Dengue is a major public health problem that affects tens of millions of people annually in tropical and sub-tropical countries. This acute viral infection happens to be severe and even life threatening but there is still no available drug or vaccine. Previous studies have noted early higher viral burden in patients who develop more severe symptoms suggesting that administration of a potent and safe antiviral may prevent progression to severe dengue. To verify this hypothesis, we have conducted the first RCT directed towards reducing the viral burden in vivo by administrating chloroquine (CQ), a cheap and well-tolerated drug that inhibits DENV in vitro with concentrations achievable in vivo, to 307 Vietnamese adults with suspected dengue (257 of them were laboratory-confirmed cases). Unfortunately, we did not see an effect of CQ on the duration of infection. However in patients treated with CQ, we observed a trend towards a lower incidence of severe forms. We did not find any differences in the immune response that can explain this trend. We also found more adverse events, primarily vomiting, with CQ. In addition, we have explored the relationships between clinical features, antibody responses and virological markers in these patients. We found that the early magnitude of viremia is positively associated with disease severity and there are serotype dependent differences in infection kinetics. We found as well that DENV was cleared faster and earlier in patients with secondary infections. To complete this study, we have also evaluated 2 rapid lateral flow tests for the diagnosis of dengue in a panel of plasma samples from 245 RT-PCR confirmed dengue patients and 47 with other febrile illnesses. Our data suggest that the NS1 test component of these tests are highly specific and have similar levels of sensitivity (~60%). Both NS1 assays were significantly more sensitive for primary than secondary dengue. The IgM parameter in the SD Duo test improved overall test sensitivity without compromising specificity. All these findings are of major importance for further anti-viral drug testing.

La participation du Canada à la Commission Internationale de Supervision et de Contrôle au Vietnam, de 1954 à 1957, ne cadre pas dans ce qui a été défini comme l'âge d'or de la diplomatie canadienne. L'internationalisme canadien et son désir de se présenter en puissance moyenne indépendante ne se sont pas réalisés. Nous avançons que les pressions inhérentes à la guerre froide ont empêché le Canada de se comporter de façon juste et impartiale dans un conflit qui impliquait des protagonistes des deux blocs. Malgré une politique très indépendante des blocs en repoussant la reconnaissance de Bao Dai au début des années 1950, le Canada ne sera pas en mesure de conserver cette position et devra donner son appui au gouvernement de Bao Dai. À partir de là, la politique étrangère canadienne s'alignera de plus en plus sur celle de Washington, au point de s'y fondre et d'en devenir un acteur sur le terrain au Vietnam. Cependant, le Canada n'a pas su saisir l'opportunité que lui offrait l'Inde de former un mouvement non-aligné pour mettre fin aux combats en Indochine. L'alignement du Canada sur les États-Unis n'était donc pas inévitable. Le premier chapitre traite de la politique étrangère canadienne entre de 1947 à la conférence de Genève de 1954. Au cours de cette période, le Canada fait montre d'une grande vis-à-vis de ses alliés de l'OTAN. À cette époque, le Canada est tenté par le mouvement non-aligné initié par l'Inde. Même s'il aspire à une plus grande influence sur les enjeux touchant le Pacifique, le gouvernement canadien fera tout ce qu'il peut pour être tenu à l'écart d'une implication directe dans le conflit indochinois. Toutefois, les puissances réunies à Genève en décideront autrement et inviteront le Canada à siéger à la CISC. Une invitation qu'Ottawa ne pourra pas refuser. Le deuxième chapitre porte sur les semaines qui suivirent la fin de la conférence de Genève en juillet 1954. C'est durant cette période que le gouvernement canadien définit sa politique relative à sa participation à la CISC, ainsi que le commissaire à la tête de sa délégation. À partir de ce moment, le Canada adoptera une politique confuse et ambiguë, mais assurément anticommuniste. Ottawa voulait paraître impartial, tout en luttant contre le communisme. Pour Ottawa, l'important est de préserver une bonne image du Canada à l'étranger. Le dernier chapitre concerne la mise en application de la politique canadienne à travers sa délégation à la CISC, entre 1954 et 1957. Nous verrons que les pressions de la guerre froide au sein de la CISC pousseront les Canadiens à défendre de plus en plus ouvertement les intérêts anti-communistes des occidentaux. La délégation canadienne s'affairera à défendre la politique de l'anticommuniste Ngo Dinh Diem au Sud, au détriment du gouvernement de Ho Chi Minh au Nord. Le Canada ira même jusqu'à vouloir empêcher la tenue d'élections libres au Vietnam et à bloquer les travaux de la CISC. C'est vers la fin de la période étudiée que la politique canadienne au Vietnam s'aligne véritablement sur celle de Washington au point de défendre ses infractions aux accords de Genève. Notamment en défendant l'envoie de troupes américaines sur le territoire vietnamien. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Canada, Vietnam, Indochine, Genève, Commission, International, Supervision, Contrôle, Politique, Paix, Guerre froide.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Uppsala : Sveriges lantbruksuniv., 2007. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

Diss. Uppsala : Sveriges lantbruksuniv., 2007.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Uppsala : Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet, 2006. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

Le présent mémoire aborde les problématiques morales de la scission corps-esprit chez les soldats de la guerre du Việt Nam telles que représentées à travers certains films traitant de cette guerre. Notre démarche sera centrée sur le travail individuel que propose le film Apocalypse Now, plutôt que sur la representation de la guerre. Nous postulons que ce film met les individus devant les contradictions inhérentes d'une société qui prétend justement pacifier le monde en faisant la guerre, et qui plus est, comme ce fut le cas au Việt Nam, au moyen d’un déchainement de violence qui dépasse l'entendement (torture, massacre de masses, napalm et Agent Orange). Notre hypothèse est que le film, à travers son personnage central, nous propose une « voie » qui n’empêche pas la guerre, certes, mais permet du moins d'entreprendre une demarche de distanciation et de redefinition morale individuelle permettant de survivre au(x) temps de guerre(s). Cette mutation morale, chez le personnage principal, s'acquiert au bout d'un voyage réflexif à tout point de vue « au coeur des ténèbres » – de la jungle, tout autant que de son être. / This master’s thesis addresses some moral issues of the body/spirit dichotomy, induced in the military training, in the Vietnam War vets as portrayed in several films on that war. Our work will be centered on the work of the individual as suggested in Apocalypse Now, rather than on the depiction of the war. We contend that this film puts the individuals in front of the contradictions of a society that pretends to pacify the world using war, and inasmuch, as was the case in Vietnam, using a conspicuous outburst of violence (torture, mass murder, napalm, Agent Orange). We hypothesize that the film, through its main character, propose a “way” which doesn’t eradicate war, but suggest that we can take a step to redefine our moral standpoint in front of ourselves to heal the wounds caused by Wars. This individual moral mutation, in the main character, is the result of a reflexive process, on all accords at the “heart of darkness”, of the jungle as much as of his soul.

Au tournant du XXe siècle, la neurasthénie – ou épuisement nerveux – est devenue une maladie populaire en Occident et jusqu’au Japon en raison de son association avec la modernité. De nombreux rapprochements ont été faits entre ce diagnostic introduit en 1869 aux États-Unis et certaines maladies contemporaines comme la dépression, le syndrome de fatigue chronique, l’épuisement professionnel et toute la panoplie des maladies causées par le stress. Les transformations socioculturelles qu’a connues le Viêt Nam sous colonisation, principalement au cours des décennies 1920 et 1930, ont été propices à la dissémination du langage des nerfs et à l’appropriation du diagnostic de neurasthénie. Ce mémoire de maîtrise en histoire se penche sur les transformations sociales survenues sous le gouvernement colonial français, dont l’urbanisation et l’instruction publique, au milieu desquelles ont émergé les nouvelles classes moyennes urbaines qui ont adopté le diagnostic de neurasthénie. À partir de la presse vietnamienne de la période, ce travail met l’accent sur l’appropriation, les causes et les traitements de la maladie. Utilisant une approche comparant la neurasthénie en Occident, au Japon et en Chine, pour ensuite présenter son entrée au Viêt Nam, il montre que la domination et donc la subalternité ont compliqué l’accès des colonisés au diagnostic de la maladie moderne neurasthénie, de même qu’à la modernité. Il fournit toutefois un éclairage sur les débuts de l’histoire du diagnostic, encore utilisé de nos jours au Viêt Nam, d’une maladie appelée « la maladie de l’époque ». / At the turn of the 20th century, the diagnostic term neurasthenia – or nervous exhaustion coined by American neurologist George Miller Beard in 1869 – was associated with modern civilization. Hence, the term rapidly spread to most Western countries and as far as Japan. Our contemporary language of stress, burn-out, depression and chronic fatigue syndrome has a history that goes back to the birth of the term neurasthenia. As Vietnam underwent deep sociocultural transformations during the French colonial era, especially during the 1920s and 1930s, life conditions became increasingly conducive to the dissemination of the language of nerves and to the appropriation of the term neurasthenia by middle class Vietnamese. This Master’s thesis on the early history of neurasthenia in Vietnam looks into the social transformations effected by the French colonial government, mainly urbanization and public education, which lead to the emergence of a new vietnamese urban middle class. Based on the vietnamese press of the period, it analyzes the appropriation of the diagnostic term neurasthenia by the Vietnamese, the causes to which they attributed neurasthenia, as well as the main treatments proposed by Vietnamese doctors. After comparing how neurasthenia was appropriated in a few Western countries, as well as in Japan and China, and then showing its appropriation in Vietnam, it shows that colonized status meant a somehow limited access to the “modern” disease neurasthenia, somehow similar to the access to “modernity”, due to political domination. The thesis then sheds light on the early history of a diagnosis still used nowadays in Vietnam, of a disease still called there “the disease of our time”.