Under the influence of orientation towards European integration, Georgia has introduced a variety of new laws with the apparent aim to decentralize legislative and executive powers. This paper shows that the Georgian efforts of decentralization remain superficial, mainly because they are not backed by additional fiscal competences at the municipality level. Following an initial description of the pre-reform situation as of 2006 and based upon a detailed account of the structural changes since 2007, the author gives insight into the conflicts which arise from the lack of institutional congruency. Neither the extraordinary status of the capital Tbilisi nor the seeming autonomy of the Rebublic of Adjara are likely to sway the renegade territories of Abchasia and Ossetia towards a reintegration under Georgian centralized rule as it continues to exist today. Likewise, the success of the proposed and discussed fiscal equalization scheme depends on whether the President and his ruling party are willing to delegate powers to the subodinate jurisdictions.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:Potsdam/oai:kobv.de-opus-ubp:1851 |
| Date | January 2007 |
| Creators | Ehrke, Jürgen |
| Contributors | Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung |
| Publisher | Universität Potsdam, Extern. Extern |
| Source Sets | Potsdam University |
| Language | German |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Book |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/doku/urheberrecht.php |
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