This paper explores the monopsonistic implications of restricting bargaining power through the rookie draft and the concept of countervailing forces. It examines both the legal framework and the empirical outcomes of the court’s policy choices. This paper accomplishes this inquiry by exploiting the fact that players drafted late in the last round tend to be similar to players selected as undrafted free agents in expectation. This allows a natural experiment on the impact of the draft. In order to measure the impact of the draft, this paper examines career outcomes both in terms of compensation and length. I ultimately find little evidence that the draft creates monopsony power, and I provide some evidence suggesting that monopsony power impacts all rookies, as one would expect from an insider-outsider model.

A historical overview of the collective bargaining process in the three major American sports, and a comparative analysis of the current collective bargaining agreements.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 238-252). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Stefan C. Norrbin, Florida State University, College of Social Sciences, Department of Economics. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 16, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2009. / "Graduate Program in Global Affairs." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-161).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2009. / "Graduate Program in Global Affairs." Includes bibliographical references (p. 240-258).

Thesis (D. Jur.)--York University, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 377-399). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ59160.

Thesis (LL. M.)--York University, 2000. / "Graduate Programme in Law." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-142). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ59173.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 238-252). Also available on the Internet.

This dissertation uses laboratory economic experiments to test the incentive effects of regulatory policies and practices under asymmetric information conditions. Significant results and policy implications are obtained on the traditional use of rate-of-return regulation (RORR) to regulate natural monopolies, and on the practice of restricting such firms from entering ancillary markets. The objective of the first several chapters is to test the incentive effects of RORR on market performance. Results confirm long-standing theories of incentive malfunctions of RORR. One result shows that under voluntary compliance, RORR is completely ineffective for regulating single sellers when cost information is private to firms, allowing them to misrepresent costs and earn monopoly profits. When firm's do not know market demand, they capture less surplus, but still earn above RORR expected returns. When stochastic auditing is added varying penalty rates and audit probabilities, significant cost overestimates remain common. Theoretical analysis explains the potential source of this anomaly as being the use of historical cost information in rate setting when excess profits are used as the audit benchmark. Other results show that in perfect repeated static implementations of RORR, wasteful input use will occur manifested as rate base padding or Averch-Johnson type selection of inefficient input combinations. Another chapter addresses the consequences of deregulating RORR franchise firms allowing them to enter ancillary markets. A stylized model of the telecommunications industry is created and experimentally tested to determine if anti-competitive firm behavior results when entry restrictions are lifted. Results offer no support for the arguments that regulated firms will use monopoly market earnings to underwrite ancillary market operations ("deep pocket"), engage in predatory pricing, or unfair competition. Economic arguments for removing entry barriers to improve market performance (increased output and lower prices) are substantiated.