This thesis consists of five essays on non-Walrasian economics. There are two essays on rational conjectural equilibrium, RCE, two on repeated games and one on general equilibrium with price-making firms and increasing returns to scale. The first two essays consider rational conjectural equilibrium from a game theoretic perspective. It is shown that (i) in general there is a continuum of RCE. (ii) Some interesting price behaviour, such as kinked demand behaviour and mark-up pricing can be supported as a RCE in a partial equilibrium model. (iii) Conjectural models can be regarded as a static representation of either a repeated game story with adjustment cost, or an instantaneous response repeated game, and that the rationality condition (in the 'correctness' sense) on conjectures amounts to sub-game perfectness in the super-game. In the third essay the solutions to repeated games with bounded memory are considered. It is shown that the Folk Theorem of repeated games (multiplicity of equilibria) can be extended to repeated games with one-period memory either if the action space of each player at each stage of the repeated game contains 'many elements' or if there is uncertainty. In the fourth essay the solutions to anonymous repeated game with a large but finite number of players are considered. In the fifth essay a General Equilibrium model with oligopolistic firms is developed (the model is based on my results in earlier chapters). Each oligopolistic firm is assumed to perceive (correctly) a kinked demand curve. I shall prove the existence of an equilibrium for such an economy without excluding increasing returns to scale or assuming concave revenue functions for the oligopolists.

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京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第23668号 / 経博第651号 / 新制||経||300(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 佐々木 啓明, 教授 柴田 章久, 准教授 高橋 修平 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

No estudo recente da Inteligência Competitiva (IC), aponta-se a necessidade de se obter uma compreensão mais quantitativa do ambiente de negócios e suas relações entre os diversos agentes econômicos com o propósito de desenvolvimento de ferramentas úteis aos profissionais de IC. Nesse sentido, o pleno entendimento da dinâmica competitiva se apresenta como alicerce fundamental na qual os produtos de IC devem ser ancorados para cumprir com seu papel nas organizações. Sob essa perspectiva, o presente trabalho se apresenta como uma proposta à compreensão do papel da IC nas organizações sugerindo um meta modelo da dinâmica competitiva. Inicia-se com foco em identificar e delimitar o papel da IC nas organizações tendo como base o constructo de modelo de negócios que tem obtido destaque na literatura, conhecido como Modelo Canvas, e como resultado é proposto um modelo do papel da IC, obtido a partir da triangulação dos métodos de pesquisa survey e desenvolvimento teórico-conceitual. Na sequência, visando a compreensão quantitativa da dinâmica competitiva, aprofundam-se as discussões microeconômicas de interação entre os agentes econômicos e, para isso, adota-se o conceito neoclássico de Equilíbrio Walrasiano e projetam-se as influências recíprocas dos agentes no ambiente de negócios a partir dos conceitos de equilíbrio da Teoria dos Jogos. Como exemplo, é realizada a discussão e a modelagem matemática desta interação para a estrutura de mercado de oligopólio na qual se obtém um meta modelo para construção de cenários de decisão. Desta forma, essa tese representa uma evolução na construção da teoria de IC, em seu sentido mais quantitativo que ainda é pouco explorado na literatura. Com isso, espera-se que este trabalho estimule novos esforços no sentido quantitativo com vista ao desenvolvimento de melhores ferramentas à prática da IC. / Recent studies in Competitive Intelligence (CI) area point out that is a need to obtain a better comprehension of business environment in a quantitative perspective - speacially the relationships among several economic agents - focus on developing useful tools for CI professionals. In this sense, a plenty knowledge of competitive dynamics presents itself as an essential foundation on which CI products must be established to fulfill its role in any organization. From this perspective, this paper offers a proposal to an understanding of CI organizational role, including a suggestion of competitive dynamics meta model. This paper starts with focus on identify and delineate the CI organizational based on the most referenced business model reference - known as Canvas Model - and thus it proposes its CI organizational role model through triangulation of a survey research and a theoretical-conceptual development. After that, it focus on microeconomics discussion about the interaction among economic agents in a quantitative perspective and, to do so, Walrasian Equilibrium theory is adopted as a background of their relationship projections in the business environment using Game Theory. In addition, this paper promotes a mathematical discussion of this dynamics in an oligopoly market structure in which it obtains a meta model for building decision scenarios. In this way, this thesis represents an evolution in the construction of CI theory in a quantitative way that is not completed explored in literature yet. Finally, one should believe that this work might will stimulate new efforts to develop better CI tools for CI professionals.

No estudo recente da Inteligência Competitiva (IC), aponta-se a necessidade de se obter uma compreensão mais quantitativa do ambiente de negócios e suas relações entre os diversos agentes econômicos com o propósito de desenvolvimento de ferramentas úteis aos profissionais de IC. Nesse sentido, o pleno entendimento da dinâmica competitiva se apresenta como alicerce fundamental na qual os produtos de IC devem ser ancorados para cumprir com seu papel nas organizações. Sob essa perspectiva, o presente trabalho se apresenta como uma proposta à compreensão do papel da IC nas organizações sugerindo um meta modelo da dinâmica competitiva. Inicia-se com foco em identificar e delimitar o papel da IC nas organizações tendo como base o constructo de modelo de negócios que tem obtido destaque na literatura, conhecido como Modelo Canvas, e como resultado é proposto um modelo do papel da IC, obtido a partir da triangulação dos métodos de pesquisa survey e desenvolvimento teórico-conceitual. Na sequência, visando a compreensão quantitativa da dinâmica competitiva, aprofundam-se as discussões microeconômicas de interação entre os agentes econômicos e, para isso, adota-se o conceito neoclássico de Equilíbrio Walrasiano e projetam-se as influências recíprocas dos agentes no ambiente de negócios a partir dos conceitos de equilíbrio da Teoria dos Jogos. Como exemplo, é realizada a discussão e a modelagem matemática desta interação para a estrutura de mercado de oligopólio na qual se obtém um meta modelo para construção de cenários de decisão. Desta forma, essa tese representa uma evolução na construção da teoria de IC, em seu sentido mais quantitativo que ainda é pouco explorado na literatura. Com isso, espera-se que este trabalho estimule novos esforços no sentido quantitativo com vista ao desenvolvimento de melhores ferramentas à prática da IC. / Recent studies in Competitive Intelligence (CI) area point out that is a need to obtain a better comprehension of business environment in a quantitative perspective - speacially the relationships among several economic agents - focus on developing useful tools for CI professionals. In this sense, a plenty knowledge of competitive dynamics presents itself as an essential foundation on which CI products must be established to fulfill its role in any organization. From this perspective, this paper offers a proposal to an understanding of CI organizational role, including a suggestion of competitive dynamics meta model. This paper starts with focus on identify and delineate the CI organizational based on the most referenced business model reference - known as Canvas Model - and thus it proposes its CI organizational role model through triangulation of a survey research and a theoretical-conceptual development. After that, it focus on microeconomics discussion about the interaction among economic agents in a quantitative perspective and, to do so, Walrasian Equilibrium theory is adopted as a background of their relationship projections in the business environment using Game Theory. In addition, this paper promotes a mathematical discussion of this dynamics in an oligopoly market structure in which it obtains a meta model for building decision scenarios. In this way, this thesis represents an evolution in the construction of CI theory in a quantitative way that is not completed explored in literature yet. Finally, one should believe that this work might will stimulate new efforts to develop better CI tools for CI professionals.

Mit der hier vorliegenden Arbeit wird ein mikroökonomisches Multiagentenmodell eines Produktionssektors vorgeschlagen. Das Modell folgt einem post-walrasianischem Ungleichgewichtsansatz und beschreibt optimierende Agenten der Produktionsseite. Diese berücksichtigen in probabilistischen Nebenbedingungen Risiken des Cash Flow, die sich aus unsicheren Absatzmengen ergeben. Produzenten stehen in monopolistischer Konkurrenz und lernen durch Beobachten. Wird vorliegendes Modell in ein Totalmodell integriert, so wird es möglich, die sich aus der Klimadebatte ergebenden, notwendigen Veränderungen im Investitions- und Produktionsverhalten zu diskutieren und darzustellen. / In the following thesis I propose a microeconomic Multi-Agent-Model of a production sector. I apply a Post-Walrasian disequilibrium approach and describe optimizing agents. These agents use chance constraints which depict a Cash Flow at Risk approach. Agents act in a Monopolistic-Competition environment.

[pt] Propomos uma nova solução para o paradoxo de Grossman Stiglitz [1980]. Trocando sua estrutura informacional por uma restrição de desatenção racional, nós mostramos que os preços podem refletir toda a informação disponível, sem quebrar os incentivos dos participantes do mercado em processar informação. Esse modelo reformula a hipótese dos mercados eficientes e concilia visões opostas: preços são completamente reveladores, mas apenas para aqueles que são suficientemente espertos. Finalmente, nós desenvolvemos um método para postular e resolver modelos de equilíbrio geral Walrasiano que circunscreve hipóteses simplificadoras anteriores. / [en] We propose a new solution for the Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] paradox. By substituting a rational inattention restriction for their information structure, we show that prices can reflect all the information available without breaking the incentives of market participants to gather information. This model reframes the efficient market hypothesis and reconciles opposing views: prices are fully revealing but only for those who are sufficiently smart. Finally, we develop a method for postulating and solving Walrasian general equilibrium models with rationally inattentive agents circumventing previous tractability assumptions.

The purpose of this thesis is to argue that the core of a monetary economy is a network of triangular contracts between banks, firms, workers and capital goods suppliers. Not only does this network give rise to the creation and valuation of money but it is the organising feature of modern economies, giving rise to both episodes of stability and crises. In constructing this argument I consider both orthodox and heterodox points of view. We analyse equilibrium models of money, and find that while money can exist in sequence economies with frictions, models of this type give no justification for its creation, valuation or holding for any significant duration, either theoretically or experimentally. Models that introduce dated goods and trading frictions to motivate the issue of risk-spreading ‘bundled’ debt are more promising for money creation, although they still cannot explain the the holding and valuation of money. Using the concept of team-production of Alchian and Demsetz and that of ‘hostage-taking’ in contracts owing to Williamson, we demonstrate how the issue of a token of generalised purchasing power from a team-production contract can enhance output and consumption. This conclusion motivates an original monetary theory of production that integrates the insights of Post-Keynesian monetary theory and the triangular contracts of the Circulation Approach and expresses them in a way that shows consistent asset and liability matching through a balance sheet approach. The creation and valuation of money and the determination of interest are embedded within the central processes of this economy. The features of the monetary production economy we analyse are in contrast to the mainstream proposition that the economy as a whole is rendered coherent by the existence of a unique and stable equilibrium determined by the utility-maximisation of households and the profit maximisation of firms. Apart from their inability to describe the economy in aggregate, such models treat money as an afterthought that is in no way core to their conception. We set the triangular contracts within a rigorous stock-flow framework of the type developed by Godley and Lavoie and argue that the shifting of the level of impact of uncertainty and failed expectations induced by money leads to specific patterns of economic disruption. These patterns are independent of the specific behavioural characteristics of households and firms and so are robust to policy changes that leave the institutions of the monetary production economy intact. We briefly assess current monetary policy and alternatives in the light of these findings.