This study examines the effects of political representation on economic inequality across western industrialized democracies. I explore an explanation of increases in economic inequality as a consequence of less representative democratic institutions. Explaining economic inequality in this manner is a shift from to the Transatlantic Consensus that attributes increased economic inequality to globalization. I expect to find that more representative electoral and governments institutions will be associated with lower levels of economic inequality. The analysis takes place across twenty-three countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) over the past forty years using a cross-sectional longitudinal model. Variables used to operationalize the level of representation of democratic institutions include a novel variable of the representative ratio, the effective number of parties, an index of institutional constraints, presidential system, single member districts, and judicial review. Voter turnout, the percentage of seats held by women, gross domestic product per capita, unemployment, and the size of the industrial sector are used as control variables. The findings support the main hypothesis: as political representation increases, economic inequality decreases.