This thesis is dedicated to the Financial Law, namely to a special part of this branch of law - Banking Law, with a special focus on legal aspects of commercial and investment banking. This thesis concentrates on the specifics of the universal banking system applied in the Czech Republic. Chapter 1 deals with the general terms and concepts of the Banking Law, namely with the different types of banks and/or other financial institutions, as well as explanation of their different functions in the banking system of the Czech Republic. This chapter furthermore provides general overview of the structure of the banking and financial system of the Czech Republic. Chapter 2 covers the functions and characteristics of two fundamental types of banks, i.e. of commercial and investment banks and provides characteristics of their common features as well as the differences between them, from the perspectives of economics and law. Chapter 3 concentrates on three different banking models, namely on model of universal banking system, segmented banking system and hybrid banking system. This chapter also provides comparison of pros and cons of the above mentioned banking models. Chapter 4 looks in detail on a model of integration of investment banking into the banking system of the Czech Republic and furthermore, on...

This study explores two issues, one is to investigate the determinants of net interest margins and bank risk-taking from 1993 to 2001 in a partial universal banking system, taking Taiwan as our example, and the other is to provide some empirical evidences of exchange ratio determination of bank mergers in Taiwan. In the first topic, the partial universal banking system here is a mix of the conventional commercial banking system (whose activity is mainly loan-deposit taking) and the universal banking system (engaging in both loan-deposit and investment activities). We employ the recently developed method of the panel data threshold regression method to estimate the determinant function of the net interest margin and bank risk-taking model. It is found that the corporate governance plays an important role in explaining the recent behavior of the banking industry. The empirical results show that the net interest margins in the commercial banking system are affected by credit risk, interest rate risk, the degree of leverage and management quality, unlike the net interest margins in the universal banking system which are more sensitive to only-credit risk and the degree of leverage. Moreover, the relationship between managerial ownership and credit risk taking behavior is inverse U-shape in the commercial banking system, consistent with the corporate control hypothesis, unlike U-shape relation in the universal banking system that supports moral-hazard hypothesis. In the second topic, we not only extend Larson and Gonedes (1969) merger exchange ratio model to taking account of market risk and more participants but also apply Marsh-Merton dividend behavior reduced form (1987) to estimate the expected post-merger price-earnings ratio. Taking the first case of the bank merger according to the Financial Institution Merger Law as our sample, we find that the L-G model indicates the interval of exchange ratios that enhance, or at least not cause any diminution in the wealth positions of all parties to a proposed bank merger. Also, the bargaining area offers some information to help merger candidates to negotiate final actual exchange ratio.

Abstract This dissertation explores two interrelated aspects of banking crises and bank regulations in perspective of regulator¡¦s soft budget constraints (SBCs in brief) and bank top management compensation. First, this paper models, in a game of incomplete information, bank behavior during banking crises when asymmetric information exists between regulators and banks. Here, I show that the situation creates the incentives for banks to roll over their defaulting loans to disguise their financial statements. Although a prudential regulator may mitigate this incentive by offering a ¡§slack¡¨ rescue packages, the bank¡¦s reputational concern may cause them to reject rescue offers. In this instance, regulators may be forced to offer amounts of recapitalization that will meet the amount necessary to restore banks to solvency. Otherwise, banks may have to gamble for resurrection, or wait until the banking crises become severe, and then more banks become insolvent, regulators have to offer optimal rescue packages subject to SBCs. New findings include (1) During banking crises, the optimal regulatory policies, on the one hand, may cause regulators have to offer rescue or bailout packages subject to different SBCs, on the other hand, mitigate banker¡¦s moral hazard. The more severe the crises will be, the greater soft budget constrained to regulators. (2) The potential severity of banking crises can be measured by the ratios, getting from net worth over the total amount of recapitalization offered by regulators and recovered from nonperforming loans. (3) As banking crises become severe, the cost of rescue becomes larger than that of bailout, the best regulatory policy is to intervene; On the contrary, if a situation labeled ¡§ too-many-to-fail¡¨ arises, the regulators may offer to rescue distressed banks subject to SBC. (4)As Bayesian equilibrium cost of regulator in crises is increasing, a random creative ambiguity for regulators to offer bailout or rescue plans may be the optimal policy to mitigate the expectation of SBC for banks . Second, this paper also shows that in the circumstances of universal banking or bank holding company, concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios and risk-based deposit insurance may be ineffective in controlling banker¡¦s risk-taking and moral hazard. Here, this paper follows, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the insurance premium scheme incorporate features of top management compensation. In a model of universal banking with two-periods and three-subsidiaries or departments, bank owner pre-commits to regulators to pick an optimal management compensation structure that induces the first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank¡¦s management. Findings include (1) If insurance premium is not fairly priced, the incentives are created for banks to have a ¡§regulatory arbitrage¡¨ by segregating its nonperforming assets from the investment bank, and shift it to the commercial bank, that increases the deposit-insurer an additional risk liability, and aggravates the risk-shifting within the universal bank; and vice versa. (2) Given management contracts{ fixed salary, a bonus paid, a fraction of equity of the bank} and { fixed salary, a penalty , a fraction of equity}for bank and security investment department respectively ; and a capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome , here bonus paid larger than 0, a penalty larger than 0, a fraction of equity between 0 and 1, then the investment policies implemented by managers, is less risky than when manger¡¦s interests are fully aligned with the equity interests. (3) Given a fairly priced insurance premium, and capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal management compensation structure can internalize the cost of moral hazard and induce the Pareto-optimal and department-equilibrium investment policies, thus mitigate moral hazard under universal banking. Finally, the state-owned and half-state-owned banks have experienced the institution-induced ineffectiveness; and the latter suffer from poor business performance level, partially because of the issues of ownership structure. This paper shows the investment policy with moral hazard under these banks incorporated with optimal compensation structures, and given capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal policies induced, that will improve their business performance level. This paper also shows that as the controlling shareholders have power over banks in excess of their cash flow rights, the incentives will be created for them to expropriate the minority shareholders. And, when the incentives for expropriation exists, the investment policy will be distorted with the managerial bias induced by their private benefits, and deteriorate morale of the banks. The regulatory mandatory requirements of one-share-one-vote principle may be proposed, instead.