Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of New South Wales, 2004. / Also available online.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 45-50) Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--Worcester Polytechnic Institute. / Keywords: Resampling; Portfolio Optimization; Transaction Costs; Mean-Variance Optimization. Includes bibliographical references (p. 23).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Richard C. Feiock, Florida State University, College of Social Science, Askew School of Public Administration and Policy. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Jan. 24, 2006). Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 133 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

A condução de processos de falência ou de recuperação geram custos, principalmente, aos seus participantes diretos: credores e devedora. Esses custos são chamados custos de falência e são classificados em diretos e indiretos. Os custos diretos são representados pelas despesas administrativas do processo jurídico, tais como honorários do administrador judicial, custas e despesas judiciais. Os indiretos são os custos de oportunidade incorridos para os participantes devido à participação em processos de falência ou de recuperação, tais como a dificuldade em obter crédito, ou o tempo despendido no processo. Admitindo-se a presença desses custos, este trabalho objetivou identificar, mensurar e classificar os custos de falência para os participantes diretos desses processos (devedor e credores) conduzidos sob a legislação falimentar brasileira a fim de compará-los aos custos encontrados em trabalhos internacionais que trataram sobre o tema. Por meio da consulta de processos de falência e de recuperação judicial nas comarcas de São Paulo-SP, Belo Horizonte-MG e Contagem-MG, foi possível coletar os dados necessários para o desenvolvimento desta pesquisa. Como resultados principais foram encontrados que os desembolsos ocorridos nos processos de falência foram de em média 35% do ativo final da falida, os ativos das falidas perderam, em média 47% do valor, a taxa de recuperação total dos credores foi de, em média, 12% e os processos duraram 9 anos, em média. Em relação aos processos de recuperação, os custos diretos foram de, em média, 26% do ativo inicial da recuperanda, a taxa de recuperação dos credores foi, em média, de 25% e a duração de processos foi de 4 anos, em média. A análise dos resultados conduziu à indicação de que o processo falimentar brasileira é moroso e oneroso, considerando-se os resultados encontrados nos estudos internacionais utilizados como parâmetro, e que a dificuldade em se maximizar o valor do ativo da falida e ressarcir credores em ambos os procedimentos é um desafio não somente para o Brasil. / The procedure of bankruptcy generates direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy to its participants. Direct costs are represented by the expenses incurred during the legal procedure, such as trustee\'s fees, legal costs and expenses. The indirect costs are the opportunity costs incurred for the participants due to participation in liquidation or reorganization. Assuming the presence of these costs, this study aimed to identify, measure and classify bankruptcy costs of Brazilian bankruptcy law to direct participants of proceedings (debtor and creditors) and to compare them to the costs found in international studies that treated on the subject. Through documentary research, it was possible to collect the necessary data for the development of research that had as its main results that the direct costs of liquidation represented in this sample, on average 11.63% of the initial asset of the bankrupt, and in the reorganization, these costs were average 25.46 % of the initial asset of the firm. The asset bankrupt companies lost an average of 46.84 % of the value. Regarding the creditor recovery rates in the liquidation it was, on average, 12.40 % and 25.36 % in the reorganization. The results led to the indication that the Brazilian bankruptcy law is slower than results of international studies and the difficulty in maximizing the value of the bankrupt\'s assets and repay creditors in both procedures is a challenge not only to Brazil.

Trading companies have played and continue to play significant and strategic roles in international trade, supporting the export of manufacturers and the import of purchasing companies. The transaction costs economics, indicated that the role of trading companies is reducing the transaction costs during export. However, the rise of transition economies, such as China, which has become one of the most important players in international trade, leads to two gaps in existing studies. First, the trading companies from these countries and regions have been kept as a “black box”, compared with relative numerous studies on developed countries. Second, the local institutions, which are considered as main determinants on business models in transition economies, are most likely to affect the transaction costs during export, and trading companies’ characteristics and their methods of reducing transaction costs. Therefore, the aims of this study were to explore these institution-related transaction costs in China’s export market, and how Chinese ETCs operate one more efficient indirect export market compared with one direct market between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers. Correspondingly, the main research questions were: 1) what are the institutions, which generate transaction costs for domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers, in China’s export market? And 2) how do Chinese exporting trading companies respond to such institution-related costs as an intermediary between domestic manufacturers and foreign buyers. A qualitative multiple-case approach was chosen. Six Chinese ETCs were selected, with their export processes as embedded units. The main sources of data included semi-conducted interviews and in-depth field observation. In addition, secondary data, such as newspapers, industrial reports, also contributed to the context of the cases. With one integrative analytical framework, this study identified a couple of institutional constraints in China’s export markets, including the bureaucratic procedures and administrative approvals, inefficient legal system and informal contract obligation, and long-term OEM trading methods. These institutions were involved in the whole procedure of export transaction, from the manufacturing by domestic manufacturers to the purchase by the foreign buyers and generated additional transaction costs in different steps, ranging from search, negotiation, to enforcement. Even though the transaction costs were greatly increased because of the export-related institutional constraints, the findings further reveal that Chinese ETCs can reduce these institution-related transaction costs by a series of effective methods, such as acquirement of knowledge on administrative procedures, collection of information on production, vertical integration, offering supplementary functions for dysfunctional domestic manufacturers and so on. The relevant explanations are twofold. As explained in traditional economic theories, Chinese ETCs’ also relied on economies of scale to reduce institution-related transaction costs. Moreover, Chinese ETCs adopted some approaches affiliated to export-related institutions, such as long-term reselling system and monopoly of export authority in history in China’s export market, and this is the first time that institutional perspective were applied to explain the transaction behaviour of trading companies. To sum up, this study extends our understanding of Chinese export trading companies and export-related institutions in China’s export market, enhances traditional transaction costs analysis on trading companies by adding the perspective from foreign buyers, and integrates institutional perspective into transaction costs analysis to better explain ETCs’ business model in transition economies. Last but not least, the findings in this study are also helpful for practitioners and policy-makers from transition economies in order to improve their export performance and local export-related institutional arrangements.

The wood energy market remains nascent in the UK, despite climate change policies and energy security concerns. Transaction costs have been identified as one barrier to woodfuel development. However, few studies provide explicit insights into such barriers to spontaneous exchange in this sector and how they influence its formation. The study approaches the development of woodfuel in the South West Region of England through Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) and aims to identify the appropriate governance structure of the supply chain as a response to existing transactions costs. When transaction costs increase, seamless market exchange gradually gives way to credible contracting and even to full vertical integration or unified ownership. The TCE approach provides insights to analyse friction and barriers to exchange and allows for a dialogue between economics, law and day-to-day business decision-making. Fuel procurement from woodfuel suppliers to woodfuel users is central to this project in looking at the barriers to exchange. Original data was collected through 42 in-depth interviews, mainly with suppliers themselves but also from Forestry Commission, regional agencies, NGOs and lobbies involved. The results suggest the influence of transaction costs. Also, there is some evidence that wood-energy regional actors are embracing organisational diversity from known rural business structures to less familiar ones in the UK, such as cooperatives and new partnerships as answers to, among other factors, transaction costs. The evidence suggests that not only support to demand and supply is necessary, as generally identified, but it is also needed at its interface by supporting the governance of the supply chain. Some practical implications for both public and private sectors are identified to better articulate the response to this need.

Transaction cost economics (TCE) theorists traditionally have classified transactions between firms as governed by either market or hierarchy. By assessing characteristics of the transaction - asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency - firms choose the governance form which minimizes transaction costs, the costs of administering the business deal. During the 1980s, however, TCE has found itself unable to explain the proliferation of strategic alliances. These hybrid relationships seek the benefits of both markets and hierarchies, including quasi-integration, the control of assets without actual ownership. Further, hybrids tend to prefer trust-based relational contracting. TCE's acknowledgment of hybrids, however, raises other questions surrounding the behavioral assumptions which supposedly influence the transaction characteristic governance linkage. Various dissenting researchers have theorized that (1) trust is more dominant in business than opportunism (2) the behavioral assumptions actually function as variables in different contexts, and (3) trust offers an integration mechanism for behavioral variables.

We consider agent trading futures on a market with small transaction costs. Her capital is deposited on a money market account, where compounding is possible. Arithmetic Brownian motion with random coefficients is considered as a model for futures strike price. The coefficients are assumed to be bounded Itô processes with bounded coefficients. Under these assumptions, an almost optimal interval strategy is derived, which almost maximizes expected utility in certain stopping times under hyperbolic absolute risk aversion utility function. Furthermore, under logarithmic utility function the derived strategy almost maximizes expected utility in wide class of (integrable) stopping times.