John Rawls's The Law of Peoples has been criticized for focusing on the interests of peoples rather than individuals and for compromising individuals' fundamental human rights in order to tolerate nonliberal ideas of justice. This dissertation develops a new political liberal approach to international justice theory that responds to these concerns. This approach gives explicit moral primacy to the individual while also upholding the political liberal commitment to toleration. I do this by developing a political conception of the person specifically for international justice theory and a global original position of persons for working out principles of international justice. This involves the specification of an idea of freedom that is not parochially liberal and the development of a new political liberal human rights framework. This dissertation does not offer a defense of political liberalism as the right account of justice; the aim of this work is to consider whether a political liberal theory of international justice is able to give the individual moral primacy and to explore how it might do so.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/24773 |
| Date | 13 August 2010 |
| Creators | Jenkins, Margaret |
| Contributors | Bertoldi, Nancy |
| Source Sets | University of Toronto |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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