Typescript. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii, 1969. / Bibliography: leaves 431-437. / xi, 437 l tables

<p>Proponents of lean production (LP) argue that successful implementation is dependent on creating an organisational climate that complements the adoption and implementation of innovation. Transformation of the organisational climate, from a culture of adversarialism (management versus workers) and worker exclusion (in terms of decision making) toward a culture of co-operation and worker participation, is thus a necessary complement to LP. Successful implementation of LP, and associated practices, thus requires the commitment of all stakeholders. This study explores worker attitudes towards transition to LP within a chosen company in the South African auto components sector. The study focuses on understanding worker perceptions of shifts in Human Resource and Industrial Relations practices which are associated with the transition to LP. The research reports on two surveys of workers to better understand their perceptions of the changes to the relationships among workers, and between workers and management.</p>

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

The competitive environment for manufacturing firms has changed dramatically over the past few decades. Globalization has resulted in many organizations experiencing market pressures to foster a fundamental rethink of the way business is conducted. It is no longer possible for an organization to only focus on its individual operation in order to gain and sustain a competitive advantage. It is now recognized that the success of the individual organization if dependent, to a large extent, on the performance and reliability of its suppliers and customers. Customers now want a wide range of options where they can configure products in accordance with their unique specifications. Hence, logisitics and supply chain management has been introduced as an alternative strategy for businesses in global competition to meet their customers' rapidly changing requirements. / Thesis (DoctorateofBusinessAdministration)--University of South Australia, 2008.

This thesis examines the competitive impact of a trade or industry association. It focuses on the role of such associations in coordinating or orchestrating members to engage in cartel or collusive behaviour, and the effectiveness of such acts. More importantly, it seeks to provide empirical evidence of the presence of coordination and compliance between the association and its members. Providing empirical evidence for the presence of such actions has been a central and difficult issue in uncovering cartel or collusive behaviour by antitrust agencies around the world. / The thesis uses the Indonesian cement industry as a case study, because there have been many assertions that the Indonesian Cement Association has been involved in cartel-like behaviour (market sharing and quota distribution arrangements among members) for some time. Such behaviour was recognised and even sponsored by the Indonesian Government. However, following the change in the regulatory regime as a response to the Indonesian financial crisis of 1997, those assertions largely disappeared. Many Indonesians believed that since such arrangements were prohibited, the cartel-like behaviour of the Association had disappeared. / The general findings suggest that there exist some variations in the behaviour of the Association and its members between the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period. During the pre-crisis period, when such arrangements were still in place, evidence of co-ordinated effort carried out by the Association in relation to most of its members was found. It was also suggested that in the long run, all members of the Association complied with the scheme. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the Association was behaving as an effective cartel. In contrast, during the post-crisis period, when such arrangements were allegedly no longer present, mixed results were found regarding the evidence of a coordinated and compliance relationship with the members. For that reason, it is plausible to suggest that the Association, even if it still carried out cartel-like behaviour, was not an effective cartel. / The structured analysis in this thesis offers a complementary framework for antitrust agencies to enhance their efforts to detect the presence of cartel practices, particularly those conducted by trade associations and when direct evidence is not available. In addition, the framework will also increase the capacity of antitrust agencies to adopt a more proactive role rather than waiting for whistleblowers. The framework can potentially also be used to indicate the existence of other forms of collusive behaviour such as tacit collusion, whereby conspirator firms may act in concert without any formal agreement. / Thesis (PhD)--University of South Australia, 2006.

Chain store business through different operations (such as franchise system) has developed quickly around the world. Especially in mainland China and Taiwan, chain stores have been growing dramatically. This research discusses the internal and external problems from chain businesses to become internationalization and globalization based in their franchise system. / Thesis (DBA(DBusinessAdministration))--University of South Australia, 2005.

This portfolio explores lean production implementation and the priority given by companies to adopt lean production technologies and practices. / Thesis (DBA(DoctorateofBusinessAdministration))--University of South Australia, 2004.

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

This thesis provides the background to and an analysis of the economics of exploring for and developing oil and gas discoveries in India. It is aimed at helping the oil and gas industry assess the financial attractiveness of investment in that country. The thesis describes the geography, climate, infrastructure, and energy market with an emphasis on how these affect upstream oil and gas industry investment. A detailed description and analysis is given of the petroleum production sharing contract (&quotPSC&quot) terms embodied in India's New Exploration Licensing Policy (&quotNELP&quot), and demonstrates that, depending on negotiations, Government Take under NELP terms is likely to be in the range 50% to 60% for a stand-alone petroleum development. However, PSC terms are regressive for marginal discoveries. In particular, State royalties might hinder the development of small or marginal discoveries and render them uneconomic. As an illustration, depending on the oil price, up to 6 MMbbls of oil in otherwise economically viable small fields in a geological basin might be made uneconomic and left stranded because of the effect of royalties. The thesis also analyses the economics of developing a sample of actual Indian oil and gas fields offshore the east and west coasts of the country in shallow and deep water. Onshore field developments are not analysed because of lack of data. All of the offshore developments analysed are profitable based on past and current economic conditions and knowledge. The majority are also relatively low-risk investments. Finally, the thesis evaluates the profitability of new oil and gas exploration and development offshore the east and west coasts of India. The required minimum size of new exploration prospects are in the range 10 to 17 MMbbls for oil prospects and 138 to 1,100 Bcf for gas prospects assuming a low probability of success. Once a new discovery is made, the required minimum economically developable reserves are 4 to 12 MMbbls for oil discoveries and 63 to 1,400 Bcf for gas discoveries.