicated in human cognition. / Thesis (M.A.)--School of Humanities, 2004.

This thesis is about the ontology of living beings as natural systems, their behavior, and the way in which said behavior, under special conditions of social coupling, may give rise to mental phenomena. The guiding questions of the thesis are: 1) What kinds of systems are living beings such that they behave the way they do? 2) How, through what kinds of mechanisms and processes, do living beings generate their behavior? 3) How do mental phenomena appear in the life of certain living beings? 4) What are the natural conditions under which certain living beings exhibit mental phenomena? To answer these questions the thesis first assumes, then justifies and defends, a Strict Naturalistic (SN) stance with respect to living beings. SN is a metaphysical and epistemological framework that, recognizing the organizational, dynamic and structural complexity and peculiarity of living beings, views and treats them as metaphysically ordinary natural systems; that is, as systems that, from the metaphysical point of view, are not different in kind from rivers or stars. SN holds that if in natural sciences rivers and stars are not conceived as semantic, intentional, teleological, agential or normative systems, then living beings should not be so conceived either. Having assumed SN, and building mainly on the second-order cybernetic theories of Ross Ashby and Humberto Maturana, the thesis answers question 1) by saying that living beings are (i) adaptive dynamic systems, (ii) deterministic machines of closed transitions, (iii) multistable dissipative systems, and (iv) organizationally closed systems with respect to their sensorimotor and autopoietic dynamics. Based on this ontological characterization, the thesis answers question 2) by showing that living beings’ behavior corresponds to the combined product of (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). Points (i) and (ii) support the idea that living beings are strictly deterministic systems, and that, consequently, notions such as information, control, agency or teleology—usually invoked to explain living beings’ behavior—do not have operational reality but are rather descriptive projections introduced by the observer. Point (iii) helps to understand why, despite their deterministic nature, living beings behave in ways that, to the observer, appear to be teleological, agential or “intelligent”. Point (iv) suggests that living beings’ sensorimotor dynamics are closed circuits without inputs or outputs, where the distinction between external and internal medium is, again, an ascription of the observer rather than a functional property of the system itself. Having addressed the basic principles of living beings’ behavior, the thesis explores the possible origin of (truly) mental phenomena in the particular domain of social behavior. Complementing Maturana’s recursive theory of language with Vygotsky’s dialectic approach the thesis advances, though in a still quite exploratory way, a sociolinguistic hypothesis of mind. This hypothesis answers questions 3) and 4) by claiming that the essential properties of mental phenomena (intentionality, representational content) appear with language, and that mind, as a private experiential domain, emerges as a dialectic transformation of language.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-134). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

No description available.

Background: Deficits in the processing of emotional stimuli have long been associated with major depressive disorder (MDD). These emotional biases are believed central to the symptomatology of MDD, with evidence growing that such biases can also be seen during remission. Although such changes are typical of psychiatric morbidity evidence is growing for the impact of ageing on emotional processing as well. Evidence shows that relative to younger adults, older adults demonstrate biases that favour positive information over negative. There is therefore overlap between MDD and normal ageing that has yet to be explored in the literature. Because positive biases are implicated in successful ageing it is important to consider the impact of previous MDD as individuals age. It is this question that is explored in this thesis. Study 1: A behavioural neuropsychological investigation was undertaken comparing older and younger adults with and without a history of MDD on a battery of affective cognitive tasks. Results suggested that the difference between the older adults with and without a history of MDD lay in their ability to disengage from negative information. Study 2: An fMRI investigation was undertaken in a subset of the study 1 sample using neuroimaging paradigms assessing memory encoding and attention for emotional stimuli. Broadly results suggested no influence of previous MDD on the processing of emotional information in the studied domains, with evidence seen in both tasks for the neural basis of the positivity effect of ageing. Study 3: A resting-state fMRI investigation of brain connectivity was undertaken to assess the influence of previous MDD and normal ageing on the communication structure of the brain. Results were largely suggestive of the influence of normal healthy ageing, with limited evidence of the influence of previous MDD or its interaction with ageing. Conclusions: Results were mixed across the investigations. Generally speaking the initial behavioural study was best powered to investigation the questions of interest, suggesting the potential for differential affective processing strategies in later life dependent on previous MDD. The subsequent imaging studies were perhaps less well placed to draw conclusions given limitations in terms of the domains investigated and the sample size. Evidence for the postulate that previous MDD impacts the development of the positivity effect has therefore been demonstrated, but for now remains limited to the behavioural domain.

Orientador: Carmem Beatriz Milidoni / Resumo: Esta pesquisa tem como finalidade analisar as formas do pensar de acordo com abordagem realizada por Sigmund Freud em sua obra: Projeto de uma psicologia. Para tal nos propusemos a examinar a teoria geral do aparelho psíquico desenvolvida pelo autor e a teoria freudiana da cognição, bem como a natureza das representações no pensamento prático. Acreditamos que este estudo possa fundamentar o entendimento das diferentes formas de pensar. / Abstract: This research aims at analyzing the forms of thinking according to Freud's works Project of a psychology. For this purpose we intended to examine the general theory of the psychic apparel developed by the author and the Freudian theory of cognition, as well as the nature of representations in the practical thought. We believed that this study can be interesting to understand the different ways of thinking. / Mestre

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:23:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2003-12-10Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:49:49Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 nenartavis_aw_me_mar.pdf: 289550 bytes, checksum: 4049f70ed547119dcec2ed53d4f423b4 (MD5) / Esta pesquisa tem como finalidade analisar as formas do pensar de acordo com abordagem realizada por Sigmund Freud em sua obra: Projeto de uma psicologia. Para tal nos propusemos a examinar a teoria geral do aparelho psíquico desenvolvida pelo autor e a teoria freudiana da cognição, bem como a natureza das representações no pensamento prático. Acreditamos que este estudo possa fundamentar o entendimento das diferentes formas de pensar. / This research aims at analyzing the forms of thinking according to Freud's works Project of a psychology. For this purpose we intended to examine the general theory of the psychic apparel developed by the author and the Freudian theory of cognition, as well as the nature of representations in the practical thought. We believed that this study can be interesting to understand the different ways of thinking.