本研究主要探討強制採用國際會計準則(International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS)對銀行聯貸組成結構(ownership structure)與債務契約條款(debt covenants)的影響。研究發現結果如下：第一、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，主辦銀行的持有比例將增加。第二、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，外資銀行參與聯貸案的家數將下降。第三、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，債務契約條款中將降低採用以會計數字為基礎的債務契約條款(無論以損益數字為基礎、或以資產負債表數字為基礎)。本研究之發現符合Schipper [2003]之論點：當債務人採用以原則式準則之會計報表作為借貸契約之基礎，將降低債權人與債務人以此報表訂契約的誘因。主要是因為原則式準則提供有限的會計處理程序與解釋指引，將導致會計數字在專業判斷下，報表數字可能增加主觀或偏誤，進而降低債務契約訂定的功能。最後，本研究發現前述採用國際會計準則的負面影響，在普通法國家(法律執行強度高的國家)比成文法的國家(法律執行強度弱的國家)有減緩的趨勢。 / In this dissertation, I examine how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects ownership structure and debt covenants in the syndicated loan market. I hypothesize and document that the proportion of the loan retained by syndicate lead arrangers increases after a borrower adopts mandatory IFRS reporting. Further, I document that foreign lenders are relatively less likely to be involved in syndicated loan deals after the adopting of mandatory IFRS reporting. Finally, I find that syndicate lenders are less likely to use financial covenants in debt agreements after the mandatory IFRS adopting, regardless of income statement-based or balance sheet-based covenants. Overall, these results are in line with the argument by Schipper [2003]. Specifically, the adoption of a principles-based accounting system (e.g., IFRS), characterized by limited interpretation and implementation guidance, increases the difference in professional judgment among debt contracting parties, which in turn reduces lenders’ and borrowers’ demand for accounting information in signing debt contracts. Finally, the negative effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption on the syndicated loan market is weaker in common-law countries (in countries with stricter enforcement regime) than in code-law countries (in countries with weaker enforcement regime).

過去研究均指出審計委員會成員若具有財務或會計專才可以提升審計委員會執行效率與效果，降低公司異常交易與內空缺失的風險，進而提升財務報表品質，並降低外部財務報表使用者與公司內部之資訊不對稱情況。本研究探討在公開發行債券過程中，若發行公司審計委員會具有財務或會計專長，債務條款是否會改變。研究結果發現，債券投資人於選擇投資債券時，確實會考量到債券發行公司審計委員會成員之會計專長，然而，沒有證據顯示財務專長在其考量範圍內，因會計專長可提高財務報表可信度，降低資訊不對稱問題，減少債券投資人所面臨的投資風險，因此，若債券發行公司之審計委員會成員具備會計專才，債券市場將給予較低的債券利率以及較優惠的條件。 / The extant literature reveals that audit committee (AC) members with financial or accounting expertise can enhance the effectiveness of AC in monitoring the financial reporting quality. In this study, I focus on the effects of financial and accounting experts on the effectiveness of AC from bondholders’ point of view, respectively. First, I find no evidence that the presence of financial experts on AC, either alone or jointly with accounting experts, are significantly related to loan terms. Second, I find that bondholders charge lower interest rate, offer longer maturity, and are less likely to require convertible bonds issuance or require collateral to firms whose AC have at least one accounting expert or only accounting experts. Third, I further find that the association between AC experts and loan terms is driven more by accounting experts than by financial experts. Given the prior results of a negative relationship between accounting experts and loan terms, firms could enhance their financial reporting quality by appropriately structuring AC with accounting experts, thereby rewarding better loan terms.