本文以Walsh (1995)績效契約為基礎，設計出兩種類型的工資調整指數，分別適用於勞工以及央行官員，並討論不同類型的工資調整指數，對於經濟社會是否有不同的影響。
經由本文的分析可得到:於經濟制度中引入勞工工資調整指數，將改變原始通貨膨脹與產出水準之間的兌換關係，減少央行官員實施高通貨膨脹政策的誘因，並達到降低通貨膨脹傾向效果;相反地，引入央行官員工資調整指數，央行官員將有誘因實施越高的通貨膨脹權衡政策，反而促使經濟社會處於更高的通貨膨脹傾向。
此外參考Candel-Sa ́nchez and Campoy-Min ̃arro (2004)之設計，考慮政府應如何設計與央行官員之間的最適績效契約，以達成極大化政府預期效用之目標。
經由本文分析得到的結論為:績效契約懲罰比例的制定，應與社會最適產出與充分就業產出之差異呈現正相關;與社會對於通貨膨脹與產出水準的相對偏好程度呈現正相關;與勞工工資調整指數呈現負相關;與央行官員工資調整指數則呈現正相關。 / Based on the Walsh (1995) model, we develop a model featured with two distinct types of wage indexation which apply to labors and central bankers respectively, and then use it to examine how these two types of wage indexation effect the macroeconomic performance of the economy.
Our analysis finds that the inflation bias of discretionary policy is reduced by introducing the labors’ wage indexation in the sense that it weakens the temptation of central bankers to create surprise inflation by changing the short-run trade-off between inflation and output. Conversely, the central bankers’ wage indexation would give the incentives for central bankers to perform inflationary policy and make inflation bias deteriorated.
In addition, in line with Candel-Sa ́nchez and Campoy-Min ̃arro (2004), we analyze how the government establishes the optimal performance contract with central bankers. Our results show that the optimal punishment weight in performance contract should be designed positively related to the gap between optimal output and full-employment output, the relative weight on inflation stabilization versus output stabilization and the
central bankers’ wage indexation. On the contrary, the optimal punishment weight should be designed negatively with the labors’ wage indexation.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0104258017 |
| Creators | 詹凱宇, Jhan, Kai-Yu |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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