This thesis explores the complex relationship between aid and statehood using the case study of post-genocide Rwanda. Since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has actively courted the support of particular donors, securing preferential aid relationships with some of them and becoming something of a 'donor darling.' The thesis uses the Rwandan case to examine how regimes become donor darlings and the effects of such a designation. Using the work of Harrison (2004) and Bayart (1993; 2000), I argue that the creation of a donor darling is a two way process; donors attempt to identify desirable qualities in recipient states, and African regimes actively market themselves in relation to donor priorities. The thesis will demonstrate that the Rwandan regime uses donor narratives on development, security and African statehood, to access aid, presenting itself as a potential partner in achieving goals of certain donors. Following Bayart. this can be seen as a strategy of extraversion. The thesis examines four areas of Rwandan regime policy: political space; ethnic difference: intervention in Zaire/DRC and peacekeeping in Darfur. These demonstrate a significant disjuncture between the regime's stated commitments to security and good governance and its actual policies. Despite this, donors have been highly reluctant to criticise the postgenocide regime. I argue that this reflects a donor concern with stability that may outweigh commitments to particular areas of good governance. Donors such as the UK have actively promoted 'post-conditionality' and 'African solutions to African problems,' emphasising the responsibility of African regimes for governance and security on the continent. However, I use the Rwandan example to argue that by heavily supporting donor darlings, donors are to some degree responsible for those regime's policies. Although they may wish to decouple aid from its effects, the Rwandan case shows this is unrealistic.

This thesis assesses the relevance of Waltz and Wendt’s systemic theories of international relations for understanding Lebanon’s international political behaviour during the 2006 war. It tests the hypothesis that substate factors, especially identity, are more important than systemic factors for affecting the conditions against which states make foreign policy-decisions. Using data collected from interviews and the analysis of primary and secondary sources, it looks at the decisions made by the Lebanese government in the context of the 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah. It seeks to identify whether factors at the systemic, state or sub-state levels were the main influence on Lebanese foreign policy-making during this period. It concludes that sub-state identities were a crucial factor affecting Lebanon’s international political behaviour and foreign policy-making capacity because they fractured the state from below and compromised its ability to act like a united, rational and coherent security-maximising actor. As a result the state was unable to react to systemic structures in the way systemic theories of international relations assume. However, as the war progressed and Lebanon came under increasing threat from Israel, different internal groups united together and the state, temporarily, began to act like a rational, security maximising actor as Waltz and Wendt assume. This means that Waltz and Wendt’s theories of international relations are unable to fully account for the conditions affecting Lebanese foreign policy making during the initial stages of the war. This highlights the need for a more pluralistic approach to fully understand the conditions that affect the foreign policy-making of the Lebanese state.

Relations with developing countries have been a field of collective European policy for more than fifty years. Yet, European development policy remains fragmented; conducted on different levels through a variety of actors with multiple instruments applied in various policy fields. Articulations of Europe's collective role in the world first emerged in the 1970s under the idea of Europe as a civilian power (Duchene 1972, 1973b). These initial elaborations have served as a key point of departure in political and academic debates on the international identity and role of an integrated/integrating Europe (see for example Solana 2002; Ferrero- Waldner 2007; also Manners 2002; Hettne and Soderbaum 2005; Telo 2006; Lucarelli 2007). However, Europe's relations with developing countries have neither received adequate conceptual nor empirical attention in these debates. This thesis therefore aims to address these gaps by exploring the spaces of interaction between the EU and the Republic of Kenya, the East African Community and the African Union. I argue that regulating spaces of interaction has always been a key element of the European project, both internally and externally. These regulation attempts resulted in the construction of a particular version of European 'space', operating through multiple structures, processes and flows that have significantly shaped the EU's external relations. In order to explore an aspect of these external relations - development policy - this thesis pursues a threedimensional approach addressing constructions, projections and perceptions of such European 'space' in East Africa. I demonstrate how key assumptions about geopolitical space and the international system made in civilian power debates can be theoretically informed and interrogated by drawing on critical geopolitics and allied work. Furthermore, I argue that the failure to engage critically with the EU's relations with developing countries and external perceptions thereof, both in the civilian power discourse and on the part of European policy makers, has created a civilian/power dilemma. In so doing this thesis contributes conceptually and empirically to a more comprehensive understanding of Europe's collective role in the world and as a development actor.

The thesis argues for the centrality of normative theory in the study of international relations because of its unique capacity to address values comprehensively, in contrast to the dominant traditions of political realism which marginalises their theoretical significance. Two themes develop, each reflecting opposing pairs: fact/value, is/ought, description/prescription, feasibility/desirability. The first theme concerns the epistemological framework provided by a normative account of such values as the security and stability of knowledge and the orderly apprehension of the world. In contrast to realism, normative theory maintains the distinction between sensory experience and the assignment of meaning, indicating the contingent nature of epistemological foundations. The second theme concerns the political conditions of knowledge which determine the role of different theories, indicating the need for an adaptation of the traditional normative scholarship by overcoming the separation of ethics from politics which has so far limited its role. As values are central phenomena in politics, and politics is essentially normative in form (as is knowledge of it), consideration of value questions cannot be limited to peripheral commentary. The two themes emerge through analyses of the theoretical literature in international relations; of the philosophical foundations of normative theory; of its relationship to ideas and ideologies; of the encapsulation of values and interests in world views; of the communicative dynamic of norms in ethics and epistemology; and finally of the applied cases of deterrence, and foreign policy. The centrality of normative theory is indicated, and its relation to political theory and the study of international relations is examined.

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The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Western states responded to the Polish crisis (1980-83), both severally and collectively, with particular reference to their capacity for coordinated action. The thesis concentrates on the interaction between the major Western states (France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States) inside the broader Western institutional framework (looking in particular at NATO, the European Community, European Political Cooperation and CoCom). It assesses the impact and relative importance of the various Western institutional networks and of longer term conflicting Western aims in Poland for the success and failure of coordination. It also analyses the relevance of wider transatlantic disputes over detente for coordination. It is argued that the domestic Polish crisis gradually spilled over into East-West and West-West relations, ultimately triggering one of the most serious crises in the history of the Western alliance. The thesis is different from that of other studies of international crises in that most such studies concentrate on relations between governments who identify each other as "enemies", whereas the main concern here is with relations within one "enemy camp". Highlighting the political and economic, as well as security dimensions to the crisis, the thesis also shows that the Western states were faced with a more complex problem than a classic foreign policy crisis. Finally, the complexity of the issues raised as a result of the Polish crisis meant that the Western states were faced not only with the problem of reconciling different and sometimes conflicting national objectives, but also with the need to reconcile contradictory economic, political and security concerns cutting across national borders. Against this backdrop the thesis argues that the problem of coordination is more complex than what is implied by the neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist perspectives, and that the success and failure of coordination rests with the individual states, navigating within the constraints of domestic politics, alliance politics and international [in this case East-West] relations.

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