Over the last two decades, following a long history of mass violence in Burundi and Rwanda, transitional justice (TJ) efforts were deployed in the two countries. Observing, particularly after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, that cycles of violence had devastated these two nations, a number of international organisations encouraged and financed socio-political and judicial responses with the aim of building sustainable peace in the region. The gacaca courts have been at the centre of the TJ process in Rwanda, and the negotiations over a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) remain the key focus in the Burundian TJ process. The local contexts have not been the sole influence on the design and implementation of the initiatives: the consolidation of TJ as a field of practice on a global level has also been of paramount importance. Under scrutiny in this thesis is the ‘battlefield' in which TJ practitioners argue about the past, a battlefield created by the frictions between the universal TJ discourse, the resulting technocratic aid practices and the often silenced, but highly politicised negotiations and implementation on the ground. My research establishes that while TJ practitioners disseminate a positive discourse designed to help societies emerging from violence, their practices are actually embedded in trenchant hierarchical structures and tensions from the violent past. I argue that their efforts, delivered through performative and technocratic work, too often ignore the hierarchical social and political structures in which they operate. Furthermore, the assumption that their technical work can fix dysfunctional states results not only in a silencing of the social and political dynamics in play, but also demonstrates a form of imperialism and colonialism, leading to the reproduction of multi-layered unequal structures, paternalistic behaviours towards beneficiaries, privileging of implementers over supposed beneficiaries, and the repetition of counter-effective practices. These efforts and silences have the potential to exacerbate the issues rather than to alleviate them. This analysis engages with two academic debates: first, the questionable capacity of ‘professionalised' and ‘universalised' TJ mechanisms to deal with past crimes; and, second, whether aid practices can effectively contribute to ‘sustainable peace', ‘development' and ‘democracy' in post-conflict contexts. My analysis is driven by the following research questions: Why is the role of practitioners and their everyday crucial to understanding TJ processes? How does the professionalisation of aid and TJ shape the practices of TJ in Burundi and Rwanda? How and why do frictions between academic theory, policy discourse and everyday practice of TJ impact on outcomes on the ground? In conclusion, my research illustrates the way in which TJ professionalised practices constitute a battlefield, with “ongoing struggles in the battle for the nature and direction of the transition” being a metaconflict ‒ a “conflict about what the conflict is about”, in which TJ victors tilt all transitional mechanisms “towards an end point for transition that approximates” to their “battlefield goals” (Bell 2009). Within these everyday battles, TJ practitioners are playing a crucial role in the implementation of TJ. Through the dissemination of their expertise, they act as ‘brokers' and ‘translators' of the TJ toolkit approach. They, particularly the most powerful practitioners, produce interpretations and offer “scripts into which others can be recruited for a period” (Lewis and Mosse 2006, 13). As Norman Long (1992, 275) points out in looking at development actors, their professional practices constitute a “knowledge battlefield” in relation to “the issues of conflicting loyalties, of negotiation over ‘truth' claims, of battles over images and contesting interests.” Describing how TJ practitioners work around policy and practice in Rwanda and Burundi, I demonstrate how the gacaca law and the Burundian TRC law, and their policy frameworks and implementing activities, have all been created around the same global discourse. But the actual negotiations of specific prescriptions and implementation have led to very different practices being moulded around different dynamics of power by actors and organisations involved in these processes. Whereas these dynamics are but natural, silencing them behind technocratic knowledge, however, has severe implications. In contrast to most of the TJ literature making reference to civil society and international donors, my research underlines the role and consequences of their everyday politics, through which the directions of the TJ agenda are decided and implemented. Building on social anthropology and development studies, I underline the entanglement formed between TJ and aid, and bring attention to unattended effects of TJ practices, including how power has a play in policy implementation and how unequal relations are reproduced. Doing so, I expand the critical TJ scholarship and the calls for ‘localising transitional justice', as well as developing the understanding of the limitations of TJ processes in Rwanda and Burundi.

This paper aimed to analyse the impact of power sharing on democracy. The paper also compared the approach of Burundi and Rwanda in their constitutions to the concept of power sharing.

This paper aimed to analyse the impact of power sharing on democracy. The paper also compared the approach of Burundi and Rwanda in their constitutions to the concept of power sharing.

This thesis is about agricultural intensification and the role of smallholder farmers in the future of agriculture in Rwanda. Intensification of agriculture has been the central objective of policy in Rwanda since independence in 1962. Over five decades, one of the dominant approaches to achieving this goal has been through mixed farming, i.e. the integration of crop and livestock production. However, despite continued efforts to transform agricultural and rural livelihood through mixed farming, many farmers have not achieved intensification. Thus, there seems to be a critical disjuncture between the government's vision of modern agriculture based on increasing levels of intensification and commercialisation, and the ability of many smallholders to engage with this intensification and commercialisation agenda. In this thesis, I argue that the disjuncture between the long-standing policy objective and Rwanda's rural realities poses serious repercussions to the rural development and the livelihoods of millions of smallholder farmers. I substantiate the argument by addressing the following question: “how does the integration of crop and livestock production contribute to agricultural intensification for smallholder farmers in Rwanda?” Firstly, I situate the research context within the historical development of agricultural policies promoting the mixed farming agenda. Secondly, I study two villages in Rwamagana district as rural and peri-urban cases. Various patterns of interactions between crop and livestock production systems are identified, characterised and analysed within the broader household livelihood strategies. Thirdly, I incorporate the life history accounts of farmers with diverse background and capabilities to engage in mixed farming to better understand the wide-ranging issue of livestock-based asset accumulation which is crucial for the crop-livestock integration. Finally, I discuss the implications for the government's continued efforts to transform agriculture and rural livelihoods through mixed farming and possible ways to assist many farmers who lack the resources required for intensification through integrated crop-livestock production.

Using ethnographic data and James Scott's (1990) concepts of public and hidden transcripts, this thesis examines fow the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government's public transcript has been institutionalised through the use of 'genocide ideology' laws. It is concerned with understanding how the RPF's use of ‘genocide ideology' is a mechanism to facilitate a continuum of violence, which I argue has led to ‘ethnic' marginalisation. ‘Genocide ideology' is a legally abstract term that refers to discourses that contest – consciously or unconsciously - the government narrative regarding the 1994 genocide. As focusing strictly om the public transcript does not tell the whole storry about power relations between the RPF government and Hutu, it also explores hidden transcript. This is necessary as the Rwandan government employs the category of ‘genocide ideology' to silence dissent and to justify arbitrary arrest. For example, since taking power, the RPF government has strived to eliminate the Hutu/Tutsi identities, replacing the divisive identities with ‘Rwandan.' Those who use Hutu/Tutsi identities outside the context of the genocide are considered génocidaire sympathisers and legally guilty of ‘genocide ideology'. I argue that within the public RPF transcript on the genocide, the victim/perpetrator dichotomy has become intertwined with Tutsi/Hutu identities, creating a hierarchy of victimhood. I concluded by arguing that the violence, fear and marginalisation experienced by participants through the government's use of the public transcript in conjunction with ‘genocide ideology' laws is causing resentment, which could lead to further conflict.

Magister Legum - LLM / This paper aimed to analyse the impact of power sharing on democracy. The paper also compared the approach of Burundi and Rwanda in their constitutions to the concept of power sharing. / South Africa