Intuition has fallen from grace. Its authority to act as a source of evidence in philosophical discourse has recently been called into question by philosophers and cognitive psychologists alike, who claim that because of the many difficulties that plague intuition, it should not hold the evidential role it does presently. This is exceedingly troubling, since appeals to intuition are pervasive throughout, and infiltrate every level of, philosophical discourse. This paper explores the extent of intuitions infiltration in philosophy and whether intuition is warranted in those positions. I argue that by focusing on virtues exhibited by philosophical methodology, many of the arguments made against them are defused. In spite of this, we can largely carry on utilizing the methodology which houses intuitions Standard Philosophical Analysis while continually attempting to revise and refine that methodology.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:AEU.10048/604 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | Jalea, Justin |
| Contributors | Morton, Adam (Philosophy), Hunter, Bruce (Philosophy), Welchman, Jennifer (Philosophy), Morton, Adam (Philosophy), Dixon, Peter (Psychology) |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 364174 bytes, application/pdf |
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