This thesis explores the British government’s approach to international negotiations concerning nuclear weapons during Harold Wilson’s first two terms of office (1964-1970). It focuses on three distinct but interrelated strands of British nuclear diplomacy: ‘hardware solutions’, the sharing of nuclear weapons between states in the form of a multilateral force; ‘software solutions’, non-physical measures of cooperation, such as consultative and planning arrangements, between alliance members; and a global non-proliferation treaty. In looking at how and why these interrelated policies evolved, this thesis considers party, domestic and international influences on decision-making within the government. It pays particular attention to political and economic events, building on existing diplomatic and strategic accounts of the period.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:537483 |
Date | January 2010 |
Creators | Gill, David James |
Contributors | Priest, Andrew John |
Publisher | Aberystwyth University |
Source Sets | Ethos UK |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Source | http://hdl.handle.net/2160/ff300f1b-17e9-4c10-8caf-14ba69498c56 |
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