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Thesis--Cologne. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (190-193).

Thesis--Cologne. / Vita. Bibliography: 190-193.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation is a reading of Schelling's influential <italic>Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom</italic> (1809), focusing on the meaning of "grounding" and the principle of sufficient reason (called the "principle of ground" in German philosophy). One of the contributions of my dissertation is to show how Schelling's treatise frames the traditional debate about "freedom vs. determinism" in terms of system. The connection with system provides a context for the claim of determinism and shows what is at stake in denying it. I argue that the principle of ground underlies the difficulties in integrating freedom within a system. Schelling is able to resolve these difficulties by distinguishing a deterministic from a non-deterministic sense of ground. Schelling uses the non-deterministic sense of ground (ground as condition of the possibility) to connect the parts of the system without jeopardizing freedom. At the same time, Schelling reserves the deterministic sense of ground for the ultimate act of freedom, by which individual human beings determine themselves. Beyond this core argument, the dissertation contributes to Schelling scholarship by interpreting the <italic>Freedom Essay</italic> in continuity with the texts leading up to and following its publication, most of which have not yet been translated. I show how these texts help to clarify some of the most difficult passages in the <italic>Freedom Essay</italic>. In particular, I draw on Schelling's correspondence to correct a widespread misreading of the fundamental distinction between that-which-exists and the ground of existence. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This thesis argues that Hegel’s views on subjectivity are deeply rooted in, and defined by, both language and time. Specifically, we claim that Hegel’s account of subjectivity is decisively characterized by fundamentally ontological conceptualizations of both language and time. What we conclude is that Hegel’s philosophy and its conceptualization of subjectivity is a robust attempt to reconcile the changing, finite, temporal modes of being with the classical philosophical expectation that philosophy arrive at truth, which is non-finite and ahistorical. By defining time as becoming and language as the medium for the rational expression and comprehension of being that is meaningful for us, we claim that Hegel’s approach to the being of subjectivity is developed through a thematic relation of language and time. Overall this thesis aims to make an original contribution to Hegel studies and his views on subjectivity, time, and language by arguing that comprehending subjectivity means grasping how it becomes. This thesis begins, then, with the idea that both being and time are becoming, and that this is at once a finite and non-finite notion. From there, we emphasize that what Nature becomes is us, human subjectivity, and that we apprehend this being that is meaningful for us as time and through language. In history, subjectivity becomes as the written embodiment of a particular people, and, in philosophy, subjectivity becomes linguistically according to an ahistorical, non-finite notion of becoming as the subject’s own self-determination; neither excludes the other because there is only the continual becoming of our making sense of the rational whole.

My aim in this dissertation is to explain Hegel’s motivation for, and the doctrine of, the identity of the identity and difference of thought and being and argue that while thought and being differ, their nature is identical. This identity is used to explain Hegel’s claim that what is real is rational and what is rational is real. The aim of this dissertation is squarely placed within ontology, and my interest is in the structure of being as opposed to metaphysical contents. Within this structure, I argue, Hegel shows us the irreversible method of that which comes to be and ceases to be. This method (or nature) is a rational process of being itself, which, while its contents are forever changing, they do so from the same invariant identity of thought and being. As a matter of method, there is an increasing difficulty in assessing the merit of Hegel’s account of thought and being – obscuring what merit my interpretation may offer. The difficulty is a growing trend in combining Hegel’s work with specific Kantian ambitions where Hegel is forced into cognitive restrictions he does not have. As indebted as Hegel is to Kant, I argue that Hegel’s value lies in his break with Kant’s critical program. This break affords a new understanding of category theory apart from our subjective acts of understanding. With this new understanding, we can grasp the identity of thought and being through what I take to be a more promising account of cognition than what much of contemporary Hegel scholarship has offered by interpreting Hegel’s work as a completion of Kant’s. I sequence the chapters of this dissertation to trace Hegel’s increasing philosophic distance from Kant on those issues that interfere with understanding Hegel’s identity of thought and being. However, to demonstrate this distance and still progress to Hegel’s position apart from Kant, I limit my discussion of Kant to Hegel’s interpretation of Kant’s work and motivation. This limitation comes with the weakness that Kantian responses to Hegel exist but are not presented. However, this dissertation does not aim at defending Hegel’s interpretation of Kant but explains what Hegel has made of Kant’s texts to further Hegel’s arguments. Lastly, for what philosophic utility may be gained from this dissertation, Hegel offers the freedom for critical investigation regarding ontological and metaphysical matters without the presupposition of metaphysical commitments. This topic is treated at length in the last chapter of this dissertation. What is presented in this dissertation is a method by which no more is assumed than the inability to deny that thought exists, as such a denial presupposes thought, and then to trace the implications of the existence of thought according to what its occurrence signifies. Employing this method allows us to be metaphysically neutral and approach being as philosophically accessible. / Philosophy

This thesis aims to consider the contemporary relevance of the philosophical and religious project of Søren Kierkegaard by offering a systematic reading of his work against the backdrop of 19th century German idealism. Along with an emphasis on a systematic interpretation of a thinker usually considered to be wholly anti-systematic in aim and orientation, I also aim to show that through developing an ontological interpretation of the work of Kierkegaard the grounds are also created to develop a social and political interpretation of his work. Ultimately, I use the ontological and political reading of Kierkegaard developed in this work to not only show the relevance of this project to contemporary materialist philosophy, but equally to show how this version of Kierkegaard is capable of offering some crucial correctives to contemporary materialism.

Habilitationsschrift--Heidelberg.

Habilitationsschrift--Heidelberg.

Thesis (doctoral)--Uppsala universitet. / Summaries in German and English. Includes bibliographical references (p. 283-293) and index.