This thesis examines the influence of compulsory state arbitration and wages board systems on workplace industrial relations. Using an historical and comparative case study approach, the thesis researches workplace industrial relations at three firms operating in the metal industry between 1900 and 1929. A political economy perspective is employed to examine the interaction of institutional stnictures and economic and political processes in the regulation of the wage-effort bargain at the workplace. Key concepts are drawn from both mainstream industrial relations theory, in particular the Oxford School approach, and labour process theory. Drawing on the work of flanders, a distinction is made between the economic and political aspects of the wage-effort bargain through the differentiation of market relations and managerial relations. This thesis argues that arbitral and wages board systems interacted with a range of factors to shape and influence workplace industrial relations. In keeping with the political economy perspective, the thesis examines the economic, industry, technological, political, and institutional environment within which the three cases operated, identifying changes and trends in these factors during the period under review and their implications for workplace industrial relations. The three cases allowed a closer examination of the influence of these general trends on the development of workplace industrial relations. The cases demonstrate the diversity of the metals sector, each representing a different industry in that sector. Further, the cases differed in their geographic and jurisdictional location, allowing comparisons between Victoria and New South Wales to be made. An examination of the role of arbitral tribunals and wages boards argues that the tribunals used their ability to regulate and stabilise market relations to offset their intervention in managerial relations. In this respect the tribunals sought to engineer changes in managerial relations favourable to industry development and yet simultaneously obtain support from the unions through improvements in market relations. As a consequence of these conflicting objectives the tribunals often behaved in a contradictory manner. In addition, unintended consequences often flowed from tribunal regulation and were important in shaping events at the workplace. Thus while industrial tribunals sought to improve market relations, they inadvertently assisted workers to gain more influence over managerial relations. In each case the workplace was the site of much regulatory activity, whether initiated by management, unions or workers. However, the three cases each present a different pattern of workplace industrial relations in terms: of scope of regulation at the workplace; the role of unions; the nature of managerial strategy; the role of unions; and the implementation and enforcement of tribunals decisions. Moreover, the effect of arbitration and wages board systems at each workplace varied, with the influence of a particular matrix of industry, economic, technological and institutional conditions shaped at the workplace.