Jag tar fram ett vitt A3 papper ur mitt block. Jag har en ny tuschpenna med oförstörd spets och börjar pricka på pappret. Halvligger på golvet, försöker att inte tänka, söker arbeta ur intet. Tekniken är enkel. Prickar jag tätt blir intrycket mörkare, prickar jag glesare blir området ljusare. Tillsammans bildar de trakter av växlande densitet, landskap av ljus och mörker. Plötsligt vaknar jag upp och ser att det jag prickat faktiskt påminner om något, inspirerad av den oförutsedda likheten färdigställer jag associationen. Fantasin om vad som skulle kunna synas på pappret styr min hand. Mellanrummet mellan handen och min inre föreställning skapar bilden. Ett resultat jag bara till hälften kan förutse. Jag ställer mig en bit bort från pappret och ser plötsligt en ny blid framträda. Det är slumpen som genom handen ska göra mitt arbete, min intuition väljer vägen. Inget uppstår ur inget. Det ”inget” som gör att något uppstår fyller min fantasi med föreställningar. Jag försöker hitta ursprunget till bilderna, trådar tillbaka. Jag skyller på mina drömmar, mina minnen, det jag såg på TV igår. Jag ger skulden åt de omedvetna intrycken som står rena i sin avskildhet, men som tillsammans blandas ihop till en obegriplig sörja. Där börjar mitt arbete. Att bena ut intrycken, skapa sagan som gör det hela begripligt. Jag känner mig som en detektiv som försöker hitta ledtrådar i min egen arbetsprocess. Vem är den skyldiga till det som skapas på pappret? I det här är jag ensam, jag är min egen beställare. Men eftersom jag följer slumpens logik, kan jag inte hållas till svars. Jag försöker bara utföra mitt jobb så väl jag kan utifrån de direktiv jag har tagit emot. Jag kan inte hållas skyldig för resultatet eftersom jag bara följer order. Jag har tillverkat en panoramatapet/väggdekoration. Den är handmålad och finns bara i ett exemplar. Min tapets huvudsakliga syfte är att inspirera till fantasier. Min förhoppning är att varje betraktare kan se egna bilder och få en egen upplevelse av min tapet. I min uppsats har jag valt att diskutera två huvudämnen som rör mitt arbete. Det första är min metod som utgått från min känsla och intuition. Det andra är en diskussion rörande projekts resultat, nämligen en dekoration. Jag har under projektets gång reflekterat över den historiska samt nutida synen på intuition och dekoration. Jag ser mitt projekt som en kedja av flera delmål. Med utgångspunkten att jobba utifrån min intuition leddes jag vidare till nya betraktelsesätt. Att arbeta helt från min intuition visade sig vara en process där jag blev tvungen att hålla mig helt öppen inför de riktningar som jag leddes in till. Jag upplevde att jag inte kunde namnge ett enhetligt mål med mitt projekt, utan snarare att projektet skulle kretsa kring flera besläktade ämnen såsom fantasi, skönhet och dekoration. Det är intuitionen och känslans problematik, att man inte kan vara helt konkret och förklarad och kanske är det denna obestämdhet som gör att den inte helt tas på allvar. Med det är också det jag upplever så intressant. / Textil formgivning / Master 2009 Textile in the Expanded Field

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

This thesis examines and gathers together for the first time all the various forms of intuition in the early publications (1896-1921) of the Swiss psychologist C. G. Jung (1875-1961) in order to demonstrate the central role of intuition in Jung’s work. Issues of terminology, translation, and dissimilar editions of Jung’s writing are treated in Part 1, which defines the plurality of meaning of the notion of intuition to be found in early Jung. Part 2 looks at the different contexts of the birth of intuition in Jung’s psychology: the debates that animated the intellectual life at the turn of the twentieth century, Jung’s teachers, how Jung experimented spiritist sessions and what he termed “active imagination,” and finally what Jung meant by “under-conscious,” this state in between unconscious and consciousness, which favours the appearance of intuition. Those definitions and contexts clarified, Parts 3 to 6 chronologically investigate intuition in details in Jung’s psychology of the under-conscious, of the unconscious, in Jungian practice, and in Jung’s psychology of consciousness respectively. The section consecrated to the under-conscious (Part 3) divides intuition into supernatural intuitions (from the realm of the paranormal to prophecies – 3.1) and psychological intuitions (3.2). Jung’s undergraduate lectures at the Zofingia Club and Liber Novus – or else, Red Book – are treated in 3.1, as supernatural intuitions. There, common traits appear between Jung’s exposition (the lectures) and Jung’s experience (Liber Novus) of intuition. Jung’s Medical Dissertation, a psychiatrist study on so-called occult phenomena, and Jung’s word association tests are treated in 3.2. Teleological hallucinations, visions, automatisms, or Einfälle, to be defined in the course of the thesis, are some of the numerous forms of intuition that are classified under psychological intuitions. Intuition in the unconscious (Part 4) manifests itself through two ways: the “primitive” aspect of empathy (1) and the contemporary Anschauung. As a pre-form – because it is unconscious – the Anschauung is in turn extremely close to the two other unconscious pre-forms of instinct and archetype. After a close historical, cultural, and terminological examination of the term Anschauung (4.1), 4.2 investigates the equivalences and distinctions of the three unconscious contents, processes, and energies. Dear to Jung as a doctor, intuition in Jungian practice (Part 5) is extremely present in his early writing. Jung described it in his constructive method, which he equated to Bergson’s intuitive method, in active imagination, and through the form that we call empathy (2), which appears during the phenomenon of transference. Part 6 is devoted to the study of intuition in Jung’s psychology of consciousness, the central topics of which are functions and types. Because it is informed of the role played by intuition in all the other areas of Jung’s psychology, this section presents the intuitive type and function in perspective and permits to grasp their specificities with regard to the three other functions and types of sensation, feeling, and thinking.

Abstract of thesis--Catholic University of America. / Description based on print version record. Bibliography: p. 30-33.

No description available.

Research on knowing in childbirth has largely been a quantitative process. The purpose of this study was to better understand the ways nine, first-time mothers learn about birth. A phenomenological approach using a feminist view was used to analyze two in-depth interviews and journals to understand first time expectant mothers' experiences of knowing in childbirth. The findings demonstrated a range of knowledge that contributed to issues of control, confidence, hope, and conflict. The participants also described an increased dependency on their mothers and a lack of intuition contiguous to the birth process. These findings contribute understanding as to how expectant mothers know birth, suggesting that their knowing does not diminish conflict surrounding and may even exacerbate it. Childbirth educators may want to include instruction on negotiating power differential in relationships encountered during childbirth, and to assess the expectant mother's view of birth and her expectations for birth. Schools of nursing should consider the inclusion of women-centered care curricula in schools of nursing at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Clearly, the politics surrounding birthing remain in place and must be removed to provide a supportive environment for normal birth.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / 1. Thare is a vitalistic reality which is external and yet immediately given in intuition. 2. This reality exists in its initial purity as a free, creative, energizing, implusive force, that Bergson calls supraconsciousness. 3. The expansion or creative explosiveness of this original impetus tends, as its psychic force is extended beyond its origin, to condense into matter and detend toward pure homogeneous space. 4. The evolution of life is one manifestation of this psychic energy in its creative struggle against matter. 5. A theory of knowledge must be formulated in relation to the creative evolving of consciousness, and also the metaphysical antithesis representing inversions of the psychical tensions of the supra-consciousness. 6. The intellect is thereby found to be one tendency of the supra-consciousness, a relaxation toward apatial representation, whose forms have been molded by the necessity of acting on inert extended matter. 7. The analytic and deductive functions of the intellect rest on its spatial form, and prevent a conceptual apprehension of the mobility, creativity, and essential freedom of reality. 8. Another tendency developed from the supra-consciousness is intuition, and by the use of intuition one can see how such metaphysical opposites as space and duration, matter and life, necessity and freedom, intelligence and intuition spring from reality as inversions of the supra-consciousness. 9. However, Bergson's initial assumption that a mathematical account of mobility is inherently incorrect, and thereby manifests a natural inability of the intellect, has been proven false. 10. Bergson's narrow restriction of the function of the intellect must be reinterpreted in terms of actual intellectual processes themselves.

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 1982. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Includes bibliographical references. / Between the idea and the reality lies the realm of the "creative act." The theme of this thesis deals with the realm in between abstraction and conception, knowing and doing, art and science, theory and practice. By using the particular realm between the architect and the engineer as the point of departure, the varying perceptions and definitions of the " bridge" are established. Two levels of definition are proposed: first, the architects' and engineers' framework for defining "bridge," and secondly, the ontic-ontological dimensions of the "bridge." The case studies provide the facts to which these definitions can be applied. Using the constraints of a historical time-frame, changes in bridge-building are documented and evaluated to provide the basis for the interpretation of technology. / by Barbara Jeanne Boylan. / M.S.

Intuition is an innate ability through which human beings acquire knowledge about the world around them. Throughout history people have speculated about how intuition operates and about the accuracy and usefulness of intuitively derived conclusions, but there have been few attempts at empirical investigation primarily due to the fact that a person using intuition does not appear to be doing anything at all. In fact, clinical lore suggests that that trying too hard may actually impede progress toward achieving an intuitively derived solution. As source of knowledge or understanding, intuition appears to stand somewhere between perception and reason. Phenomenologically, intuitively derived solutions resemble perceptions, in that both are experienced as “given,” however unlike perception intuition involves no discernable physiological pathway leading from sensory stimulation to the conscious awareness of some thing. Functionally, intuition has similarities to the process of reasoning, in that both can provide useful information about the world to consciousness. In use, however, intuition differs from reasoning, which takes place through explicit, observable intermediates between the recognition of a problem in need of a solution and the achievement of a successful solution. Intuition involves no such intermediates. Thus, intuition appears to be a function with neither pathway nor process. The set of studies discussed in Part A of this thesis was designed to examine the notion that, rather than an abrupt and disjunctive “change of state,” intuition is an incremental, accumulative process through which implicit and increasingly complete intermediates, or states of “partial knowledge” are generated prior to the achievement of a solution in consciousness. In Part A, it was demonstrated that unsuccessful attempts to identify objects portrayed in difficult visual gestalts significantly facilitated participants’ performance on a related partial-word solution task. When the unrecognized stimulus items were incoherent, i.e., altered so that the component parts were displaced and rotated relative to each other, the facilitation effect, while still significant, was less than when the unrecognized gestalt was coherent. This finding supports the idea that the amount of solution-relevant implicit knowledge generated in an unsuccessful attempt to solve a problem varies with the quality of information present in the problem situation. The set of studies in Part B examined the effect of inserting “dead air” interval between the visual gestalt and the related partial-word in the partial-word solution phase. Against prediction, coherent partial-word facilitation did not decrease at any interval condition, while incoherent partial-word increased at the longest interval condition. Overall, the findings are best explained by a bi-directional, dual-processing model in which the organization of visual stimuli and the symbolic labeling of sub-components within the visual stimuli are processed independently. Such a model could provide some context for the dispute between proponents of reorganization vs. forgetting in the debate about mechanism underlying incubation effects.

Intuition is an innate ability through which human beings acquire knowledge about the world around them. Throughout history people have speculated about how intuition operates and about the accuracy and usefulness of intuitively derived conclusions, but there have been few attempts at empirical investigation primarily due to the fact that a person using intuition does not appear to be doing anything at all. In fact, clinical lore suggests that that trying too hard may actually impede progress toward achieving an intuitively derived solution. As source of knowledge or understanding, intuition appears to stand somewhere between perception and reason. Phenomenologically, intuitively derived solutions resemble perceptions, in that both are experienced as “given,” however unlike perception intuition involves no discernable physiological pathway leading from sensory stimulation to the conscious awareness of some thing. Functionally, intuition has similarities to the process of reasoning, in that both can provide useful information about the world to consciousness. In use, however, intuition differs from reasoning, which takes place through explicit, observable intermediates between the recognition of a problem in need of a solution and the achievement of a successful solution. Intuition involves no such intermediates. Thus, intuition appears to be a function with neither pathway nor process. The set of studies discussed in Part A of this thesis was designed to examine the notion that, rather than an abrupt and disjunctive “change of state,” intuition is an incremental, accumulative process through which implicit and increasingly complete intermediates, or states of “partial knowledge” are generated prior to the achievement of a solution in consciousness. In Part A, it was demonstrated that unsuccessful attempts to identify objects portrayed in difficult visual gestalts significantly facilitated participants’ performance on a related partial-word solution task. When the unrecognized stimulus items were incoherent, i.e., altered so that the component parts were displaced and rotated relative to each other, the facilitation effect, while still significant, was less than when the unrecognized gestalt was coherent. This finding supports the idea that the amount of solution-relevant implicit knowledge generated in an unsuccessful attempt to solve a problem varies with the quality of information present in the problem situation. The set of studies in Part B examined the effect of inserting “dead air” interval between the visual gestalt and the related partial-word in the partial-word solution phase. Against prediction, coherent partial-word facilitation did not decrease at any interval condition, while incoherent partial-word increased at the longest interval condition. Overall, the findings are best explained by a bi-directional, dual-processing model in which the organization of visual stimuli and the symbolic labeling of sub-components within the visual stimuli are processed independently. Such a model could provide some context for the dispute between proponents of reorganization vs. forgetting in the debate about mechanism underlying incubation effects.