Considering the South China Sea dispute as a flashpoint of regional stability and power balance within the Southeast Asian region, the first failure in ASEAN history to reach a consensus in 2012 and the deadlock in 2016 on this issue brought up uncertainty towards the ability of ASEAN member states to reach a consensus on the South China Sea issue. This thesis seeks to analyze this issue based on neo-classical realism and the two-level games theory to what extent, if any, do the ASEAN member states’ domestic factors and external relations influence their decision towards the South China Sea dispute. The theoretical framework of neoclassical realism provides three indicators for analysis, which are national interests, domestic politics, and the role and perception of political leaders. The two-level games theory addresses on the preferences and coalitions within states, political institutions, and the role of chief negotiators as the three indicators to determine the win-sets of the ASEAN member states. The conclusions show the different win-sets size of ASEAN member states vary accordingly from a larger win-sets size of an authoritarian state to a smaller win-sets size of a more democratic state.