公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊？過去已經有許多文獻指出，銀行核定企業的聯合貸款對投資人來說是一項特殊資訊，因為當銀行借錢給公司之前，通常有實地查核的動作，一旦銀行核定該項貸款，則代表銀行認可借款公司的財務狀況，所以會對股市投資人產生認證效果，市場會將該訊息視為一項對公司股價有正面影響的訊息。但是晚近文獻出現不同的看法，有學者發現獲得銀行貸款的公司，除了長期經營績效並未表現較好之外，其短期宣告效果也有樣本選擇偏誤的問題。 本文嘗試利用較完整的公司獲得聯貸資金的樣本、以及較高頻率的股價資料，重新檢視公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊。在實證部份，採用較完整的公司獲得聯貸資金的樣本，此資料來自美國證券管理委員會EDGAR資料庫。本論文以該資料庫做為搜集聯貸宣告的樣本，可以避免樣本選擇偏誤的問題。實證結果發現聯貸宣告時，並沒有產生顯著正向的股價報酬，本論文也發現美國公司近年來有逐漸將聯貸訊息轉移到盤後再宣告的趨勢，因此本論文再將聯貸案宣告的資料，分成交易時間和非交易時間加以分析，而實證結果顯示，不論於交易時間或非交易時間出現的聯貸宣告，其公司股價均沒有顯著的異常報酬，而且很多公司甚至有負報酬的現象。最後，本論文進一步使用高頻率的日內資料來分析，公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊。而實證結果發現，雖然在銀行核定公司聯貸的前後，該公司股價的日內報酬率為正值，但是在統計上並不顯著。因此基於以上的實證結果，本論文的結論為：銀行核定企業聯合貸款並不具有認證效果，因此並不是一項特殊的資訊。

本研究主要探討強制採用國際會計準則(International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS)對銀行聯貸組成結構(ownership structure)與債務契約條款(debt covenants)的影響。研究發現結果如下：第一、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，主辦銀行的持有比例將增加。第二、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，外資銀行參與聯貸案的家數將下降。第三、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，債務契約條款中將降低採用以會計數字為基礎的債務契約條款(無論以損益數字為基礎、或以資產負債表數字為基礎)。本研究之發現符合Schipper [2003]之論點：當債務人採用以原則式準則之會計報表作為借貸契約之基礎，將降低債權人與債務人以此報表訂契約的誘因。主要是因為原則式準則提供有限的會計處理程序與解釋指引，將導致會計數字在專業判斷下，報表數字可能增加主觀或偏誤，進而降低債務契約訂定的功能。最後，本研究發現前述採用國際會計準則的負面影響，在普通法國家(法律執行強度高的國家)比成文法的國家(法律執行強度弱的國家)有減緩的趨勢。 / In this dissertation, I examine how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects ownership structure and debt covenants in the syndicated loan market. I hypothesize and document that the proportion of the loan retained by syndicate lead arrangers increases after a borrower adopts mandatory IFRS reporting. Further, I document that foreign lenders are relatively less likely to be involved in syndicated loan deals after the adopting of mandatory IFRS reporting. Finally, I find that syndicate lenders are less likely to use financial covenants in debt agreements after the mandatory IFRS adopting, regardless of income statement-based or balance sheet-based covenants. Overall, these results are in line with the argument by Schipper [2003]. Specifically, the adoption of a principles-based accounting system (e.g., IFRS), characterized by limited interpretation and implementation guidance, increases the difference in professional judgment among debt contracting parties, which in turn reduces lenders’ and borrowers’ demand for accounting information in signing debt contracts. Finally, the negative effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption on the syndicated loan market is weaker in common-law countries (in countries with stricter enforcement regime) than in code-law countries (in countries with weaker enforcement regime).

公司發生訴訟將影響其價值與財務狀況，亦影響未來償債能力。本研究係探討公司的事前訴訟風險(ex-ante litigation risk)是否影響銀行對其之貸款條件，進而探討宗教信仰是否降低銀行對於訴訟風險的敏感度。本研究發現，當公司面臨較高的事前訴訟風險時，銀行將要求較高的貸款利率，同時主貸銀行持有較高貸款比例且參與貸款的銀行數量較少。此外，由於宗教信仰能抑止管理階層的不道德行為及提昇財報品質，故本研究以公司總部所在地之信仰宗教人數比例作為衡量宗教的代理變數。實證結果發現，公司若位於宗教程度較高的地區，能降低事前訴訟風險對於銀行貸款條件的影響，進而獲得較低的貸款利率、較大的貸款金額，並增加參與貸款的銀行數量。 / Lawsuits may deteriorate defendant firms’ financial position and lower their firms’ value. Moreover, it reduces the recovery rate in the event of default. This study examines whether banks price their borrowers’ ex-ante litigation risk in syndicated loan market and further investigates whether the relation between ex-ante litigation risk is conditioned on religiosity. The results suggest that banks tend to price in firms with higher ex-ante litigation risk by charging higher spread, and form more concentrated syndicate. In addition, strong religious social norm is seen as a mechanism to constrain managerial opportunism and improve financial reporting quality. Using the proportion of adherents where firms’ headquarters locate as a proxy for religious adherence, I find that the association between ex-ante litigation risk and syndicated loan features is alleviated. Firms with higher ex-ante litigation risk are associated with lower loan spreads, larger loan amounts and greater number of total lenders if borrowers are headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms.