Šiuo metu, kai rinkos atsigauna po daugybę neigiamų pasekmių sukėlusios finansų krizės bei ilgai trukusios recesijos, atsigavimo procesą be jokios abejonės spartina didelių investicinių ir kitų projektų, kuriems reikalingos sindikuotos paskolos, įgyvendinimas, taigi sindikuotos paskolos yra svarbus veiksnys skatinantis ekonomikos raidą tiek pasauliniu tiek teritoriniu mastu. Po finansų krizę įtakojusio ir rinkas sudrebinusio vieno iš didžiausių JAV bankų „Lehman Brothers“ bankroto susvyravo pasitikėjimas bankais, o kartu ir pačių bankų pasitikėjimas vienas kitu. Bankai tapo daug atsargesni tarpusavio santykiuose skolindami lėšas vienas kitam, sudarydami kitus sandorius ir bendradarbiaudami. Atsižvelgiant į tai, kad sindikuotų paskolų atveju kreditoriumi yra sindikatas, kurio nariai dažniausiai yra atskiri bankai, skolinantys pagal tą pačią kreditavimo sutartį, sindikuotų paskolų teikimas tapo sudėtingesnis, nes visų pirma baiminamasi situacijos kai kuris nors iš bankų tampa nemokus. Taigi sudarant ir įgyvendinant sindikuotų paskolų sandorius be jau egzistavusių probleminių aspektų pastaruoju metu atsirado ir naujų, kurie taip pat reikalauja detalaus tyrimo. Didžiąją dalį sindikuotų paskolų teikia tarptautiniai bankų sindikatai formuojami iš skirtingų valstybių bankų, atsižvelgiant į tai ir siekiant sumažinti tokių sandorių sudarymo laiko ir lėšų kaštus yra rengiamos pavyzdinės sindikuotų bankų paskolų sutartys. Tokias sutartis rengia Paskolų Rinkos Asociacija (angl. Loan... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Syndicated loan is a financial contract, which is very common in international market and is used to finance large loans in amounts of several hundred millions and a significant proportion run into billions. The essence of syndication is that two or more banks agree to make loans to a borrower on common terms governed by a single agreement between all parties. In Lithuania syndicated loan agreements are not very common and there are no special laws regarding this kind of contracts. Considering this situation syndicated loan contracts are regulated by the common rules established in Lithuanian Civil Code, lawyers preparing the syndicated loan agreements also use the recommendations provided by The Loan Market Association. The Association has recommended forms of syndicated facility agreements and there are user guides from the point of view of both lenders and borrowers. The purpose of this paper is to analyze substantial peculiarities of syndicated loan agreements, main problems that parties to the contract are facing while in the stages of organizing the syndicate and later making this syndicated loan mechanism work. Main problems discussed in this paper are bank manager liability and status attracting creditors to the syndicate and framing it with the syndicated loan agreement. This paper also discusses clawback clause, pro rata sharing and other most common theoretical and practical problems concluding the syndicated loan agreement and bringing it to life.

The market for syndicated loans has grown in the last two decades and is now a major source of funding for corporate organizations. As an important source of capital, an understanding of how this market operates is worth acquiring. Central to syndicated loans are the unique relationships that exist between the borrower, the lead arranger and the participant lenders. An analysis of these relationships and how these relationships affect loan syndications is also critical. The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of information asymmetries and the resulting agency problems on loan syndications in terms of volumes and, structure. This paper also explores the role of reputations of the in mitigating the agency problems associated with loan syndications.

I explore the role of participants’ relationships with borrowers and lead arrangers in syndicated lending. I predict and find that these relationships mitigate the information asymmetry problems faced by participants with both borrowers and lead arrangers, and allow participants to take a larger share in the loan. In particular, participants with a borrower relationship take, on average, a 10% larger share of the loan, with the effect being more pronounced when the borrower is informationally opaque or less conservative in its accounting. Similarly, participants with a lead arranger relationship take, on average, a 9% larger share of the loan, with the effect being more pronounced: (i) when the borrower has engaged in accounting irregularities or covenant violations in the past, (ii) when the lead arranger is a repeat lender or a large lender, and (iii) when participants have limited information acquisition capacity. Furthermore, loans with a larger total share taken by participants with a borrower or lead arranger relationship are associated with a smaller lead arranger share, less concentrated loan syndicate structure, a lower loan spread, and a lower upfront fee, consistent with these relationships mitigating information asymmetry. Overall, my study sheds light on how participant-level relationship lending shapes debt contracting.

This thesis examines the impact of announcements of syndicated loans on the share prices of borrowing firms. I use a sample of 5,465 loan observations reported in the International Financing Review Platinum database to study this impact. Event study methodology is used. My overall results show significantly positive wealth effects on the borrowing firms. However, when I partition my data set into revolving credit agreements, term loans and hybrid loans, I find that the results are driven primarily by revolving credit agreements. I also observe that the size of the event window plays an important role in identifying the wealth effects for the borrowers. A five-day event window (-2, +2) shows share price response to revolving credit announcements to be significantly positive. A three-day event window (-1, +1) reveals that announcements are statistically positive for revolving credit agreements and statistically negative for term loan announcements. My results are consistent with previous studies in this area. I also distinguish between financial press announcements and information provider (IFR) announcements to cater for the potential for reporting bias. I find that both the IFR and financial press announcements are significant for the five-day window, but only the financial press results are significant for the three-day window. My study is unique in that I differentiate the impact of different sources of information on the market reaction to borrower share price. In addition to the examination of the wealth effect, I also use the structure of the loans to examine the uniqueness of bank loans and their ability to provide financial slack. Specifically, I examine whether revolving credit loans or term loans or hybrid loans make bank loans unique and their ability to provide financial slack. I observe that out of the three structures of bank loan, only revolving credit loans allow the borrower to more precisely match the funds acquired with the firm’s investment needs and to market time by borrowing at times when financing costs are attractive. Revolving credit loans are positively valued by the market both initially and over the longer term. Bank loans reduce information asymmetry, but the renegotiation characteristics of revolving credit loans allow borrowers to exploit changes in the interest rate environment, thus providing support for the market timing theory of capital structure. In contrast to puzzling results of previous studies, I present evidence of long-term positive performance following bank loans.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2007. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Business Information, Technology and Law. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 255-280).

A loan deal is often composed of several components (for example, a 3-year revolving loan, a 10-year secured senior term loan, and a 5-year subordinated term loan). The division of a deal into two or more components, each with different risk characteristics, is called tranching. This study recognizes the importance of tranching and establishes tranching as an integral component of a syndicated loan structure. In the first essay, we present a model to explain the economic value of tranching and show that riskier firms are more likely to take loans with multiple tranches. Therefore, the average credit spread on syndicated loans with multiple tranches is higher than that on nontranched loans. However, after accounting for the risk characteristics of a tranched loan, we show that a given tranche of a multi-tranche loan, on average, has a lower credit spread than an otherwise similar loan that is not part of a multi-tranche loan. We also show that the benefits of tranching accrue primarily to borrowers with speculative debt ratings. Prior studies have found an abnormal stock return of 100 to 150 basis points for firms that announce they have borrowed funds from a bank. Despite some conflicting evidence (Peterson and Rajan, 2002; Thomas and Wang, 2004; Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel, 2006), the literature tends to interpret this positive bank loan announcement effect as the markets response to the mitigation of information asymmetry regarding the borrowing firm caused by the certification role of the lending banks who act as quasi-insiders. In the second essay, we document that a strong selection bias exists in prior studies. We show that less than a quarter of the loans made by banks are ever announced by borrowing firms and the loans that are announced are systematically different from loans that are never announced by the firms. Firms with low debt ratings, firms with zero or negative profits but positive interest expense, firms that take large loans in relation to their assets base, firms with little analyst following, and firms with high forecasted EPS growth are more likely to announce their loans. We show that while there was a positive announcement effect over the period 1987 to 1995, loan announcements elicited zero or negative returns in the last ten years as the mix of companies announcing loans changed over time.

No description available.

by Chow Ho Wai. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-51). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF EXHIBITS --- p.v / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi / PREFACE --- p.vii / CHAPTERS / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Definition of Syndicated Loans --- p.1 / Definition of Pricing --- p.2 / Project Objectives --- p.2 / Project Scope --- p.3 / Chapter II. --- KEY ELEMENTS OF SYNDICATED LOAN MARKET --- p.4 / Benefits to Borrowers --- p.4 / Benefits to Lenders --- p.6 / Types of Syndicated Facilities --- p.11 / Titles and Roles --- p.12 / Principal Terms and Conditions --- p.14 / Hong Kong Market Characteristics --- p.16 / Chapter III. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.22 / Literature Review --- p.22 / Model --- p.24 / Sample Data --- p.27 / Analytical Methods --- p.29 / Chapter IV. --- EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS --- p.32 / Significant Independent Variables --- p.32 / Loan Pricing Model --- p.34 / Chapter V. --- CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.35 / APPENDICES --- p.39 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.50

Evidence shows that nonbanks, which are now significant participants in the corporate loan market, exploit information gained from lending to trade in public securities. In the first essay, I examine whether these institutions use loan-based information to facilitate merger and acquisition (M&A) deals. I find that firms are more likely to become targets if they borrow from nonbanks rather than banks. Borrowing from a larger number of nonbanks or from those with a sizeable client network also enhances a firm’s acquisition prospects. When nonbanks gain more information about borrowers through loan amendments or multiple loans, the impact of nonbank lending grows stronger. I also identify three channels that might allow nonbanks to exploit loan-based information in the M&A market. In the second essay, I focus on the difference in covenant structure between nonbank loans and bank loans. Previous studies show that loans to riskier borrowers are more likely to have stronger financial covenants in order to mitigate agency problems and conflicts of interest between debt and equity holders. Interestingly, I find that nonbanks loans have fewer, less restrictive financial covenants than commercial banks, all else equal. Although the prior literature shows that banks play an active role in corporate governance following covenant violations, I find that nonbanks are less likely to intervene in borrowers’ decision making in similar circumstances. Nonbank borrowers are significantly more likely than bank clients to experience severe financial distress.

調焦焦點理論將人的特質區分成促進型目標定向( Promotion focus)與防禦型目標定向( Prevention focus)。促進型目標定向經理人的動機在於推動正面結果的產生，因此對於公司的成長與業績較為敏感；防禦型目標定向的經理人則是為了防止發生負面結果而兢兢業業，對於公司的經營偏好維持現狀。本篇研究假設促進型目標定向的經理人因為較為關注正面結果的出現與否，因而使得公司能夠有較佳的經營結果。故本篇研究假設借款公司的經理人若偏向促進型目標定向，可從銀行得到較低的聯貸利差，借款金額較高以及較長的借款期間，需要提供擔保品的機率則較低。樣本來自於S&P1500，並排除金融業及保險業；經理人的調節焦點則是藉由分析經理人所寫的致股東信所衡量。研究結果顯示擁有促進型目標定向經理人的借款公司，與聯貸利差呈現負相關，顯示這類型的公司可以得到較優惠的利率。至於非利率條件，包含借款金額、借款期間以及提供擔保品的機率，本研究並未發現擁有促進型目標定向經理人的借款公司與較優惠的非利率條件之間具有關聯性。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and syndicated features. Regulatory focus theory divides people into promotion and prevention focus. Promotion-focused people are demonstrated to pay more attention to accomplishments and growth, while prevention-focused people are more concerned about safety and security. Based on the assumption that CEOs who are more inclined to be promotion-focused are more concerned about the presence and absence of positive outcomes, the operating results would be better compared to that of the prevention-focused CEOs’. Therefore, I hypothesize that borrowing firms with CEOs who are more inclined to be promotion-focused would have lower syndicate spread, larger loan amount, longer maturity and lower possibility of providing security. The sample consists of S&P 1500 non-financial firms, and CEO regulatory focus is captured by conducting content analysis of the letters that CEOs write to shareholders. The results suggest that borrowers with CEOs that are more inclined to be promotion-focused are associated with lower loan spreads, after controlling for several firm-specific and loan-specific controls. However, I do not find evidence that CEO regulatory focus is related to non-pricing loan contract terms, including loan amount, loan maturity and the possibility of providing security.