Return to search

Bargaining with externalities under an endogenous matching protocol. / CUHK electronic theses & dissertations collection

本文研究一個賣家和多個潛在買家對於一個不可分割商品的議價,且賣家之間存在與身份相關的外部性。我們考察一個有限期的展開形式的博弈,此博弈採用內生的匹配機制,在每一期的博弈中,賣家選擇和哪一個買家進行議價。 / 此博弈有一個唯一的平衡,且無論外部性爲正或負,在平衡中,協議總是立即達成。只有兩個買家時,若外部性爲負,商品必然售予效率買家;若外部性爲正,當買家的議價能力提高時,平衡結果可能會從無效率變爲有效率。若有超過兩個買家存在,無效率結果出現的可能性將會提高。 / This paper studies bargaining between one seller and multiple potential buyers on the sale of one indivisible good, in which indentity-dependent exernalities exist among buyers. We consider an extensive game with nite horizon and endogenous matching procedure, that is, the seller chooses the buyer whom to bargain with during each period of the bargaining game. / The bargaining game has a unique equilibrium with immediate agreement regardless of whether externalities are positive or negative. In a two-buyer game, the good is sold to the efficient buyer when externalities are negative. When externalities are positive, the outcome may change from inefficient to efficient by increasing the bargaining power of the buyers. Inefficient outcomes arise with higher probability in a game with more than two buyers. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Zhang, Xuechao. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 37-38). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Abstract in Chinese --- p.ii / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter 3 --- The Model --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Bargaining Procedure --- p.8 / Chapter 3.2 --- Histories and Strategies --- p.9 / Chapter 3.3 --- Outcomes and Payos --- p.10 / Chapter 4 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.13 / Chapter 4.1 --- Equilibrium Dynamics --- p.13 / Chapter 4.2 --- Effi ciency Analysis --- p.20 / Chapter 5 --- Further Extensions --- p.32 / Chapter 5.1 --- Buyer-active Protocol --- p.32 / Chapter 5.2 --- Innite-horizon Framework --- p.34 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.36 / References --- p.37

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_328307
Date January 2013
ContributorsZhang, Xuechao., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
Source SetsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
LanguageEnglish, Chinese
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, bibliography
Formatelectronic resource, electronic resource, remote, 1 online resource (iii, 38 leaves)
RightsUse of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Page generated in 0.0018 seconds