本文研究一個賣家和多個潛在買家對於一個不可分割商品的議價，且賣家之間存在與身份相關的外部性。我們考察一個有限期的展開形式的博弈，此博弈採用內生的匹配機制，在每一期的博弈中，賣家選擇和哪一個買家進行議價。 / 此博弈有一個唯一的平衡，且無論外部性爲正或負，在平衡中，協議總是立即達成。只有兩個買家時，若外部性爲負，商品必然售予效率買家；若外部性爲正，當買家的議價能力提高時，平衡結果可能會從無效率變爲有效率。若有超過兩個買家存在，無效率結果出現的可能性將會提高。 / This paper studies bargaining between one seller and multiple potential buyers on the sale of one indivisible good, in which indentity-dependent exernalities exist among buyers. We consider an extensive game with nite horizon and endogenous matching procedure, that is, the seller chooses the buyer whom to bargain with during each period of the bargaining game. / The bargaining game has a unique equilibrium with immediate agreement regardless of whether externalities are positive or negative. In a two-buyer game, the good is sold to the efficient buyer when externalities are negative. When externalities are positive, the outcome may change from inefficient to efficient by increasing the bargaining power of the buyers. Inefficient outcomes arise with higher probability in a game with more than two buyers. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Zhang, Xuechao. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 37-38). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Abstract in Chinese --- p.ii / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter 3 --- The Model --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Bargaining Procedure --- p.8 / Chapter 3.2 --- Histories and Strategies --- p.9 / Chapter 3.3 --- Outcomes and Payos --- p.10 / Chapter 4 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.13 / Chapter 4.1 --- Equilibrium Dynamics --- p.13 / Chapter 4.2 --- Effi ciency Analysis --- p.20 / Chapter 5 --- Further Extensions --- p.32 / Chapter 5.1 --- Buyer-active Protocol --- p.32 / Chapter 5.2 --- Innite-horizon Framework --- p.34 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.36 / References --- p.37

Wong, Yat Fung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 41-43). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 3 --- Basic Model --- p.10 / Chapter 4 --- Perfect Equilibrium with Delay --- p.15 / Chapter 5 --- Perfect Equilibrium with Immediate Agreement --- p.21 / Chapter 6 --- Efficiency Loss Caused by Optimism --- p.26 / Chapter 7 --- Discussions --- p.31 / Chapter 8 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.33 / Chapter 9 --- Appendix --- p.34

Ko, Chiu Yu. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 3 --- Model --- p.10 / Chapter 4 --- Finite Stage Model --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1. --- "Stage with deadline: G(n, z)" --- p.15 / Chapter 4.2 --- "Stage without deadline G(n,∞)" --- p.32 / Chapter 5 --- Infinite Stage Models --- p.40 / Chapter 5.1. --- "Stage with deadline G(∞,z)" --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2 --- "Stage without deadline G(∞,∞）" --- p.40 / Chapter 6 --- Non-convex Example --- p.49 / Chapter 6.1 --- Risk loving players --- p.49 / Chapter 6.2 --- Indomitable players --- p.52 / Chapter 7 --- Application --- p.64 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.67 / Chapter 9 --- Appendix --- p.70 / Chapter 9.1 --- Alternative assumption of recognition of the first proposer --- p.70 / Chapter 9.2 --- "Proof of equilibrium for finitely repeated Rubinstein, bargaining problem" --- p.72 / Chapter 9.3 --- Proof for general risk loving bargainers --- p.76 / Chapter 9.4 --- Definition of security equilibrium --- p.77

Thesis. 1979. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Alfred P. Sloan School of Management. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY / Vita. / Bibliography: leaves 238-242. / Ph.D.

Chen, Fengjiao. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 34-35). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Wage Bargaining and Strike --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Outside Option --- p.7 / Chapter 3 --- The Model Setting --- p.9 / Chapter 4 --- Equilibrium Analysis --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1 --- Equilibrium when b < We --- p.12 / Chapter 4.2 --- Equilibrium when b = We --- p.13 / Chapter 4.3 --- Equilibrium when b > We --- p.15 / Chapter 4.4 --- Opting Out is an Equilibrium --- p.26 / Chapter 4.5 --- Implications on Preemption and Renegotiation --- p.27 / Chapter 5 --- Discussion --- p.28 / Chapter 5.1 --- Without Outside Option (HHFG Model) --- p.28 / Chapter 5.2 --- Committed to Strike (Shaked 1994) --- p.29 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Influence of discount factor 5 --- p.30 / Chapter 5.4 --- Equilibrium Refinement by Good Faith Bargaining Rule --- p.31 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.32

Chan, Kin Cheong. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 42-44). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstracts --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 --- lntra-Marriage Bargaining --- p.4 / Chapter 2.2 --- Evolutionary Analysis of Bargaining Models --- p.6 / Chapter 3 --- The Model --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Equilibrium --- p.9 / Chapter 4 --- Equlibrium Selection --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1 --- Convergence --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2 --- Mistake and Experimentation --- p.19 / Chapter 4.3 --- Nash Bargaining Solution --- p.26 / Chapter 5 --- Heterogeneous Popoluations --- p.30 / Chapter 6 --- Discussion --- p.33 / Appendix --- p.35 / Reference --- p.42

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At individual level, we adopted the well-known ultimatum game experiment with asymmetric information. By allowing individuals to view historical market information, we study how individuals utilize the market transaction information to help them make decisions under the asymmetric information condition. We testified the History-Consistent Rationality Model, and illustrated that the model is sufficient to yield accurate point predictions that are on average within 5% absolute deviation of the total pie size for every subject behavior in 20 rounds. / At market level, we studied how people evaluate the value of information, and what kind of information revelation mechanism would collectively maximize market efficiency. We examined the prevailing market mechanism and found that there are unavoidable deadweight losses, so we proposed a new model that could eliminate deadweight losses under many market conditions, and designed and conducted experiments to testify our claims. / In this dissertation, we relaxed the perfect information assumption in the marketplace, and studied the reality with asymmetric information from a market scope, and then drill down to decision making model at individual level. / Stiglitz (2009) reviewed the cause of the recent financial tsunami, and claimed that Adam Smith's invisible hand is invisible because it is not actually there: market equilibrium is not constrained Pareto efficient whenever there are information imperfection or asymmetric information, which is always the case in reality. People have conflicts of interests and incentives to provide distorted information, which could be difficult to verify by the other parties, so even if individuals are acting in a perfectly rational way, the outcome is not systemically rational. He concluded that "we need to do a better job of managing our economy, but this will require better research that is less framed by the flawed models of the past, less driven by simplistic ideas, and more attuned to the realities of today." / Lau, Ka William. / Adviser: Ching Chyi Lee. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-04, Section: A, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-127). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

Chan, Chi Chuen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 85). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter I --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter II --- Bargaining with Matching --- p.8 / Chapter III --- Horizontal Merger --- p.14 / Chapter IV --- Analysis --- p.22 / Chapter IV.1 --- Existence of Profitable Merger --- p.22 / Chapter IV.2 --- Endogenously Determined Merger Size --- p.36 / Chapter IV.3 --- Industry Optimal Merger Size --- p.45 / Chapter V --- Extensions --- p.49 / Chapter V.1 --- Two-step Sequential Merger --- p.49 / Chapter V.2 --- Multiple Mergers of Common Size --- p.53 / Chapter V.2.1 --- Analysis --- p.54 / Chapter V.2.2 --- Endogenously Determined Merger Size --- p.60 / Chapter V.2.3 --- Industry Optimal Merger Size --- p.63 / Chapter VI --- Discussion --- p.65 / Chapter A --- Appendix --- p.69 / Chapter A.l --- Figures --- p.69 / Chapter A.2 --- Mathematical Proof in Detail --- p.79

In consumption goods markets, we observe both bargaining and searching. However, in this literature, very little work has been done to incorporate both features into one model. This study addresses this problem. In my first chapter, I add a bargaining parameter to a traditional sequential search model and solve for the new equilibrium in this set-up. Then, I do some comparative statics, changing the distribution of the bargaining parameter to see what happens to the equilibrium. Finally, I use the model to explain two seemingly contradicting empirical works in the literature of discrimination in the auto market. Ayres and Siegelman (1995), using data they collected from a controlled experiment, found that the initial offers for the minorities are higher. Yet Goldberg (1996), using consumer expenditure survey data (CES), reported that there is no significant difference between the final prices for minorities and non-minorities. My model reconciles these two results and shows that if minorities have a more dispersed bargaining parameter distribution and if the final transaction prices are the same at the mean level, then the initial offer distribution for the minorities first-order stochastically dominates that for the non-minorities. In my second chapter, I investigate how the bargaining process affects firms’ offer distribution and thus the final price distribution. Based on Varian (1980), I add a bargaining parameter into the model, and solve for the new equilibrium in this set up. Then, I do some comparative statics, changing the distribution of the bargaining parameter to see what would happen to the equilibrium. This model yields the same results as the first chapter. In the third chapter, I applied my theoretical model to the automobile market, and empirically test the model. I used CES data, and my findings support the theoretical model. The minority dummies are not significant in determining the mean level of consumers’ bargaining ability distribution, but are significantly positive in determining the variance of the distribution. / text