Business leaders increasingly face pressure from stakeholders to be transparent. There appears however little consensus on the risks and payoffs of disclosing vital information such as corporate strategy. To fill this gap, this study analyzes firm-specific determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder theory and agency theory help to understand whether companies serve their interest to engage with stakeholders and overcome information asymmetries. I connect these theories and propose a comprehensive approach to measure voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Hypotheses from the theoretical framework are empirically tested through panel regression of data on identified determinants and outcomes and of disclosed strategy through annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports, corporate websites and corporate press releases by the 70 largest publicly listed companies in the Netherlands from 2003 through 2008. I found that industry, profitability, dual-listing status, national ranking status and listing age have significant effects on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effects are found for size, leverage and ownership concentration. On outcomes, I found that liquidity of stock and corporate reputation are significantly influenced by voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effect is found for volatility of stock. My contributions to theory, methodology and empirics offers a stepping-stone for further research into understanding how companies can use transparency to manage stakeholder relations.

Business leaders increasingly face pressure from stakeholders to be transparent. There appears however little consensus on the risks and payoffs of disclosing vital information such as corporate strategy. To fill this gap, this study analyzes firm-specific determinants and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder theory and agency theory help to understand whether companies serve their interest to engage with stakeholders and overcome information asymmetries. I connect these theories and propose a comprehensive approach to measure voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Hypotheses from the theoretical framework are empirically tested through panel regression of data on identified determinants and outcomes and of disclosed strategy through annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports, corporate websites and corporate press releases by the 70 largest publicly listed companies in the Netherlands from 2003 through 2008. I found that industry, profitability, dual-listing status, national ranking status and listing age have significant effects on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effects are found for size, leverage and ownership concentration. On outcomes, I found that liquidity of stock and corporate reputation are significantly influenced by voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effect is found for volatility of stock. My contributions to theory, methodology and empirics offers a stepping-stone for further research into understanding how companies can use transparency to manage stakeholder relations.

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<p>Company’s annual report has been widely used by stakeholders such as investors, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors. Information included in annual report consists of both mandatory information required by law, regulations as well as accounting standard and voluntary information depended on management’s judgments. We find that voluntary information vary from company to company. From corporate governance field, we find that the company’s board of directors plays an important role in monitoring the management’s performance and have an impact on management’s judgment, including their decision to disclose information in annual report. Board of directors comprises inside and independent directors. Both of them have incentives to disclose information in annual report.</p><p>In this study, we use quantitative method to examine the association between board composition and different types of voluntary disclosure in listed companies in the Shanghai stock exchange (SSE) of China and OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm. The board composition is measured by the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the board. Voluntary disclosure has been classified into three categories: Strategic information, non-financial information and financial information.</p><p>The results show that there is no significant association between board composition and voluntary disclosure from our samples Chinese and Swedish companies. However, we find association between different types of voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics. We find significant negative association between strategic information and financial leverage for Chinese companies. We find significant negative association between financial information and equity-based management compensation in Swedish companies. On comparison, we find that Swedish companies is inclined to disclose more financial information than Chinese companies while Chinese companies would like to disclose more strategic information than Swedish companies.</p>

We examine whether corporate governance affects the level of information asymmetry in the capital market. We hypothesize that firms with stronger corporate gov-ernance would be more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate information using public rather than selective methods, and that this would be associated with lower levels of in-formation asymmetry. We carefully establish the path through which corporate govern-ance affects a firms voluntary disclosure method based on previous literature. Surpris-ingly, in full sample analysis we find that firms with stronger corporate governance (as measured by Gompers et al.s, 2003, G index) are associated with higher levels of infor-mation asymmetry (as measured by Easley et al.s, 1996, PIN). In subsample analysis, we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, for the most weakly governed firms, stronger corporate governance is associated with lower information asymmetry, and the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry is more pronounced than that of firms with moderate and strong corporate governance. <p> To further test our hypothesis, we consider the external effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the disclosure method to examine the corporate governance-information asymmetry relationship. Consistent with our hypothesis, our evidence suggests that by forbidding the practice of selective disclosure, the regulation significantly decreases the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry level.

We examine whether corporate governance affects the level of information asymmetry in the capital market. We hypothesize that firms with stronger corporate gov-ernance would be more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate information using public rather than selective methods, and that this would be associated with lower levels of in-formation asymmetry. We carefully establish the path through which corporate govern-ance affects a firms voluntary disclosure method based on previous literature. Surpris-ingly, in full sample analysis we find that firms with stronger corporate governance (as measured by Gompers et al.s, 2003, G index) are associated with higher levels of infor-mation asymmetry (as measured by Easley et al.s, 1996, PIN). In subsample analysis, we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, for the most weakly governed firms, stronger corporate governance is associated with lower information asymmetry, and the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry is more pronounced than that of firms with moderate and strong corporate governance. <p> To further test our hypothesis, we consider the external effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the disclosure method to examine the corporate governance-information asymmetry relationship. Consistent with our hypothesis, our evidence suggests that by forbidding the practice of selective disclosure, the regulation significantly decreases the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry level.

Company’s annual report has been widely used by stakeholders such as investors, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors. Information included in annual report consists of both mandatory information required by law, regulations as well as accounting standard and voluntary information depended on management’s judgments. We find that voluntary information vary from company to company. From corporate governance field, we find that the company’s board of directors plays an important role in monitoring the management’s performance and have an impact on management’s judgment, including their decision to disclose information in annual report. Board of directors comprises inside and independent directors. Both of them have incentives to disclose information in annual report. In this study, we use quantitative method to examine the association between board composition and different types of voluntary disclosure in listed companies in the Shanghai stock exchange (SSE) of China and OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm. The board composition is measured by the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the board. Voluntary disclosure has been classified into three categories: Strategic information, non-financial information and financial information. The results show that there is no significant association between board composition and voluntary disclosure from our samples Chinese and Swedish companies. However, we find association between different types of voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics. We find significant negative association between strategic information and financial leverage for Chinese companies. We find significant negative association between financial information and equity-based management compensation in Swedish companies. On comparison, we find that Swedish companies is inclined to disclose more financial information than Chinese companies while Chinese companies would like to disclose more strategic information than Swedish companies.

Purpose – The purpose of this thesis is to identify the determinants of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital in a Swedish context in 2013. Research design – The thesis is a quantitative, cross sectional study. The data is collected from firms’ annual reports using a disclosure index developed by Bukh et al. (2005). The data was analysed using ANOVA, Mann Whitney U-test and Pearson’s’ r. Findings – The drivers of voluntary disclosure in a Swedish context are industry type, age and size. There was no significant relationship found between ownership concentration, leverage and profitability and the amount of voluntary disclosure. Contribution – There has been a limited amount of research performed on Swedish companies and voluntary disclosure. This study contribute trough mapping the disclosure situation in Sweden. The study also offers an insight to the situation the year before the new directive (2014/95/EU). Value – This paper gives a recent depiction of the disclosure situation in Sweden. The thesis has a more extended theoretical framework than previous studies and interpret the result with four different theories.

Advertising expenditure is one of the most important budget items supporting marketing activities for most companies, and may be treated as an intangible asset. Through the impact on demand and costs, advertising activities affect the firm’s pricing and output decisions as well as the firm’s market value (Tannous, 1997; Chauvin & Hirschey, 1994). Despite the significant economic importance of advertising expenditure, not much attention has been given to the value relevance of advertising expenditure and the impact of advertising expenditure disclosure on firms’ market value. Most of the empirical studies for value relevance of advertising expenditure have been conducted using data from the US and UK Academic research on the value relevance of advertising expenditure in Canada is nonexistent. The accounting standard applied in Canada is different from that used in prior US and UK studies. . Canada adopts Canadian GAAP before 2011, and switches to IFRS from 2011onwards. Both regimes do not require firms in Canada to disclose advertising expenditure. However, most US studies use data before 1994 to analyze value relevance of advertising expenditure. Before 1994, disclosing advertising expenditure is mandatory for US firms under US GAAP. The UK evidence uses data before 2005, during which period UK firms still adopt UK GAAP. Although UK. GAAP does not require companies to disclose advertising expenditure, unlike IFRS, different accounting standards can lead to different financial data reporting and different results. In addition, studies on the impact of voluntary disclosure of advertising expenditure on market value are nonexistent. Furthermore, Canada has a more stable financial system than that of the US and UK In this context, the objective of this thesis is to initiate research on the important dimension of advertising expenditure among Canadian firms. The findings of this thesis will enhance understanding of the relationship between advertising expenditure and market value, and companies’ decisions to voluntarily disclose advertising expenditure on their market value.

Thesis advisor: Mark Bradshaw / Managers prioritize questions from favorable analysts during earnings announcement conference calls, reinforcing analysts’ incentives to be optimistic. However, managers also interact with unfavorable analysts on calls, and, when they do, absolute announcement returns are larger. I seek to understand why managers interact with unfavorable analysts. I find that unfavorable analysts attenuate their negative views after these interactions with managers. Additionally, the stock price response is stronger for forecasts from managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts, consistent with enhanced credibility of these managers. Finally, I use peer firm restatement announcements as exogenous shocks to investors’ assessment of a firm’s accounting quality, and I find that nonrestating firms with managers who regularly interact with unfavorable analysts experience attenuated negative returns, relative to other nonrestating peers. Overall my findings are consistent with managers’ interactions with unfavorable analysts providing significant benefits to the firm, such as resolving analysts’ concerns and increasing managers’ credibility. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Accounting.