This thesis examines the relation between the conception of an act as the original ground of all knowledge and the conception of the I as self-limiting in the philosophies of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Benjamin Höijer. By relating the philosophical project of these two thinkers to Kant’s definition of enlightenment it argues that, while both Fichte and Höijer seek to find a satisfactory refutation of scepticism, their motive for doing this is chiefly a practical rather than a theoretical one: their ambition is to show how knowledge is only possible through human freedom and independence. Thus, the scep-tical doubt about whether true knowledge of the external world is possible is transformed into a ques-tion about how the fundamentally free and infinite I can stand in a relation to a “not-I” posited beyond itself. Both Fichte and Höijer try to answer this question by arguing that such a limit of the I’s subjec-tivity must be a product of an original free act, and that it is therefore only thinkable in relation to the infinite nature of the concept of action. The main difference between their respective philosophies lies in their characterisations of this original, limit-imposing act: for Fichte, it is synonymous with the I, while for Höijer, it must necessarily precede any agent.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:sh-37342 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Bjarkö, Fredrik |
| Publisher | Södertörns högskola, Idéhistoria |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | Swedish |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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