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Repeated bargaining.

Ko, Chiu Yu. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 3 --- Model --- p.10 / Chapter 4 --- Finite Stage Model --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1. --- "Stage with deadline: G(n, z)" --- p.15 / Chapter 4.2 --- "Stage without deadline G(n,∞)" --- p.32 / Chapter 5 --- Infinite Stage Models --- p.40 / Chapter 5.1. --- "Stage with deadline G(∞,z)" --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2 --- "Stage without deadline G(∞,∞)" --- p.40 / Chapter 6 --- Non-convex Example --- p.49 / Chapter 6.1 --- Risk loving players --- p.49 / Chapter 6.2 --- Indomitable players --- p.52 / Chapter 7 --- Application --- p.64 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.67 / Chapter 9 --- Appendix --- p.70 / Chapter 9.1 --- Alternative assumption of recognition of the first proposer --- p.70 / Chapter 9.2 --- "Proof of equilibrium for finitely repeated Rubinstein, bargaining problem" --- p.72 / Chapter 9.3 --- Proof for general risk loving bargainers --- p.76 / Chapter 9.4 --- Definition of security equilibrium --- p.77

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_325997
Date January 2007
ContributorsKo, Chiu Yu., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
Source SetsThe Chinese University of Hong Kong
LanguageEnglish, Chinese
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeText, bibliography
Formatprint, v, 83 leaves : ill. ; 30 cm.
RightsUse of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

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