本研究以1999至2008年間國內上市公司為研究對象，觀察會計資訊品質對其募資決策之關聯性，並進一步探討會計資訊品質對於選擇舉債之企業的債務契約內容是否造成影響。 本研究參考Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008)，將會計資訊品質分為三個方面，以盈餘管理的程度、損失認列的及時性與價值攸關性作為衡量會計資訊品質之指標，進而個別分析其與企業之募資決策與債務契約內容之關聯性。 實證結果指出，盈餘管理的程度愈高、損失認列的及時性愈低或價值攸關性愈低之企業，愈有可能選擇舉債以募資；即會計資訊品質愈差之企業，愈有可能選擇舉債以募資。除此之外，盈餘管理的程度愈高或損失認列的及時性愈低之企業，其於債務契約內之借款利率水準愈高；即會計資訊品質愈差之企業，其所須負擔之借款利率愈高。再者，盈餘管理的程度愈高、損失認列的及時性愈低或價值攸關性愈低之企業，愈可能提供擔保品；即會計資訊品質愈差之企業，其於借款時愈可能被要求提供擔保品。

本文從債務契約的角度，調查穩健會計對財務報表使用者的經濟效益，以及編製者提供穩健會計的經濟誘因。穩健會計的最主要受益者為債權人，選擇債務契約係基於，首先，本研究利用當期公司穩健特性預期次期該公司契約是否違約，研究結果發現穩健會計得以使債權人及時偵知債務人倒帳風險，其次，本研究調查編製者的經濟誘因，實證結果未能發現，其中經濟誘因的變數包括銀行貸款利率、異常應計與盈餘反應係數，本文建議未來研究可繼續探求財報提供者報導穩健之誘因，並進行跨國分析比較。 / Perceived from the perspective of debt contract, this paper investigates the benefit of accounting conservatism for users of financial statements and the motivation of financial preparers to provide conservative reporting. I choose this topic because main beneficiaries of accounting conservatism are the lenders. First, I use the measure of conservatism in current period to predict the default risk of borrowers in next period. The evidences show that conservatism benefits lenders through the timely signaling of default risk. Second, I try to discover the motivation of borrowers to provide conservatism accounting through the proxies of cost of capital, abnormal accruals and earning response coefficient but fail. One potential avenue for future research is to find the economic motivation of financial reporting preparers to report conservative accountings and do the cross-country comparisons.

本研究主要探討強制採用國際會計準則(International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS)對銀行聯貸組成結構(ownership structure)與債務契約條款(debt covenants)的影響。研究發現結果如下：第一、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，主辦銀行的持有比例將增加。第二、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，外資銀行參與聯貸案的家數將下降。第三、當借款公司強制採用國際會計準則報導後，債務契約條款中將降低採用以會計數字為基礎的債務契約條款(無論以損益數字為基礎、或以資產負債表數字為基礎)。本研究之發現符合Schipper [2003]之論點：當債務人採用以原則式準則之會計報表作為借貸契約之基礎，將降低債權人與債務人以此報表訂契約的誘因。主要是因為原則式準則提供有限的會計處理程序與解釋指引，將導致會計數字在專業判斷下，報表數字可能增加主觀或偏誤，進而降低債務契約訂定的功能。最後，本研究發現前述採用國際會計準則的負面影響，在普通法國家(法律執行強度高的國家)比成文法的國家(法律執行強度弱的國家)有減緩的趨勢。 / In this dissertation, I examine how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) affects ownership structure and debt covenants in the syndicated loan market. I hypothesize and document that the proportion of the loan retained by syndicate lead arrangers increases after a borrower adopts mandatory IFRS reporting. Further, I document that foreign lenders are relatively less likely to be involved in syndicated loan deals after the adopting of mandatory IFRS reporting. Finally, I find that syndicate lenders are less likely to use financial covenants in debt agreements after the mandatory IFRS adopting, regardless of income statement-based or balance sheet-based covenants. Overall, these results are in line with the argument by Schipper [2003]. Specifically, the adoption of a principles-based accounting system (e.g., IFRS), characterized by limited interpretation and implementation guidance, increases the difference in professional judgment among debt contracting parties, which in turn reduces lenders’ and borrowers’ demand for accounting information in signing debt contracts. Finally, the negative effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption on the syndicated loan market is weaker in common-law countries (in countries with stricter enforcement regime) than in code-law countries (in countries with weaker enforcement regime).

公司發生訴訟將影響其價值與財務狀況，亦影響未來償債能力。本研究係探討公司的事前訴訟風險(ex-ante litigation risk)是否影響銀行對其之貸款條件，進而探討宗教信仰是否降低銀行對於訴訟風險的敏感度。本研究發現，當公司面臨較高的事前訴訟風險時，銀行將要求較高的貸款利率，同時主貸銀行持有較高貸款比例且參與貸款的銀行數量較少。此外，由於宗教信仰能抑止管理階層的不道德行為及提昇財報品質，故本研究以公司總部所在地之信仰宗教人數比例作為衡量宗教的代理變數。實證結果發現，公司若位於宗教程度較高的地區，能降低事前訴訟風險對於銀行貸款條件的影響，進而獲得較低的貸款利率、較大的貸款金額，並增加參與貸款的銀行數量。 / Lawsuits may deteriorate defendant firms’ financial position and lower their firms’ value. Moreover, it reduces the recovery rate in the event of default. This study examines whether banks price their borrowers’ ex-ante litigation risk in syndicated loan market and further investigates whether the relation between ex-ante litigation risk is conditioned on religiosity. The results suggest that banks tend to price in firms with higher ex-ante litigation risk by charging higher spread, and form more concentrated syndicate. In addition, strong religious social norm is seen as a mechanism to constrain managerial opportunism and improve financial reporting quality. Using the proportion of adherents where firms’ headquarters locate as a proxy for religious adherence, I find that the association between ex-ante litigation risk and syndicated loan features is alleviated. Firms with higher ex-ante litigation risk are associated with lower loan spreads, larger loan amounts and greater number of total lenders if borrowers are headquartered in areas with strong religious social norms.