調焦焦點理論將人的特質區分成促進型目標定向( Promotion focus)與防禦型目標定向( Prevention focus)。促進型目標定向經理人的動機在於推動正面結果的產生，因此對於公司的成長與業績較為敏感；防禦型目標定向的經理人則是為了防止發生負面結果而兢兢業業，對於公司的經營偏好維持現狀。本篇研究假設促進型目標定向的經理人因為較為關注正面結果的出現與否，因而使得公司能夠有較佳的經營結果。故本篇研究假設借款公司的經理人若偏向促進型目標定向，可從銀行得到較低的聯貸利差，借款金額較高以及較長的借款期間，需要提供擔保品的機率則較低。樣本來自於S&P1500，並排除金融業及保險業；經理人的調節焦點則是藉由分析經理人所寫的致股東信所衡量。研究結果顯示擁有促進型目標定向經理人的借款公司，與聯貸利差呈現負相關，顯示這類型的公司可以得到較優惠的利率。至於非利率條件，包含借款金額、借款期間以及提供擔保品的機率，本研究並未發現擁有促進型目標定向經理人的借款公司與較優惠的非利率條件之間具有關聯性。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and syndicated features. Regulatory focus theory divides people into promotion and prevention focus. Promotion-focused people are demonstrated to pay more attention to accomplishments and growth, while prevention-focused people are more concerned about safety and security. Based on the assumption that CEOs who are more inclined to be promotion-focused are more concerned about the presence and absence of positive outcomes, the operating results would be better compared to that of the prevention-focused CEOs’. Therefore, I hypothesize that borrowing firms with CEOs who are more inclined to be promotion-focused would have lower syndicate spread, larger loan amount, longer maturity and lower possibility of providing security. The sample consists of S&P 1500 non-financial firms, and CEO regulatory focus is captured by conducting content analysis of the letters that CEOs write to shareholders. The results suggest that borrowers with CEOs that are more inclined to be promotion-focused are associated with lower loan spreads, after controlling for several firm-specific and loan-specific controls. However, I do not find evidence that CEO regulatory focus is related to non-pricing loan contract terms, including loan amount, loan maturity and the possibility of providing security.