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審計委員會專家對債務條款之影響 / Audit Committee Expertise and Loan Terms

過去研究均指出審計委員會成員若具有財務或會計專才可以提升審計委員會執行效率與效果,降低公司異常交易與內空缺失的風險,進而提升財務報表品質,並降低外部財務報表使用者與公司內部之資訊不對稱情況。本研究探討在公開發行債券過程中,若發行公司審計委員會具有財務或會計專長,債務條款是否會改變。研究結果發現,債券投資人於選擇投資債券時,確實會考量到債券發行公司審計委員會成員之會計專長,然而,沒有證據顯示財務專長在其考量範圍內,因會計專長可提高財務報表可信度,降低資訊不對稱問題,減少債券投資人所面臨的投資風險,因此,若債券發行公司之審計委員會成員具備會計專才,債券市場將給予較低的債券利率以及較優惠的條件。 / The extant literature reveals that audit committee (AC) members with financial or accounting expertise can enhance the effectiveness of AC in monitoring the financial reporting quality. In this study, I focus on the effects of financial and accounting experts on the effectiveness of AC from bondholders’ point of view, respectively. First, I find no evidence that the presence of financial experts on AC, either alone or jointly with accounting experts, are significantly related to loan terms. Second, I find that bondholders charge lower interest rate, offer longer maturity, and are less likely to require convertible bonds issuance or require collateral to firms whose AC have at least one accounting expert or only accounting experts. Third, I further find that the association between AC experts and loan terms is driven more by accounting experts than by financial experts. Given the prior results of a negative relationship between accounting experts and loan terms, firms could enhance their financial reporting quality by appropriately structuring AC with accounting experts, thereby rewarding better loan terms.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0102353024
Creators呂璨宇, Lu, Tsan Yu
Publisher國立政治大學
Source SetsNational Chengchi University Libraries
Language英文
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
RightsCopyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders

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