This essay examines the role of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. For Fichte, the ultimate ground of philosophy is the infinite self-positing activity of the I. However, this self-positing activity must have as its product a determined I, and therefore it must establish a limit to the I’s original infinity. Further, such a limit is only thinkable as a relation to that which lies beyond it: the negation of the I, or the not-I. By this characterization of the nature of the I, Fichte establishes it as a paradoxical concept that is at once infinite and finite. To solve this paradox, he introduces the concept of a “check” (Anstoβ) that puts a halt to the outward-striving activity of the I. In experiencing this check, the I is not limited by something outside of itself, which would negate its position as the ultimate ground of its own being, but rather is given the task of positing its own limit. In Grundlage des Naturrechts, Fichte develops this idea through another concept: that of a “summons” (Aufforderung) given to the I by another subject. Since the I is characterized by containing the ground of its own being, the intersubjective relation to the other is conditioned by the I limiting itself, so that the self-grounding character of the other can be recognized. In experiencing the summons of the other, though, the I does not only posit a limit for itself, but also becomes conscious of its own nature as a free, self-positing subject. Intersubjectivity, therefore, must be considered a fundamental element of the I as such. In Fichte’s own words: “No I, no Thou; no Thou, no I.”

This thesis examines the relation between the conception of an act as the original ground of all knowledge and the conception of the I as self-limiting in the philosophies of Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Benjamin Höijer. By relating the philosophical project of these two thinkers to Kant’s definition of enlightenment it argues that, while both Fichte and Höijer seek to find a satisfactory refutation of scepticism, their motive for doing this is chiefly a practical rather than a theoretical one: their ambition is to show how knowledge is only possible through human freedom and independence. Thus, the scep-tical doubt about whether true knowledge of the external world is possible is transformed into a ques-tion about how the fundamentally free and infinite I can stand in a relation to a “not-I” posited beyond itself. Both Fichte and Höijer try to answer this question by arguing that such a limit of the I’s subjec-tivity must be a product of an original free act, and that it is therefore only thinkable in relation to the infinite nature of the concept of action. The main difference between their respective philosophies lies in their characterisations of this original, limit-imposing act: for Fichte, it is synonymous with the I, while for Höijer, it must necessarily precede any agent.

Uppsatsens centrala tes är att tanken på den eviga återkomsten i Nietzsches prosadikt Så talade Zarathustra kan förstås som ett tragiskt ögonblick. För att kunna avhandla denna tes ställs den avgörande frågan: Vad avses med 'tragiskt ögonblick'? Jag söker syftesbestämma detta begrepp inom ramarna för den tyska idealismens tanketradition, där Schelling och Schopenhauer tjänar som exempel. Denna specifika förståelse av det tragiskas begrepp är att särskilja från genrebestämningar av tragedin. / The central thesis of this paper is that the thought of the eternal return in Nietzsche's work Thus spoke Zarathustra can be interpreted as a tragic moment. For proving this thesis, it is necessary to clearly understand how the concept of the metaphysically revelatory tragic moment within the tradition of German idealism differs from a genre-definition of tragedy. I use Schelling's and Schopenhauer's philosophies of art as examples of cases in German idealism where the tragic moment has been considered metaphysically revelatory. Thereupon I adjudicate whether the thought of the eternal return can qualify as such a moment.