Interval uncertainty affects our decision making activities on a daily basis making the data structure of intervals of real numbers more and more popular in theoretical models and related software applications. Natural questions for people or businesses that face interval uncertainty in their data when dealing with cooperation are how to form the coalitions and how to distribute the collective gains or costs. The theory of cooperative interval games is a suitable tool for answering these questions. In this thesis, the classical theory of cooperative games is extended to cooperative interval games. First, basic notions and facts from classical cooperative game theory and interval calculus are given. Then, the model of cooperative interval games is introduced and basic definitions are given. Solution concepts of selection-type and interval-type for cooperative interval games are intensively studied. Further, special classes of cooperative interval games like convex interval games and big boss interval games are introduced and various characterizations are given. Some economic and Operations Research situations such as airport, bankruptcy and sequencing with interval data and related interval games have been also studied. Finally, some algorithmic aspects related with the interval Shapley value and the interval core are considered.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:METU/oai:etd.lib.metu.edu.tr:http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12610337/index.pdf |
Date | 01 January 2009 |
Creators | Alparslan Gok, Sirma Zeynep |
Contributors | Weber, Gerhard Wilhelm |
Publisher | METU |
Source Sets | Middle East Technical Univ. |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Ph.D. Thesis |
Format | text/pdf |
Rights | To liberate the content for public access |
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